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Part One: 
Hypotheses, Theoretical Background, and Methodology
8
1.1    Introduction
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and interdependence -the main focus area of this  research-  has 
serious importance for both of the cooperating partners: the EU and the countries in its southern 
neighborhood can both benefit from this partnership on many different levels. The European Union 
-as a part of its deepening integration process- has to build up its own independent foreign policy, 
and for this purpose its close neighborhood is obviously the best area to start with. To create a 
region  of  peace  and  prosperity  in  its  surrounding  regions  is  highly  important  both  for  socio-
economic and security reasons.1 For the Mediterranean partner countries this partnership is also 
essential as it offers them an opportunity to get external help for the development of their economies 
and  to  gain  broader  access  to  European  markets.  The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  was 
established  in  1995  at  the  Barcelona  Conference  as  the  main  institutional  base  for  the  current 
cooperation between the EU and its partners in the MENA2 region. In the framework of this research 
both the historical premises and the current institutional context of the partnership will be examined 
including the Union for the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
After  the  introduction  of  the  institutional  framework  of  this  cooperation,  Euro-Mediterranean 
security and economic interdependencies will be evaluated to discover the “hidden realities” lying 
behind  these  institutional  cooperation  forms.  Several  sectors  of  security  and  economic 
interdependence will be closely studied to gain a deep insight of these ties, which will make us able 
to give a fair  evaluation of the institutional framework outlined before.  This  evaluation will  be 
focused on the ENP, because of  its unique and effective structure and its potential to become the 
EU's main tool of foreign policy making in its neighborhood.3 
Finally,  the  Arab  uprisings  of  2010/11  will  provide  a  perfect  “test  ground”  for  the  concrete 
implementation  of  our  knowledge on  Euro-Mediterranean cooperation  and interdependence  and 
show us how these ties work in the contemporary inter-regional political arena.  The ENP plays a 
central role in the EU's reactions to the uprisings, therefore -here again- it will be the key element 
being studied to understand the EU's capabilities and intentions.
1    Based on: Marseille Declaration, 2008: http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/dec-final-
Marseille-UfM.pdf 
2 "MENA" in this work will be used to describe the EU's southern neighbours including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, and Syira but excluding Turkey, Iraq, Iran and 
the Gulf states
3 The most detailed source on the ENP: http://www.enpi-info.eu/ 
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1.1.1.   General statement of the problem area
This  dissertation  will  draw  up  a  multilevel analysis of  Euro-Mediterranean  cooperation  and 
interdependence. It will examine several layers of this partnership: first it will shortly summarize the 
theoretical and methodological background used during this research, then the research itself will 
take place exploring both the security (political/societal) and economic aspects of this partnership in 
detail.
This project will have a serious duality of approaches from its very beginning: In the first part  
contemporary neorealist IR theory will be applied as background for a security-focused analysis of 
the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, and later as a complementary point of view different theories 
of  International  Political  Economics  (IPE)  will  be  utilized  to  describe  the  economic 
interdependencies between the two halves of the region. This duality will follow through almost the 
entire project: theories, methodologies and the research itself will have two independent “legs”, 
with the aim that in the end these two approaches will complement each other in a synergistic way,  
merging into third kind of approach with a significantly enhanced explanatory power.4
To provide a historical perspective, first the evolving institutional background will be explored from 
the first institutions of cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea to the two main 
contemporary systems, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). Since the mainly multilateral UfM has several problems in its development now-days 
and did not fulfill the role it aimed to, more attention will be dedicated to the bilateral mechanisms 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which seems to have a much more powerful effect in the 
MENA region but where appropriate, examination of the UfM will be drawn in as well.
After  the  introduction of  the  theoretical,  methodological  and institutional  background,  the core 
element of the dissertation will take place, focusing on the current state of the partnership and the 
Mediterranean  Region.  Here  will  be  examined  both  the  security  and  economic  aspects  of  the 
partnership  in  detail.  As  mentioned  above,  for  the  security-focused  examination  mainly  Barry 
Buzan's neostructuralist theory will be used as a background and for the economic examination 
different IPE theories will be utilized. For the research on the security aspects of the partnership 
focus will be on examining original EU documents and expert studies on the partner countries, 
while the economic research will mainly involve the processing of statistical data instead.
4 On the importance of interdisciplinarity see: Allen F. Repko (2008): Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory, SAGE
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While  examining  the  complex  political  background  of  Euro-Med  relations,  the  effects  of  the 
2010/11 Arab revolutions in the region must be addressed as well. The main assumption here will be 
that  while  the  EU is  largely interdependent  on  security  terms  with  the  MENA, it  has  also  an 
economic leverage over the region, therefore it could use its economic weight5 to reach stabilization 
and  “defend” itself from a possible security deterioration. Using the EU's economic capabilities to 
reach stabilization in the MENA can be an especially appealing strategy if we recognize that the 
main  divers  of  the  Arab  uprisings  were  coming  from the  region's  economic  decline.  Here  the 
assumption will be that the EU could positively contribute to Arab economies even without raising 
the amount of direct aid or development loans offered for them. The long term solution could come 
from a deeper Euro-Mediterranean economic integration instead, offering market access, circular 
mobility and trade opportunities for both sides. To prove these assumptions, security and economic 
interdependencies of the two sides will be examined showing that these interdependencies are deep, 
therefore  the  development  of  institutional  cooperation amongst  these players  needs  to  be  taken 
seriously on the high policy making level.
From the side of EU policy making,  the focus will  mainly be on the analysis  of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and on its Action Plans, showing how the EU deals with these economic and 
political relations and discovering a possible ENP reform agenda based on the findings. As a case 
study, the examination of some individual countries (Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco) will take 
place to show how the partnership works in practice in these rapidly changing countries of the 
region. 
The final part of the dissertation will try to develop scenarios on the basis of the research findings, 
and measure the probabilities of different outcomes depending on the future behaviors of the actors. 
This conclusive part  will  answer the two research questions set  out bellow, and summarize the 
effects of the discovered political and economic developments. At this point the two theoretical-
methodological approaches used in this research will merge into one interdisciplinary approach to 
show how two different fields of social science can complement each other to give a clearer picture 
of one complex case.
5 Although this economic weight seems to be shrinking because of the current euro-crisis, the economic leverage of 
the EU over the MENA is still very significant. 
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1.1.2. Research purpose and significance of study
The real significance of this work comes from its timing: the 2010/11 Arab revolutions can serve as 
a  perfect  political  background to give a  first  test  to  the  EU's  baby-aged foreign  policy and its  
institutions. The main research purpose therefore will be to give a fair evaluation to the EU's new 
common foreign policy system's (especially the ENP's) first steps in the European neighborhood, 
and see if the EU can live up to its political and economic weight at least in the geographical areas 
next to its immediate borders, and if its able to use this weight for the benefit of both sides of the 
Euro-Mediterranean region. 
Examining the European Neighbourhood Policy from its foundation in 2004 until now-days we can 
easily identify two general principles it’s driven by: security and (democratic) reform. This duality 
of goals  are  sometimes competing,  sometimes complementing each other.  The developments  of 
now-days give a perfect example of the first: the EU was seriously hesitating to give any specific 
answer  to  the  Arab  revolutions  in  the  beginning  and  also  did  not  make  any political  steps  to 
encourage protesters due to it’s own security reasons. This diplomatic inactivity shows that the short 
term security principle outranked the long term reform principle on the EU’s foreign policy agenda 
this time. Since the EU had quite smooth relations with the authoritarian regimes of the region, the 
theoretically supported democratization movements toppling these EU-friendly dictators were not 
honestly welcomed in reality at first. The EU has fears that the new democratic governments in the 
south will be less cooperative in handling the migration problem for example, or even become Iran-
shaped theocratic states. On the other hand, following the Turkish-style democratization process 
they  can  develop  to  be  more  western-friendly too.  Whatever  will  be  the  final  outcome of  the 
process, the EU has an opportunity now to throw in its economic and political weight to shape the 
region's future, even if it has only limited capabilities to do so. 
Catherine Ashton herself described the „J theory of 
democratization”6 not long ago in an open lecture:7 
if  we have the vertical  axis  as „stability”,and the 
horizontal axis as „openness” we can describe the 
move from authoritarian  control  towards  an open 
democracy with a J shaped graph. This means that 
6 Ian Bremmer, 2006; The J curve: a new way to understand why nations rise and fall
7 See: http://www.arthmultimedia.com/documents/uni_corvinus/corv_catherine_ashton.mp4 
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from the security aspect the moment of transition from one to the other is the most sensitive. When a 
state has authoritarian leadership stability is high but this comes at the price of low openness. When 
a country opens up, authoritarian stability starts to decrease until a certain point when the regime 
collapses. After the transition, a new and more open democratic system emerges which develops a 
new type of stability reaching the opposite end of the J curve.
If Lady Ashton herself recognized and described this rule, we could assume that the EU’s foreign 
policy owners are conscious of the fact that right now, in the process of transition can the Union 
gain the most influence in the region, and this should implicate strong and confident actions. The 
revolting states are at the bottom of the J right now, and might need assistance to climb upwards. 
What tools can the EU use to help climbing? Military intervention was only a limited option (and 
also  not  needed  any  more,  since  the  regimes  already  collapsed  from the  inner  pressure),  but 
economic help and technical assistance is much needed.
Until  recently the  above described relative  ineffectiveness  of  the  ENP embodied  a  comfortable 
compromise:  the  bilateral  Action  Plans8 (the  core  units  of  ENP  which  set  the  agenda  and 
conditioning of cooperation with the EU for the partner states) prescribe democratization and socio-
economic reform as conditions for financial help in exchange, but these conditions were never taken 
seriously by the authoritarian regimes and have never been truly enforced by the EU. The EU did 
not put too much pressure on the regimes and in exchange these countries were partners in handling 
migration and counteracting Islamist movements. This pragmatic attitude showed that in the conflict 
of the short term security interests versus the democratic values -until now at least- the first was the 
dominant. Now, that security is gone the only way forward for the EU is to act along the democratic 
values, and as the J theory shows us this can lead to security on the long term solving the EU’s 
classic  dilemma  about  its southern  neighbors.  The  process  of  redrawing  the  EU’s  southern 
neighborhood policy  has  already  begun  and  we  can  identify  two  core  elements  of  its  needed 
reforms:
The first of these elements is of course money: the increase of financial assistance given to these  
countries looks already quite sure. The amount and form of giving is far less predictable:  French 
and Spanish ministers have called for serious increase of direct  financial  support  to the region, 
redirecting  money  from the  Eastern  Partnership.  The  possible  increased  role  of  the  European 
Investment Bank has also arisen, but most probably the real outcome will be the mixture of these 
8 All of these Action Plans can be downloaded from the ENP info site: http://www.enpi-info.eu/ 
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possibilities. The southern partnership will gain more weight financially in the ENP and also the 
EIB will  activate  more  development  credits  with  friendly conditions.  The question  will  be  the 
amount: will this financial „mixture” be enough to help these states through the bottom of the „J”, or 
will  the  ENP fail  to  gain  substantial  influence like  it’s  predecessor,  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership did? Will  an inwards looking and economically challenged EU be able  to  act?  The 
answers to these questions will be derived from the evaluation of the EU's official answer to the 
Arab Spring titled “Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth” (SPRING)9, which has 
already allocated a 350 million  Euro extra  aid package to  support  Egypt,  Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia (Libya is not included yet), but -however ambitious this plan seems to be- the real effects of 
it will depend on the correct implementation.
However important money is, the main purpose of this study lies rather in the second element. Our 
assumption is that the EU can gain significant influence in the region not by the short-term financial 
aid it plans to provide, but by developing a long-term agenda for deeper economic integration. This 
makes us believe that the second -and far more important- element of the reforms should be the 
recognition of deep inter-regional interdependencies and the renovation of the ENP accordingly. As 
we will assume, the core reason for the Arab spring to break out was the overall economic decline of 
the  region,  which  led  to  the  demise  of  the  “social  contract”  that  existed  before  between  the 
authoritarian  regimes  and  their  suppressed  people.  As  demographic  expansion  together  with 
economic stagnation lowered the well-being of people in the region, they lost trust in their elites and 
attempted to oust them. By succeeding in taking out the rulers -however- the economic problems did 
not get solved for the MENA. This is where the EU could come in and provide not only short term 
financial aid, but also a long-term perspective for economic development by deepening the Euro-
Mediterranean economic integration. This would provide European market access for the products 
of  the  region  and  FDI  transfer  for  MENA domestic  economies,  which  would  put  them  on  a  
sustainable development path and therefore stabilize them politically.
Summarizing the significance and purpose of this research we can identify the core element of it as 
an  attempt  to  clarify  the  inter-regional  security  and  economic  factors  of  contemporary  Euro-
Mediterranean relations, therefore to get closer to understand the dynamics of it. Once the picture 
becomes clear, it will be easier to identify appropriate tools at the EU's disposal with which it can 
help its southern neighbors to climb towards prosperity, securing the materialization of the Union's 
main foreign policy goal: a circle of peaceful and prospering neighbors at its borders.
9 Details of the program: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2011/af_aap-spe_2011_enpi-s.pdf 
14
1.1.3. Research questions and hypotheses
The current research on contemporary EU-MENA relations can be split into two separate question 
groups. One group can be formed around the rapidly changing security relations and the dynamics 
of interactions between the EU and its southern neighbors. This line of the research implies the deep 
examination of EU-MENA security interdependencies and the evaluation of the EU's policies in re-
spect of these. The first group of research questions therefore can be formulated as the following:
(1) How could we describe the sectors of Euro-Mediterranean security interdependencies?  How do 
the EU's foreign policy tools (mainly the ENP) reflect these interdependencies and could they be 
improved? Finally, what did the Arab revolutions change in the original status-quo in these sectors?
The second group of questions comes from the EU's proposed deeper involvement in the MENA's 
economic development. As the region's dominant economy, the EU could use its economic potential 
to stabilize its neighborhood and to build a mutually beneficial economic cooperation with its south-
ern partners. Therefore the second group of research question can be stated as following: 
(2) How could we describe Euro-Mediterranean economic interdependencies? How do the EU's ex-
ternal economic policies (aid, trade, FDI) reflect these interdependencies and could these policies be 
improved? Could a deeper Euro-Mediterranean economic integration be profitable for both of the 
cooperating partners?10 Finally, how did the Arab revolutions change the prospects of these econom-
ic relations?
The two hypotheses of the current work can be derived from the questions above:
H1: The Euro-Mediterranean area has several sectors of security interdependencies that are 
deep enough to transform the area into a single security complex.11 This interdependence was 
highlighted by the Arab Spring, which posed new challenges to EU policy makers. The level of  
interdependence is not reflected correctly by the current set of EU policies therefore they do 
not meet these challenges and their review is unavoidable.
10 By deper integration we propose a common Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area as did Andre Sapir and Georg 
Zachman (2012): A European Mediterranean Economic Area to Kick-Start Economc Development, in: Egmont 
Papers Nr. 54, Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations
11 A detailed description of security complexes will be lined out in the "Theoretical Background" chapter of this thesis.
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When proving H1, at first existing sectors of security interdependencies will have to be discovered, 
and identified as “independent variables”, and then different EU policies (ENP mainly) will have to 
be evaluated accordingly as “dependent variables”. Finally, the Arab uprisings as “intervening vari-
ables” have to be examined to see what they changed in the original system and how policy im-
provements should reflect these changes:
H2:  The Euro-Mediterranean area is economically interdependent but this is asymmetrical: 
the Arab states are much more dependent on the EU than the EU on them. This dependence  
gives the EU a potential economic leverage in the region especially as the Arab Spring was 
triggered by mainly economic reasons. Current EU policies do not coordinate this potential 
efficiently, therefore their revision is highly desirable and reaching a deeper Euro-Mediter-
ranean economic integration should be the main goal of this revision.
When proving H2, first  the economic dependency of MENA states on the EU will  have to be 
proved  and  identified  as  “independent  variable”,  then  different  European  external  economic 
policies will have to be evaluated accordingly as “dependent variables”. Finally, the Arab uprisings 
as “intervening variables” have to be examined to see what they changed in the original system and 
how policy improvements should reflect these changes:
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Both of H1 and H2 are based on a hidden assumption (H0), which is that the current economic crisis 
of Europe will be solved sooner or later and economic collapse and the disintegration of the EU is 
avoidable. Although a serious European economic meltdown is not entirely excludable, this scen-
ario will not be discussed in this work, and the existence and ongoing acting ability of the EU will 
be taken for granted.
1.1.4.    The framework of hypothesis testing
Before explaining what framework will be used to prove the two hypotheses, it is useful to narrow 
down the area of issues this thesis will cover. Exploration of related issues will cover:
− Theoretical issues: exploration of IR theories applied to Euro-Mediterranean relations in this 
            research.
− Methodological issues: exploration of IR methodologies applied to Euro-Mediterranean rela-
            tions in this research.
− Historical issues: short exploration of the historical evolution of inter-regional ties.
− Institutional issues: exploration of the current institutional background.
− Security issues: exploration of sectors of security interdependence.
− Economic issues: exploration of economic interdependence.
− Policy evaluation: Evaluation of the EU's Mediterranean policies (mainly the ENP).
As Euro-Mediterranean relations could serve as an infinite source of academic research, here we 
will have to narrow down the area we cover and exclude some closely related issues because of 
length limitations. Some related but excluded areas are: (1) Geopolitical issues: Chinese, Russian 
and Turkish influence on the region (2) The Arab-Israeli conflict (3) Issues of the “Greater Middle 
East” (Iraq, Iran and the Gulf states) (4) The Eastern Partnership (The eastern “arm” of the ENP) (5) 
Internal EU issues (Conflicting Member States and EU institutions) (6) Other external policies of 
the EU (Peace missions, EEAS, etc.). These are all relevant areas of research and their exclusion 
might seem to be an oversimplification of the subject, but as they cover widely different approaches 
their inclusion would make this work fragmented, which should be avoided.
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After the explanation of theoretical, methodological, historical and institutional issues the research 
on security, economic and policy issues will follow a modified version of Barry Buzan's sectoral ap-
proach which will be applied to Euro-Mediterranean relations. This framework will consist of four 
elements: (1) Examination of security interdependencies on Buzanian terms, (2) Examination of 
economic interdependencies, (3)Examination of the effects of the Arab Spring on these interdepend-
encies, and (4) Evaluation of EU policies related to these interdependencies.
The "algorithm" of exploration (1-4) will be used generally to the whole MENA region, with ex-
amples taken from all the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea but as this region consists of 
many diverse entities -here again- the focus area has to be narrowed down somewhat. To be able to 
see a more detailed picture (the "micro-physics" of the ENP), some individual countries must be se-
lected and explored deeper. After having explored the overall (macro-) picture of Euro-Mediter-
ranean relations on both security and economic fields, four individual countries will be selected as 
case studies to have a deeper insight into the micro-level of the developments. These countries will 
be: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The selection of these countries are based on the idea of 
representation: Egypt and Jordan represent two Mashreq countries while Morocco and Tunisia rep-
resent the Maghreb, Egypt and Morocco represent the bigger, Jordan and Tunisia the smaller ones, 
while in Jordan and Morocco there were only reforms during the Arab Spring the other two had re-
volutions and regime changes. All this diversity could lead to a relatively wide coverage of issues in 
the end without having to explore all the countries one-by-one. The exploration of the four case 
studies will go in parallel with the evaluation of the ENP designed for them and with the search for 
the economic reasons that are lying behind the revolutions. These together will add up to the prov-
ing of the assumption that the economic challenges in the MENA could be perfectly met by a deeper 
economic cooperation initiative from the EU's side.
The work on hypothesis testing will be largely build on Barry Buzan's Regional Security Complex 
Theory12 (RSCT), because of the theory's well-structured and elegant way of dealing with interde-
pendencies.  The original research framework of Buzan will be closely followed, but applied on 
only one geographical level and altered in the economic sector. This sector will get larger attention 
than the others, and the methodological approach used here will be also different than in the other 
four sectors.  The exploration of economic interdependencies will be embedded into the Buzanian 
sectors/levels system of security in the following way:13
12 See: Buzan, Barry - Ole Waever (2003):  Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge
13 The illustration is the author's own work (2012)
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Out of the Buzanian geographical levels, this thesis will use exclusively the inter-regional level as 
Euro-Mediterranean relations fall into this area. The five Buzanian sectors (Military, Political, Eco-
nomic, Societal and Environmental) will be explored according to Buzan's original issue areas (Act-
ors, Objects, Agenda, Threats and Dynamics), but the economic sector will be altered and explored 
through terms of economic interactions (Aid, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment). While the four 
“original” sectors are expected to show signs of interdependence, the economic sector is expected to 
show asymmetric relations and dependence. As the first step of hypothesis proving, this will prove 
the base statements of H1 and H2. The second step of hypothesis proving will be the evaluation of 
the EU's Mediterranean policies in each sector (“Agenda”), while the third step will examine the ef-
fects of the Arab Spring on each sector. This last sectoral issue (“Dynamics”) will describe the latest 
developments in the MENA including the effects of the revolts and propose the adaptation of EU 
policies to these developments. These two steps together will prove (or partially falsify) the main 
statements of H1 and H2.
Here we already have to mention that Buzan's theory (RSCT) was originally applied to Euro-Med 
relations by Astrid Boening,14 whose groundbreaking research on this field is developed further by 
the current work by extending it to the examination of the five sectors described above. Therefore 
we are building our work on an already existing theoretical idea but we are first in the practical 
application of the current research framework.
14 See: Asrid Boening: (2008) “Pronouncements of its Impending Demise were Exaggerated: The EuroMed Partnership 
Morphing into a Regional Security Super Complex”, University of Miami working papers
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1.1.5.    Literature review
Academic literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations is largely widespread, therefore here we will 
only be able to form a comprehensive review of literature related strictly to this current thesis, not to 
the entire circle of issues connected to Euro-Mediterranean relations. The three areas of literature 
closely related to this current thesis are the following:
− (A)  Literature  on  the  theoretical  background  of  the  thesis:  neorealism and  international 
political economy, especially the area of complex interdependencies
− (B) Literature on the history and the current institutional background of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations, focusing largely on the current issues of the Eurpean Neighbourhood Policy
− (C)  Literature  on  the  political  and  economic  effects  of  the  Arab  Spring  on  Euro-
Mediterranean relations
(A) Literature on the theoretical background of the thesis
The first "group" of literature builds up the theoretcal base of the thesis. Based on classical realism 
(Morgenthau, 1948), several new forms of realist thinking got widespread in the post-war decades of 
academic  IR.  Out  of  these,  the  most  influential  was Kenneth  Waltz's  structural  realism (Waltz, 
1979), which accounts for the complet renewal of the realist school by introducing the structure of  
state-capabilities as the main analytical area to the study of International Relations. Based on Waltz's 
work -again- several offsprings of neorealism got recognised in IR studies in the 1980s and 90s. Out 
of these, Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the "Coppenhagen School" namely Ole Weawer and 
Jaap de Wilde are the most influential contributors of contemporary neorealist theory. 
The work of Buzan and the Coppenhagen School manifested itself in several books of the authors in 
the  last  three  decades  out  of  which  three  are  especially  significant  for  the  Regional  Security 
Complex Theory which will serve as the main theoretical tool of this thesis: “The Logic of Anarchy: 
Neorealism  to  Structural  Realism”  (1993)  is  the  book  where  Buzan  sets  out  the  complete 
"renovation" of Waltzian neorealism updating the notion of the international structure to a more 
complex level giving it therefore much more explanatory power. This update means already some 
incorporation  of  liberal-theory  elements.  The  second  step  is  “Security:  A New  Framework  for 
Analysis” (1997) where the field of security and securization becomes the main focal point,  to 
culminate in the third step, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security” (2003) 
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where the author finally lays down the  Regional Security Complex Theory and applies it to several 
regions of the World basically covering the whole planet.
In “The Logic of Anarchy:  Neorealism to Structural  Realism”15 (1993)  Buzan sets  out  several 
updates to neorealism with the following main points:  1) The Waltzian static IR structure becomes 
dynamic, in which the actors and the structure continuously form each other creating a dynamic 
international environment, 2) To the structure/actors duality a third new level is added, interactions. 
With this move Buzan incorporates some liberal theoretical points. 3) The black box of the state is 
opened up and the Waltzian homogenous notion of power is deconstructed to its layers, making each 
state a special type of power holder. (e.g. the USSR as mainly military power while the EU as  
mainly economic power). These three reform developments in realism make already a strong base 
for further theoretical progress towards the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).
The next step, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”16 (1997) puts security in focus, and sets 
out the sectors/levels duality of analysis using the three levels set out in the previous work while 
with the concept of  sectors referring to different arenas where we speak of security. The list of 
sectors is  set  out  as the following: Military,  Political,  Societal,  Economic,  and Environmental17 
therefore this theory can be regarded as a widening to traditional materialist security studies by 
looking at  security  in  these  new sectors  as  well.  Securization  is  probably the  most  prominent 
concept of the book: it's  argued that security is a speech act with distinct consequences in the 
context over international politics. By talking about security, an actor tries to move a topic away 
from politics into an area of security concerns thereby legitimating extraordinary measures against 
the socially constructed threat. The process of securization is inter-subjective meaning that it  is 
neither a question of an objective threat or a subjective perception of a threat. Instead securization 
of a subject depends on an audience accepting the securization speech act. This means that Buzan 
integrated some socio-constructivist elements in the theoretical base of his new theory as well.
As a third step in “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”18 (2003) Buzan sets 
out  the concept  of  regional  security  complexes  and  shows  how  security  is  clustered  in 
geographically shaped regions. Security concerns do not travel well over distances and threats are 
15 Buzan, Barry (1993): The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. Columbia University Press, New 
York
16 Buzan, Barry - Ole Waever - Jaap de Wilde (1998): Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder,CO, London, 
England, Lynne Rienner
17  More detailed description of these sectors can be found in the "Theoretical Background" chapter
18 Buzan, Barry - Ole Waever (2003):  Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge
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therefore most likely to occur in regional level. The security of each actor in a region interacts with 
the security of the other actors. There is often intense security interdependence within a region, but 
not between regions, which is what defines a region and what makes regional security an interesting 
area of study. Buffer states sometimes isolate regions, such as Afghanistan's location between the 
Middle East and South Asia. Regions should be regarded as mini systems where all other IR theories 
can be  applied,  such as  polarity,  interdependence,  alliance systems,  etc.  This  book sets  out  the 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which will be used as one of the main theoretical bases 
for this dissertation.
Finally, Buzan's contemporary neorealism (RSTC) is connected and applied to Euro-Mediterranean 
relations by the works of Astrid  Boening whose publications serve as the starting point  of this 
current  work.  Starting  with  her  dissertation  “From the  Barcelona  Process  to  the  Union for  the 
Mediterranean: Sectors and Levels of Integration and Trust in the Mediterranean Region" (Boening, 
2009) where the  Buzanian sectors/levels approach is applied to the Euro-Mediterranean region for 
the first time, she worked through this path to the apllication of Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) to the region in her article “Pronouncements of its Impending Demise were Exaggerated: 
The EuroMed Partnership Morphing into a Regional Security Super Complex” (Boening, 2009) 
creating  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Regional  Security  Super  Complex19 (EMRSSC)  as  new 
terminology describing complex Euro-Mediterranean interdependencies. Proving the existence of 
an EMRSSC on Buzanian terms using the RSCT is the focal point of the first part of this thesis.
The second part of this work builds on International Political Economy (IPE) theories, therefore the 
literature of this area has to be introduced as well.  Shortly summarizing the history of IPE, we 
could start as far as the classical mercantilist versus free market debate of the 18 th century Western-
Europe.  Here  the  two  main  opposing  arguments  of  contemporary  IPE  has  already  occurred: 
mercantilists  argued  in  favor  of  strict  trade  measurements  against  competitors  for  example  in 
“Principles of Political Economy” published in 1767 by James Stuart while the opposing argument 
in favor of free markets can be tracked most famously in the works of Adam Smith for example: 
“An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations“ (Smith, 1776). The debate about 
the optimal policies of international economics continued through the 19th and early 20th century 
with David Ricardo's “On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation” (1817), where the 
author  sets  out  the important  notion of comparative advantages and with  Friedrich List's  “The 
National  System of  Political  Economy”  and  most  famously  with  Karl  Marx's  Capital  (1894), 
19 More on the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex can be found in the “Theorethical Background” 
chapter
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although  none  of  these  authors  can  be  considered  exclusively  IPE  theorists.  For  these  early 
economists IPE was considered only a marginal issue of general economics, therefore we can talk 
about  an  “independent  school  of  IPE” only after  WWII,  when the  current  North-South  global 
economic division started to gain surface in parallel with decolonization.
Post-War IPE has several subdivisions dealing with international trade, development, investment 
and  several  other  issues,  but  here  we  will  examine  only  three  aspects:  the  general  theory  of 
(economic) interdependence, the liberal (free trade) school and the isolationist dependence theory:
− The notion of interdependence was already recognized in IR by the previously presented 
realist  schools,  but  defined only as a  set  of  vulnerabilities of states  to  each others  actions.  As 
globalization took an even faster pace in the 1970s, new explanations became necessary. Nye and 
Keohane  (1977)20 argue  that  interdependence  consist  of  much  more  factors  than  simple 
vulnerability and there are several reciprocal (but not always symmetrical) areas of connections 
among states. In their later book (2002)21 they go further and state that multiple channels connect 
societies forming a system of complex interdependence amongst countries.
− Liberal theorists like Krugman (1987)22 argue that economic interdependence has its positive 
side as nations can specialize on selected products that they have the most resources for according 
to  their  comparative  advantages.  Free  trade  is  therefore  beneficial  for  all  the  trading partners, 
making the most out of the globally available resources. The theory looks at the internal factors of a 
country while assuming that, with assistance, "traditional" countries can be brought to development 
in the same manner more developed countries have been.
− Economic structuralist (or Marxist) theorists like Wallerstein (1974)23 argue that economic 
interdependence has its negative side as it  gives space for exploitation.  His dependency theory 
builds on the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a 
"core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention 
of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor 
states are integrated into the "world system" of interdependencies. 
20 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1977): Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Brown
21 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2002): Power and Interdependence in a Partially Globalized World 
22  Krugman, Paul R. (1987)."Is Free Trade Passe?", in: The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic 
Association) I/2 pp. 131–144. 
23 Immanuel Wallerstein, (1974): The Modern World-System,vol. I
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In the current thesis there will  be used a mixture of the two opposing theories (liberalism and 
dependence)  and applied  to  Euro-Mediterranean relations  to  discover  which  policies  would  be 
optimal  both  from the  EU's  and  the  MENA countries'  side  to  develop  a  mutually  beneficial 
cooperation. As dependence and interdependence can be examined both in economic and security-
related context, it is useful to emphasize here again that this dissertation utilizes two different set of 
theories to describe the current state of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The first part, with its core 
focus  on  the  Regional  Security  Complex  Theory  describes  mainly  security  interdependencies, 
whereas the second part focuses mainly on economics to apply a mixture of the above-stated IPE 
theories to Euro-Mediterranean relations. The novelty of this approach can be witnessed when these 
two fields are merged into an embedded approach, where IPE will be integrated into the economic 
sector of the Regional Security Complex Theory giving it a more comprehensive edge.
(B) Literature on the current institutional background of Euro-Mediterranean relations
On  the  historical  roots  of  Euro-Mediterranean  relations  we  can  find  many  detailed  and 
comprehensive works from several authors. As the historical background counts for only a marginal 
part of this thesis, the summarization of this field was possible using only a few reliable sources.  
The general historical context can be tracked excellently in the work of László Póti and Erzsébet N. 
Rózsa24 (1999),  where  historical  ties  between  the  two  regions  and  the  origins  of  the  current 
institutions of cooperation are set out in a comprehensive and clear way. Building on this work, one 
of the most comprehensive descriptions of the contemporary institutional structure can be found in a 
recent  article  of  Erzsébet  N.  Rózsa25 (2010)  where  the  complex  network  of  contemporary 
institutions of Euro-Mediterranean relations are synthesized and evaluated in a strict and precise 
way. An excellent evaluation of the historical progress of institutions tied together with a special 
study on the economic relations can be found in Tamas Szigetvari's dissertation26 (2003) and the 
more recent works of the author as well.
Evaluation and criticism of the contemporary institutional background forms a much larger part of 
the current thesis, therefore the literature-base of this field is significantly larger as well. Several  
European think-tanks turned to the analysis of the EU's forming “common foreign policy” recently 
24  N. Rózsa Erzsébet, Póti László (ed), (1999) Európa régi-új régiója : A Mediterráneum, SVKI, Budapest
25 N. Rózsa Erzsébet (2010): From Barcelona to the Union for the Mediterranean - Northern and Southern Shore 
Dimensions of the Partnership. HIIA Papers T-2010/9
26 Szigetvári Tamás (2003): Euro-mediterrán Partnerség: Az Európai Unió és a mediterrán országok 
kapcsolatrendszerének elemzése és értékelése. Ph.D. értekezés, Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi és 
Államigazgatási Egyetem, Budapest
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and the interest in the European Neighbourhood Policy attracted an increasing number of scholars in 
the last few years. Out of the several books and articles in the field, the most significant collection 
of essays was edited by Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff27 (2010) where the editors tried to 
collect the most relevant authors to develop a comprehensive evaluation of the ENP. The editors set 
out several questions regarding the ENP, one of which (and maybe the most significant) is why the 
ENP couldn't deliver the same kind of success for the EU as the enlargement did. The authors find  
different ways of giving answers: first they build a theoretical and methodological context for the 
academic  approach  towards  the  ENP,  then  they  evaluate  the  institutional  structure  and  the 
implementation. Some of the most relevant findings include:
− Ian Manner's “theorization” of the EU's normative power as a new kind of approach towards 
geopolitics with “attraction” and economic influence rather than hard (military) power.
− Ben Tonra's thoughts on the EU's identity building process both internally (as the developing 
identification of Europeans as EU citizens) and externally (inter-playing wit the ENP) as the 
identification of the people outside of the EU's borders as “neighbors”.
− Sven  Biscop's  evaluation  of  the  European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  and  how  the  ENP's 
operative Action Plans underline this strategy by focusing on primarily security issues.
− Carmen Gebhard's work on the theoretical assessment of the ENP's funding idea as some 
kind  of  “overstretching  enlargement”,  which  means  that  the  policy  patterns  of  the  EU-
enlargement live further in the form of the ENP only without the “golden carrot” of EU-
membership prospects.
− Sten Rynning and Christina Philkjaer Jensen's geopolitical approach towards the ENP and 
the  assessment  of  how  the  evolving  European  geostrategy  overlaps  with  Russian  and 
American interests in the EU's neighborhood.
− Frederica Bicchi's evaluation of the ENP's impact on three Maghreb countries (Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia) concluding with the notion that individual countries could react very 
differently to the same incentives therefore the ENP's Action Plans should somehow reflect 
these “localities” and be more differentiated.
− Carlos Echeverria Jesus'  notion that the ENP as a mainly bilateral  approach towards the 
Middle-East could develop to be an effective tool in the EU's hands, but cooperation with the 
dominant US in the region is essential.
27 Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff (2010): The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, 
Implementation and Impact, Palgrave Studies 
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An other  important  collection of essays  is  edited by Thierry Balzacq28 (2009) intends to  assess 
governance and security issues in the neighborhood of Europe and evaluate the answers given by the 
EU to these challenges by the implementation of the ENP. Some of the most relevant findings 
include:
− Julian Jeandesboz's work on how the internal “power games” of EU institutions could affect 
negatively the coherence of the ENP, and why these institutional power competitions can 
undermine the effective implementation of any kind of common European foreign policy.
− Amelia Hadfield's long and detailed assessment of how institutional development led the EU 
to  form  the  ENP and  what  are  the  main  differences  between  the  ENP and  the  Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and how they could complement each other. We can see 
also a critical comparison of the ENP to the enlargement process concluding that the same 
set of tools will not work in a completely different cultural environment, especially without 
the “carrot” of prospective EU-membership.
− Nicole Wichmann's evaluation of the ENP as the EU's tool for rule of law promotion in 
different issue areas. (Judiciary reform, dug trafficking and corruption.)
− Elena  Baracani's  criticism  of  the  ENP stating  that  the  EU  uses  political  conditionality 
unevenly with different countries in the neighbourhood therefore making the competition for 
EU financial assistance unfair.
− Shara  Wolff's  examination  of  the  ENP  as  “external  governance”  of  the  EU  deeply 
intervening into the domestic issues of neighbour countries by giving them strict and detailed 
Action Plans to execute.
Finally,  some  individual  articles  written  recently  on  the  ENP have  to  be  mentioned  as  well. 
Rosemary Hollis29 (2009) gives an evaluation to the ENP from the perspective of the Arab neighbor 
countries, concluding that from their point of view the “transition” from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership to the ENP as the EU's main policy tool to “deal” with the MENA region has a negative 
message.  Instead of focusing on the region's  needs,  with the ENP the EU started to  “form” its 
neighborhood according to its own needs, forcing the Arab states into an unequal system. Michael 
Emmerson and his colleagues30 (2011) argue that the EU has to become a global player otherwise 
the global impact of Europe will diminish. The Lisbon Treaty gave way to the development of the 
28 Thierry Balzacq (2009): The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, 
Security, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
29 In: Andrew Gamble and David Lane (2009): The European Union and World Politics , London, Palgrave Macmillan
30 Michael Emerson, Rosa Balfour, Tim Corthaut, Jan Wouters, Piotr Maciej Kaczynski & Thomas Renard, (2011): 
Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor –, Institutions law and the restructuring of European Diplomacy,  CEPS
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common foreign policy, but to gain a global impact the EU has still a long way to go. In addition to 
an effective ENP, Europe should centralize its foreign policy in other areas as well: a single EU 
diplomatic  mission  representing  all  member  states,  a  single  EU  representation  in  international 
organizations and the financial boost of the European External Action Service (EEAS) could be a 
good start to gain a real global presence.
(C) Literature on the political and economic effects of the Arab Spring
Finally, the literature on the Arab Spring with special attention to its effects on Euro-Mediterranean 
relations has to be assessed as well.  As the Arab Spring itself is a historically new phenomenon, 
academic literature on its effects is a young and new area too. Despite its relative new status, the  
Arab Spring has an amazingly intense attention from the academic community therefore we can talk 
about an already huge and diverse set of publications. Here we will not include all the connected 
literature,  only  the  works  related  closely  to  the  effects  of  these  events  to  Euro-Mediterranean 
relations:
− Catherine Ashton31 (2012) herself argued on several forums for the necessity of high-scale 
European help for the Arab transitions.
− Timo Behr32 (2012) argues that the EU has set out an ambitious new agenda to help the Arab 
transitions, but has done it in an euro-centric way. To avoid this it will have to comply with 
seven norms: (1)  Primum non nocere: The EU has to shirk excessive activism and ready-
made solutions,  by drawing on domestic  impulses and emphasising local  ownership.  (2) 
Broad-based  Engagement:  This  will  require  the  EU  to  engage  “illiberal  society”  in  its 
neighbourhood  that  does  not  share  all  of  its  core  values,  such  as  gender  equality.  (3) 
Articulating Interests: The EU should be forthright in setting out its own interests and how 
these concretely relate to the normative goals it puts forward in its strategy. (4) Democracy 
Partnerships:  When countries  reject  closer  integration,  the  EU should work closely with 
regional organizations to provide democracy aid and assistance. (5)Effective More-for-More: 
When  countries  accept  closer  integration,  the  EU  should  inverse  the  logic  of  its 
conditionality and become more demanding and outspoken. (6) Multilateral Partnership: The 
EU should explore proposals for a more limited, but broadly-based multilateral framework 
of  regional  engagement  and  scrap  the  Union  for  the  Mediterranean.  (7)  Multipolar 
Mediterranean:  The EU needs to  streamline  governance and development  issues  into  its 
31 Catherine Ashton: Supporting the Arab Awakening, The New York Times, 02.02.2012.
32 Timo Behr (2012): After the Revolution: The EU and the Arab Transition, Notre Europe papers Nr. 54
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strategic partnerships with new and old regional actors.
− Andre Sapir and Georg Zachman33 (2012) go further with the three Ms and argue in favour 
of a bold initiative by the EU to frame economic reform strategies, notably by setting the 
objective of constituting by 2030 a vast Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA), which 
would draw inspiration from the existing European Economic Area (EEA) that links the EU 
to  Norway,  Iceland  and  Liechstenstein.  They imagine  the   EMEA as  the  world  largest 
economic  area  unifying  around  700  million  people  with  controlled  south-north  circular 
migration which would solve several economic problems on both sides.
− Dr.  Hoda  Selim34 (2011)  argues  that  the  sucess  of  the  Arab  transitions  depends  on  the 
answers  to  the  short  term challenge  of  providing  a  secure  political  environment  in  the 
transiting countries by their new elites, and the long term economic challenge of providing 
prosperity for their citizens. This process could be supported with external (EU) assistance 
thrrough (1) Reducing regulatory and other  barriers  to  facilitate  private  sector  entry,  (2) 
Financing education/training programs for the youth, (3) Guaranting more market-access for 
the Mediterranean partners, (4) Strengthening of human rights and governance institutions, 
(5) Aiding for the development of the Mediterranean civil society.
− Rosa Balfour35 (2012) notes that the EU’s response to the Arab Spring has first of all been 
marked by recognition that basic paradigms of its prior policy have been overturned, namely 
that regime stability would deliver greater security for both the region and the EU, and that 
economic reform would lead to more political pluralism. In addition, while not so much the 
subject of explicit comment by the EU, the Arab Spring has exposed as a myth the idea of 
‘Arab exceptionalism’, based on culturalist interpretations of Islam being incompatible with 
democracy.  She  lists  the  changes  and continuities  of  EU policies  after  the  Arab  Spring 
concluding that the three Ms: Money, Markets and Mobility are the most importatnt factors 
of Euro-Mediterranean relations and it's unclear yet that how the EU plans to "give more" of 
any of these Ms.
− Erzsébet N. Rózsa36 (2012) argues that the social and economic trends of globalization did 
not  leave  the  Arab  countries  untouched  and  demographic  movements,  migration  and 
urbanization  play  a  key  role  in  forming  the  current  transitions  in  the  Arab  World. 
33 Andre Sapir and Georg Zachman (2012): A European Mediterranean Economic Area to Kick-Start Economc 
Development, in: Egmont Papers Nr. 54, Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations
34 Dr. Hoda Selim (2011): the expected consequences of the revolutions, in: Femise Report on the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques
35 Rosa Balfour  (2012): Changes and Continuities in EU-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring , in: Egmont 
Papers Nr. 54, Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations
36 N. Rózsa Erzsébet  (2012): Demography, Migration, Urbanization – the "Politics-Free Processes" of Globalization, 
in: Külügyi Szemle, 2012/1. Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
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Legitimation for the new governments could come from political and economic stabilization, 
where the creation of jobs for the young generation plays a crucial role.
− Tamás  Szigetvári37 (2012)  follows  the  development  of  Arab  economies  in  the  last  few 
decades, and shows how the demographic boom of the MENA and the dependence on oil 
exports led these countries to growing pressure for economic reforms in the 90s. As weak 
reform programs were unable to significantly change the trajectory of these countries, some 
made  even  more  radical  steps  towards  economic  liberalization  in  the  2000s.  As  a 
consequence, these countries made significant gains in GDP growth in the last decade, but 
the society benefited from this unevenly. The short period of economic blooming ended with 
the global economic depression in 2008 which can be partially blamed for the growing social 
tensions  in  the  region leading to  the  Arab Spring which  shows the "bankruptcy"  of  the 
political bargain between ruling elites (dictators) and the peole. Because of the diminshing 
incomes from tourism and the temporary decline of oil production the Arab Spring accounts 
for economic losses until now, but with an "inclusive growth" modell this effect could be 
gradually reversed on the long term. 
− Bruno Amoroso38  gives a detailed analysis  of Euro-Mediterranean economic issues, and 
although being written  far  before  the  Arab Spring,  his  work  already lines  out  the  most 
important  questions  of  today  about  the  region's  economic  future:  (1)  Economic  co-
development in the Mediterranean Basin is highly desirable and needs the active support of 
(at least) the southern EU-members. (2) The agro-protectionism of the EU has to come to an 
end, and a mutually beneficial agro-trade system must be developed making benefits for 
both sides. This can be based on the  different climate circumstances of the two regions 
which allows trade in different seasonal agro-products.(3) Environmental threats and issues 
(like  overfishing)  should  be  dealt  with  on  an  inter-regional  level.  (4)  A Mediterranean 
consensus on commodity specialization should be developed making the cooperation and 
coordination of  these  industries  inter-regional.  (5)  Market  monitoring  systems should  be 
developed to adopt production and prices to changing circumstances therefore protecting 
producers.  (6) Specialization and cooperation in industrial development should be a priority 
to benefit from comparative advantages. (7) Research and development policies should be 
also coordinated to help advance the technology and knowledge transfer.
37 Tamás Szigetvári (2012): The Economic Aspects of the Arab Spring,  in: Külügyi Szemle, 2012/1. Hungarian 
Institute of International Affairs
38 Bruno Amoroso: On Globalization, Capitalism in the 21st century, Palgrave 1998
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1.2    Theoretical background
1.2.1 Introduction
Euro-Mediterranean relations can serve as an especially useful background for testing International 
Relations (IR) theories given the complexity and heterogeneity of the region and its affairs. The 
theorization of IR as a subdivision of social sciences can be tracked back to the end of the first 
World War, which means that it is less than a hundred years old. Compared to the relatively young 
age of the field we can identify a surprisingly wide spectrum of IR theories of now-days, which 
gives endless possibilities for scholars to build their arguments on these theories while examining 
the complex political structure of a given geographical area. The wide spectrum of IR theories of 
now-days -on the other hand- gives no space for all-inclusive studies as the amount of theories to be 
applied is just too big to comprehend them in a single body of work. This makes IR researchers to 
pick and select some theories from the spectrum and use them exclusively, bearing in mind that  
there could be different theoretical aspects of their field as well.
In the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations there are at least three big groups of IR theories to be 
applied  to  the  region  with  a  huge  explanatory  potential:  neorealism,  neoliberalism  and  socio-
constuctivism. As there are no black-and-white exclusively right or wrong approaches in IR, there 
should be always a mixture of theories used for real life examples, possibly extracting and mixing 
the most useful explanatory elements of the "ingredient theories" for the given case. In the following 
chapters  therefore  there  will  be  an  experimental  triangulation  of  neoliberal  (as  economic 
globalization) and neorealist (as security complex) theories of Euro-Mediterranean relations using 
parts of both theories which can be most successfully applied to the given geographical area. As a 
complementary  viewpoint,  in  the  last  chapter  socio-constuctivism  and  functionalism  will  be 
assessed as well, but only with a limited scope as the length of the current work can not provide 
space for a deeper  tri-partite theoretical background. When using the mixture of neoliberal and 
neorealist  elements  in  this  study,  we  are  not  walking  on  an  unbeaten  path  as  this  method  of 
triangulation  was  a  base  characteristic  of  the  progress  of  IR  theories  from the  beginning.  For 
example the optimistic post-WWI international liberalism has given way to the pessimistic realist 
theories  after  WWII  and  the  two  of  them was  synthesized  in  the  English  School  later  taking 
explanatory elements from both. Neither is this study new in using neoliberal and neorealist theories 
in parallel,  the heterogeneity of theoretical background is  more the norm than the exception of 
contemporary IR studies.
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1.2.2.      Neorealism and the Regional Security Complex Theory
The post-WWII disillusionment in “liberal idealism” of IR theorists gave way to a new group of 
theories,  namely the realist  school  most  prominently advocated  by Morgenthau (1948)39.  Early 
realism stated that the international system of states is best understood if we see the system anarchic 
and the players (states) in it motivated exclusively by the pursuit of power. This ego-centrist view 
of state behavior leads to ad-hoc confrontations and alliances, but never produces a stable world 
system integrating states and coordinating state behavior. The radical assumptions of early realism 
were softened by Waltz(1979)40, who developed a system-theory out of classical realism namely the 
Waltzian structural realism. Structural realism changes focus from the ego-centrist state behavior 
and looks towards the system level in which they "live". Different social and physical attributes of 
states as population, economic development, geographical situation, natural resources, etc. overall 
lead to a specific capability aggregate within each state, and this aggregate power sets the place for 
each state in the global structure. The capability-allocation formed structure gives different roles to 
each state in the system and the structure itself pushes states' behavior in certain directions. 
When examining Euro-Mediterranean relations -as the Euro-Med partnership itself is a form of 
institutional cooperation amongst states- one can obviously not relay on the early realist theories 
shortly described above since they exclude almost all kinds of state-to-state cooperation. Still, as 
realism is a continuously developing field of IR theories, contemporary realist views should be 
incorporated into the examination as they provide a very important explanatory background.
When we talk about contemporary realism there is a wide spectrum of authors to chose from. Post-
Waltzian realism developed in several directions in the last few decades but the most  significant 
development of now-days in the realist field can be considered Barry Buzan's Regional Security 
Complex Theory.41
The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) uses sectors and levels as core analytical units to  
explain  international  relations.  Sectors  are  the  different  "competencies"  of  states  as   Military, 
Political, Societal, Economic, and Environmental capabilities and policies. Levels are the different 
geographical arenas where states function: on domestic, regional, inter-regional and global levels. 
39 Hans Morgenthau (1948): Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 
40 Kenneth Waltz (1979): Theory of International Politics. McGraw Hill. New York
41  Literature on the development of  Regional Security Complex Theory can be tracked at the “Literature Review” 
chapter of this dissertation.
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The interplay of  this  sectors/levels  duality gives  the  core  analytical  background for  the  RSCT 
theory, and the chosen level is the regional arena where most of the "fieldwork" is carried out. To 
justify the selection of the regional level as the core interest Buzan argues that between individual 
states and the global arena there is an intermediate analytical level, the regions through which we 
are capable of avoiding both the extreme oversimpliﬁcations of the unipolar view, and the extreme 
de-territorialisation of many globalist visions of a new world disorder. The regional framework 
brings out the radical diversity of security dynamics in different parts of the world and in the same 
time reflects the fact that most of the regular security issues are local and threats are therefore most 
likely to occur on regional level. As states within a region are integrated into the structure of their 
given region and play their roles according to the unique rules of that, regions are also integrated 
into  the  global  structure  which  is  therefore  capable  of  forming them from outside.  For  a  new 
regionalist theory there are at least two obligations to fulfill: one is to get rid of both the neorealist  
and globalist "absolute narratives" and admit the existence of different rules of play within each 
region, and the other is to define geographically these very regions. Regions used in the RSCT 
theory are set out as the following Post-Cold War constellation:42
We can count ten Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) covering the full geographical area of our 
planet. There are insulator states as well, not belonging to any RSC or belonging to more than one in 
42  Barry Buzan (2003) : Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
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the same time therefore the geographical coverage is not absolutely complete. However, maybe with 
the exception of Africa, we could say that the geographical coverage of RSCs is almost perfect.
As researchers interested in the Euro-Mediterranean region we can easily identify the two RSCs of 
our interest: the European RSC covering the area of the present day EU plus the EU candidate ex-
Yugoslavian states on one hand and the Middle Eastern RSC on the other hand covering the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA). Also as the consequence of Euro-Mediterranean research, we can 
correct immediately Buzan's map stating that the Euro-Mediterranean region itself should be viewed 
as an independent RSC instead of a separate European and Middle Eastern RSC given the complex 
interdependencies between the two regions and the international cooperation forms binding together 
the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The Euro-Mediterranean RSC would geographically look 
like  the  combination  of  the  two  RSCs  with  a  little  modification:  it  would  include  the  whole 
European RSC and the Middle Eastern RSC but without the Gulf states. To prove the existence of a 
Euro-Mediterranean RSC is one of the key concerns of this dissertation.
When using Buzan's Regional Security Complex Theory and applying it to the Euro-Mediterranean 
space, the first thing we have to consider is the core structure of the theory itself, namely the notion 
of sectors and levels. Looking at the levels, we can assume that the Euro-Mediterranean area has 
both global,  inter-regional,  intra-regional,  inter-state and sub-state levels of importance.  Without 
collecting all security-related issues on all levels, here will be set out only a few examples for each. 
Global importance can be assumed for several cases related to this geographical area, like the Israel-
Palestinian conflict, global oil supply and transnational (global) terrorism or the emergence of the 
euro as the second global currency on the other side. Intra-regional issues are several to chose from, 
with the most important of them surely the European integration itself on the northern side or the 
permanent conflict generation amongst the states on the southern. On sub-state level security issues 
water, food and environment related threats can be highlighted amongst many others.
Finally but most importantly we have to analyze the inter-regional level as well which was left out 
from the list above on purpose as our focus is set mainly on the interactions between two regions 
namely Europe and the MENA. Analyzing this relationship deeper with the help of the Regional  
Security Complex Theory needs to consider the other ingredient of the theory as well: sectors.
After  looking  through  the  Euro-Mediterranean  area  and  identifying  different  levels  of  its 
importance, the sectors of security binding together the two halves of this space should be analyzed 
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as  well.  Buzan  names  five  important  sectors  of  security:43 (1)Military,  (2)Political,  (3)Societal, 
(4)Economic, and (5)Environmental sectors, all of which have serious inter-regional importance in 
Euro-Mediterranean  relations.  To  prove  the  superiority  of  inter-regional  level  in  the  Euro-
Mediterranean area over the other levels listed and described above, we will have to examine the 
five sectors of this level more deeply.
(1)The military sector on inter-regional level has its special importance in the Euro-Mediterranean 
space. As the over-armed but under-governed southern neighbors of the EU pose a constant threat to 
each others stability, so do they threat European security in the same time. This preceived threat led 
to several EU missions being sent to the MENA with the purpose of maintaining stability in the 
neighborhood.  Destabilization  in  the  southern  neighborhood  can  lead  to  security  threats  like 
migration, arms proliferation and the spread of terrorist organizations for the EU therefore is the 
well maintained presence. The peak of European military involvement in MENA affairs came in 
2011 with  the  Arab revolutions,  one of  which  -the  Libyan-  triggering  direct  European military 
action. At the time of writing a similar action in Syria can not be ruled out either. All of this leads us 
to the observation of a growing EU military involvement in MENA affairs strengthening the case for 
a Euro-Mediterranean common military sector which has partially already materialized in NATO's 
Mediterranean Dialogue.
(2)The political sector of Euro-Mediterranean relations is even more obviously present. From the 
colonial times through all kinds of different cooperation forms during post-colonial times until the 
Barcelona declaration in 1995 we can observe several cases of political interactions culminating in 
the complex network of institutional cooperation of now-days. Direct forms of political cooperation 
can be found in the minister's  conferences of  the Union for  the Mediterranean or  in the Euro-
Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly as well. The following part of this dissertation will begin 
with a detailed examination of institutional political cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean space 
and the main focus area of this work, the European Neighbourhood Policy will be introduced as well 
showing an other important level of interactions in the political sector.
(3)The societal sector -although far less observed by experts than the others- is equally important in 
Euro-Mediterranean relations. Beyond the Anna Lindh Foundation, which is the official main tool of 
the EU aimed to the development of societal connections between the two regions, there are several 
individual  projects  founded  by the  Commission  and other  agencies  with  the  same goal.  These 
43 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde (1998): Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
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projects cover several areas of inter-regional societal cooperation with the involvement of local civil 
organizations and NGOs. The work of these groups should not be undervalued as they provide one 
of  the  best  vehicles  of  EU  value  projection  towards  the  MENA and  the  common  projects  of 
European and Arab organizations  are  the best  tools  of  improving cultural  understanding.  Some 
experts  even  assume  that  beyond  the  digital  communication  tools,  the  other  main  channel  of 
democratic value projection were these "depoliticized" cooperation projects all of which added a 
significant extra motivation for the 2010/2011 Arab Spring to happen.
(4) The economic sector of Euro-Mediterranean security can be considered as the main sector of 
importance amongst the five listed here. As the EU being a "soft power" can not rely on "hard power 
solutions" like for example the US in Iraq, its main tools left are its economic policies toward its  
southern partners. When we explore the European Neighbourhood Policy in the next part of this 
work, we will see how important the economic motivating tools ("carrots") are for the EU when it 
comes to terms of cooperation agreements with its southern neighbors. Developmental contributions 
and  other  kinds  of  financial  support  along  with  prospects  of  admission  to  the  huge  European 
markets can be the core motivators for Arabic neighbor states to comply with EU policies. On the 
other hand the economic sector is also significant in the opposite direction: a stable and prosperous 
southern  neighborhood  could  provide  security  within  the  EU  as  well,  reducing  the  flow  of 
immigrants and other economic threats into the north.
(5) Finally the environmental sector related to Euro-Mediterranean security needs to be understood 
as  well.  Beyond  their  own  environmental  problems  of  both  regions  (like  deforestation,  water 
scarcity,  air  pollution...etc.)  there  is  a  common  environmental  problem:  the  pollution  of  the 
Mediterranean Sea. This common problem can be seen also as a symbolic one: the sea should not 
divide,  but  should  connect  the  people  on  its  two  shores,  and  environmentally  so  it  does.  The 
pollution emerging from one area can be disseminated in the whole Sea fast  traveling with sea 
currents therefore posing problems for all coastal states both north and south. The wide recognition 
of this problem led to the incorporation of the "Depollution of the Mediterranean Sea" project to the 
body of the Union of the Mediterranean which will be analyzed in the following parts of this work 
as well.
 
The main body of this research will be carried out by analyzing each of these sectors through their 
issue areas (Actors, Objects, Agendas, Threats and Dynamics). Seeing the several sectors of Euro-
Mediterranean inter-regional security interdependencies, we can agree with Astrid Boening (2009) 
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in her assumption that the two separate RSCs of Europe and the MENA should be merged into a 
single Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (EMRSC):
"In a world which is  in  greater  political  and socio-economic transformation than ever before,  I 
propose an adjustment to the Regional Security Complex Theory delineated by Buzan and Waever 
(2003)  with  respect  to  the  Middle  East  Regional  Security  Complex  in  favor  of  a  Euro-
Mediterranean Regional  Security  Complex (EMRSC) to more accurately represent  the complex 
socio-economic and political inter-linkages and dynamics in fact observed. "44
Explaining  what  a  Euro-Mediterranean  Regional  Security  Complex  means  and  what  factors 
distinguish this formation from a more traditional security community, she follows:
"Buzan (1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166) introduced the concept of a security community and a 
security complex theory. Security community, according to Buzan (1991, 218) represents the far end 
on the scale of security interdependence, wherein “disputes among all the members are resolved to 
such  an  extent  that  none  fears… either  political  assault  or  military  position  on  his  continuum 
security  configurations,  related  to  the  idea  of  a  ‘security  community’”.  A  security  complex 
represents  “a  group  of  states  whose  primary  security  concerns  are  linked  together  sufficiently 
closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan 
1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166). "45
And finally proving that the Euro-Mediterranean area can be understood and analyzed best as a 
single unit (region) with the Buzanian terms of Regional Security Complex Theory:
"The Euro-Mediterranean, according to the parameters outlined by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
(1998, 16), could be termed a heterogeneous security complex, as it abandons the assumption of 
being locked into specific security sectors, but rather features interactions across several sectors 
such as states, nations, firms (incl. NGOs) and “confederations” (in the widest sense, the EU), and 
across the political, economic, and societal sectors. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, 17) state 
that  there  is  a  “cause-effect  nature  of  the  issues  around  which  securitization  takes  place:  the 
‘facilitating conditions’ for securitization. Second is the process of securitization [as the extreme 
version of politicization] (Ibid., 23) itself”. "46
44 Astrid B Boening (2008): Pronouncements of its Impending Demise were Exaggerated:The EuroMed Partnership Morphing into 
a Regional Security Super Complex
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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Concluding  all  these  assumptions  we  can  establish  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Regional  Security 
Complex as one (and the most important) of the four "theoretical legs" of this dissertation meaning 
that  -although  not  exclusively-  this  theoretical  background  will  serve  as  the  firm base  for  the 
research outlined in the second part of the thesis.
1.2.3.      IPE: complex interdependence and world-system theory47
Globalization,  meaning  here  the  worldwide  intensification  of  connections  amongst  societies 
deserves a place in the theoretical spectrum of Euro-Mediterranean relations as well. Globalization 
has several aspects: we can talk about cultural, economical, technological, migrational and many 
other means of globalization, all of which are recognizing the "elimination of distance and borders" 
amongst  people  therefore  making  them  increasingly  interdependent.  This  technology-driven 
integration of global cultures, markets, media, politics and several other factors can be seen as both 
a positive or a negative process. In this sub-chapter economical interdependencies will be the chosen 
factor of globalization to be examined closely, the positive and negative effects of global economic 
interdependencies will be drawn up and applied to Euro-Mediterranean context. 
The two aspects (positive and negative) of global economic interdependencies have generated two 
different theoretical approaches of IR, namely the pro-globalist "modernization school" and the anti-
globalist "dependence theory". These theories -as a subdivision of IR- are also called International 
Political Economy (IPE) theories, and while both of them acknowledges the fact that globalization is 
a  central  phenomenon  in  contemporary  international  relations,  their  diagnoses  are  completely 
different. After describing both of these aspects we will try to find the golden mean between them, 
and apply a moderate mixture of pro- and contra-globalist views to Euro-Mediterranean relations, 
possibly extracting the most relevant statements from both theories for this special case. Before 
starting with the two theories we can already make a first assumption here: as liberal trade policies 
and therefore  global  economic  integration  is  mostly beneficial  to  powerful  and well-developed 
states, pro-globalization theories echo mainly their aspect of the process, while weaker states being 
more vulnerable to  exploitation through international  trade are  seeing the anti-globalist  theories 
more  adequate.  In  other  words  the  global  North-South  economic  division  leads  to  a  division 
amongst IPE theories as well, and these theories can well be tested on the local (regional) North-
South division between the two halves of the Euro-Mediterranean region.
47  Based on: Wiliam R, Nester: Globalization, Wealth, and Power in the Twenty-first Century, Palgrave Macmillan, November 2010 
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The  pro-globalist  school  (For  example:  Krugman,  1987)48 argues  that  global  economic 
interdependencies are both natural and positive developments of our age therefore no measures are 
necessary to be taken against them. This viewpoint is "inherited" from the history of the firstly 
industrialized nations, mainly from Britain and the United States. These two powers as being first 
with the process of industrialization were able to pursue radically liberal international trade and 
investment  policies  since  they did not  have  any competitors  at  that  time.  As later  several  new 
countries joined the industrialization race -for example Germany, Japan, Russia and more recently 
many East-Asian states- these "latecomers" had to compete with Britain and the US in international 
markets. To be able to compete with the two already established and strong industrial economies the 
new competitors had to protect their "infant industries" first, and only when these industries became 
stronger were they able to compete on the global stage. This protective international trade policy 
-known  today as  neomercantilism-  became  later  the  antithesis  of  Anglo-Saxon  liberalism.  The 
industrialized countries of the global North -Britain, US and the "latecomers"- reached a relative 
equal  level  of  industrialization  by  now-days,  therefore  amongst  them liberal  trade  is  mutually 
beneficial although there can be found differences amongst them being the US and Britain still the  
most  liberal  traders  and  Japan  more  neomercantilist.  These  developments  underlined  the  pro-
globalization  ideology,  (as  also  being  represented  in  the  complex  interdependence  theory  of 
Keohane and Nye)49 giving strength  to  the argument  that  economic interdependence  makes the 
process of globalization mutually beneficial for all. Institutions like the World Trade Organization 
(previously GATT), the World Bank and the IMF led by these industrialized nations rest therefore 
on the ideology of economic liberalism and pursue principles like tariff and quota eliminations and 
the most favored nation (MFN) rule.
On the other hand, there are still several non-industrialized "developing countries" mainly placed in 
the Southern hemisphere therefore called as the "Global South". These countries did not manage to 
develop sophisticated industrial  economies  yet,  therefore they are unable  to  compete  with their 
Northern partners in production and trade. The contradiction comes already here as the developed 
states and the WTO tries to extend the liberal market rules to these underdeveloped states what leads 
usually to their economic exploitation. As they have no developed industries, the only product they 
can  offer  for  the  global  market  is  usually cheap labor  and natural  resources.  This  brings  them 
directly into a neo-colonial relation with their old colonial masters and other industrialized nations, 
48 Krugman, Paul R. (1987)."Is Free Trade Passe?", The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic 
Association) I/2 pp. 131–144. 
49 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1977): Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Brown
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making them both the natural resource supply and the export market for these nations. In this case 
therefore  it's  more  adequate  to  talk  about  economic  dependency  rather  than  interdependency 
between  the  global  North  and South  which  makes  the  dependents  -"the  losers"  of  the  system- 
leaning toward anti-globalist sentiment. 
Dependency theory is most famously articulated in Immanuel Wallerstein's world system theory, 
which divides nations into three separate groups according to their  role in the global economy: 
centrum, semi-periphery and periphery. Centrum countries are the "core" of the global economy 
where most of the decisions are made and most of the profits are accumulated. These countries have 
highly developed economies capable of forming global economic policies through investments and 
trade.  Periphery  states  are  on  the  other  end:  they  have  no  developed  industries  and  no  real 
capabilities for global economic presence. Between these two there is a third group: semi-periphery. 
These  countries  are  able  to  exploit  periphery  countries  via  economic  expansion  but  are  also 
exploited by core countries in the same way. Exploitation of the periphery makes these countries 
disinterested in globalization and generates resistance from their side:  "The mark of the modern 
world is the imagination of its profiteers and the counter-assertiveness of the oppressed. Exploitation 
and the refusal to accept exploitation as either inevitable or just constitute the continuing antinomy 
of  the  modern  era,  joined together  in  a  dialectic  which has  far  from reached its  climax in the 
twentieth century."50
As dependence and interdependence rests on economic and also security-related factors, it is useful 
to distinguish between geopolitical and geoeconomic power to clarify the exact relevance of theories 
used in this dissertation. Geopolitical power rests mainly in military, diplomatic and other security-
related capabilities and most IR theories are concerned about this kind of power when they describe 
their vision of "international order". Some of these theories were addressed in the first part of this 
sub-chapter with a core focus on the Regional Security Complex Theory. Geoeconomic power on 
the other hand lies in the economic capabilities of the nations, mainly described by IPE theories.  
This kind of power comes from each nation's economic performance and we can witness the use of 
this power in international financial, trade and investment policies around the globe.
After exploring both pros and cons of contemporary economic globalization and lining out the two 
main  policy  approaches  towards  it,  the  question  naturally  arises  how these  approaches  can  be 
applied to Euro-Mediterranean relations. First of all it should be clarified that Euro-Mediterranean 
50  Immanuel Wallerstein, (1974): The Modern World-System,vol. I, p. 233 
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economic relations are highly asymmetric therefore we are more correct to speak about economic 
dependence in this case rather than interdependence. This implies that here dependency theories 
should  be  used rather  than the pro-globalist  "modernization  theory"51,  because the  relations  are 
clearly unequal between the well-developed and economically powerful European Union (centrum) 
and  the  underdeveloped  MENA countries  (periphery).  The  following  trade-intensity  map52 can 
clearly prove this and show how peripheral MENA states are relative to the EU: 
However, this doesn't mean that economic cooperation and trade can not be mutually beneficial for 
both sides, it means only the polarization of the benefits. The other question is that if we know that 
the economic relations are asymmetric, what should this imply for the Arab states in the means of 
development  policies  and  what  should  the  EU  do  on  the  other  side,  how  could  it  help  this 
development? Traditionally Arab states tend to apply isolationist policies not only towards Europe, 
but towards each other as well. This strategy proved to be a failure, making these countries even 
more  poor  and  therefore  ironically  even  more  vulnerable  for  exploitation.  This  tendency  was 
recognized, and tried to turn back with several initiatives, most notably with the Barcelona Process 
and its plan for a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, until now with only moderate success.
Now, after the Arab Spring there is a new chance for development, but the questions of economic 
development strategy choices for the Arab countries are still open, and the EU's role in this process 
is not clarified yet either. The second part of this dissertation will explore these questions deeper and 
51 Rostow's take-off theory for example, see: W. Rostow (1956): The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth
52 From: Bruno Amoroso: On Globalization, Capitalism in the 21st century, Palgrave 1998
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search for possible solutions for both sides. Neither of the two economic policies outlined above are 
expected to take the winner's place in this context, the question is more about how these strategies  
can be mixed to deliver an optimal outcome and what role the EU can play with its several tools of 
intervention to help this process succeed.
1.2.4    Other relevant theories53
Two  other  theoretical  areas  of  IR  have  to  be  mentioned  when  one  examines  the  complex 
interdependence of Europe and the MENA region, especially in the context of the Arab Spring. One 
is  (neo)functionalism  (A),  which  explores  the  “spillover”  of  European  values  to  the  EU's 
neighborhood,  and  the  other  is  constructivism  (B),  which  emphasizes  the  role  of  constructed 
identities and therefore interests of the players of IR. These theories are not deeply elaborated in this 
current thesis therefore they are only mentioned with the purpose of providing a wider “theoretical 
frame” for the work complementing the two main theories used here (neorealism and IPE).
A) Functionalism
 
When talking about Euro-Mediterranean relations and their theoretical background, one field of IR 
theories can not be left out from the spectrum for sure: (neo)functionalism. We could even state that 
this  political  theory lies at  the very core of the European integration process itself,  therefore it 
should form a firm base for the European Neighbourhood Policy as well. 
According  to  David  Mitrany54 (and  many  other  functionalist  thinkers)  the  core  principle  of 
functionalism lies in the so-called spillover effect. As states give up (voluntarily or other way) parts 
of their functions to international or transnational formations and institutions, as a side effect other  
functions are more and more likely to follow. This spillover effect in the end can lead to economic 
and political integration seen on the example of the European Union itself.
Of course the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is far from being as deeply integrated as the EU, but  
spillover effects can be found in this area as well. Different state functions transferred to cooperation 
forms like the Union for the Mediterranean can lead to a dynamical deepening process. The various 
functions transferred already include:
53 These theories will not be directly used during this research, but their relevance should still be clarified to provide 
insights to the compexity of the field.
54 David Mitrany (1975): The Functional Theory of Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press.
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-    Trade related policies (as of the development of a Free Trade Area)
-    Culture related policies (partially transferred to the Anna Lindh Foundation)
-     Development and investment policies (coordinated by EIB)
-     Energy policy (Mediterranean Solar Plan and Euro-Mediterranean Energy Ring)
-     Environmental policy (partially transferred to the UfM)
-     Educational policy (Euro-Mediterranean University)
On the other hand, the Action Plans of the European Neighbourhood Policy contain also several 
forms of appropriations of state functions from the Mediterranean partner states. These are mainly 
security  and economy related  issues  where  the  EU "motivates"  its  partners  to  comply with  its 
policies therefore grabbing these functions partially out of the partner states' hands. These Action 
Plans will be examined in detail in the second part of this dissertation, therefore here we will not 
elaborate this area deeper.
The main point however of (neo)functionalism in the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations is not the 
functional convergence between the two regions detailed above but the indirect effect of it, the so-
called democracy-spillover. This complex phenomena lies in the middle of the EU's efforts toward 
its neighborhood, therefore can be considered as the "open secret" of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. The democracy-spillover happens when the accumulation of different trans-Mediterranean 
interactions (common projects and institutions on both state and sub-state levels) reach a level of 
intensity when the very political structures of the partners start to converge as well. This means that 
out of "social learning" through common projects and activities both the ruling elites and the people 
of  the  authoritarian  regimes  in  the  south  get  closer  to  the  ideas  of  democracy governing  their  
northern  partners,  and  this  process  can  lead  to  the  transformation  of  their  own  societies  to 
democracy in the end.
Although it is obvious that other relevant factors have contributed to the happenings of the Arab 
Spring  as  well,  it  can  not  be  denied  that  the  democracy-spillover  effect  from the  side  of  the 
European Union had played a key role. This fact brings up several new questions which are not the 
focus points of the current work therefore are only discussed briefly here:
• How many credits should be attributed to the EU and the ENP regarding to the functional  
"incubation" of the Arab Spring?
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• If there is a significant European "input" (and there is) to the preparation of the political 
climate for the Arab Spring in  the revolting states,  can we say that  this  is  the first  real 
success  of  the  EU's  soft  power  in  spreading  democracy and  therefore  serving  the  EU's 
interests as well? (Or maybe second only to the eastern enlargement?)
• If these assumptions turn out to be correct, can we say that the EU is capable now of a role to 
be  a  global  "soft-superpower"  helping  democratization  all  around  the  globe  and 
complementing in this process successfully the American hard power?
These questions lead far from the current topic of Euro-Mediterranean functionalism and will be 
only marginally elaborated in this dissertation, but it is important to remember here that functional  
convergence plays a key role in igniting social changes, and is capable to have even a global effect 
as  seen  on  the  example  of  the  Arab  Spring.  As  the  EU's  formation  process  and  therefore  its  
wakening foreign policy are both largely based on (neo)functional mechanisms, we can interpret the 
Arab Spring as a success of this approach which could give a global relevance to these events on the 
long term as well.  
B) Constructivism
Finally -although only partially- we will discover a fourth area of IR theories applicable to Euro-
Mediterranean relations, constructivism. The two main classic fields of IR theories outlined above 
-realism and liberalism- are both the products of classic rationalist  social  thinking perhaps best 
modeled  in  microeconomics.  Both  of  these  theories  describe  actors  (states)  as  pre-social,  self-
interested, rational entities and the field of interactions (the society of states) being only the arena 
for  pursuing  their  strategic  interests.  Both  theories  describe  actors  as  "defensive  positionalists" 
meaning  that  their  actions  aim  to  maintain  at  least,  but  better  to  expand  their  power  in  the 
international system. The main difference is that realists are thinking in a zero-sum game, where 
one's gains are always others losses because only the relative power gain counts as advance on 
others, while liberals think that absolute gains should be counted so the game is not zero-sum and 
therefore there can be mutually beneficial strategies as well. These presumptions imply that realists 
focus  mainly  on  confrontations  amongst  states,  while  liberals  explain  the  mutually  beneficial 
cooperation forms and interdependencies.
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While (neo)liberal and (neo)realist theorists were occupied with their IR theory debates based on the 
firm philosophical  foundations  of rationalism,  in  the 1970s a  completely new genre of theories 
turned  up,  challenging  the  dominance  of  rationalism.  Works  of  French  philosophers  Jacques 
Derrida, Michael Foucault and German sociologist Jürgen Habermas attacked the very philosophical 
base of Cartesian rationalism in social science, turning its focus from classical rationalist empiricism 
towards an interpretative mode of understanding and focusing on social  science's unquantifiable 
aspects. Their main statements were the antitheses of rationalism:55
− actors are inherently social entities, not egoistic rational individuals
− their identities and interests are socially constructed
− they are products of inter-subjective social learning
− knowledge is always attached to interests and there is no neutrality, therefore social theories 
should always be aware of their effects and positioned against all forms of oppression.
This so called "critical school of thought" was mainly occupied with the meta-structures of social 
sciences, therefore their works mainly stayed on philosophical levels of social theories, neglecting 
the possibilities of their application to social reality. This ambivalence provided convenient ground 
for counterattack from rationalist  scholars,  although some of them managed to integrate critical 
theory elements to their rationalist works like the already addressed Security Complex Theory of 
Barry Buzan shows it. Reacting to both these attacks and to the IR-earthquake of the collapse of the 
Eastern European Communist Systems which was not foreseen by any IR theories, a new theory 
was set on rise from the early 1990s.
Constructivism grew out of the scientific assumptions of critical theory, but tried to apply these 
assumptions to social reality, developing a new kind of empiricism. Constructivist thinkers stayed 
on the socio-constructivist  and interpretative presumptions  of critical  theorists,  but  they applied 
these  methods  to  study  daily  social  discourse  and  practices.  The  attack  from  rationalists  was 
therefore transformed to an opportunity by the constructivists to prove the plausibility of a non-
rationalist,  interpretative  methodology.  The  main  assumptions  of  IR  constructivism  can  be 
summarized by one of the field's most prominent theorists, Alexander Wendt's own words:56
55 Based on: Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Macmilan, 2009
56 Alexander Wendt (1999): Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press
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− "Material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared 
knowledge in which they are embedded." 
− "Identities are the basis of interests"
− "It's  through reciprocal  interaction  that  we create  and instantiate  the  relatively enduring 
social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests."
 
These words mean that the focus of IR research should change from material structures towards 
identities and knowledge structures because these are the main drivers of human action. The other 
main assumption is that these structures are not only forming identities and their actions, but in the  
same time they are being formed by them. The main tool of research should be discourse analysis, 
mapping how identities construct each other, their interests and social institutions through social 
discourse. Constructivism in IR supposes that states have similar identities as humans therefore their 
interests  and actions can be best understood by an international discourse analysis and both the 
attributes  of  international  structures  (institutions  and  systems)  can  be  formed  by  states  and 
reciprocally,  states  can  be  formed  by international  structures.  Euro-Mediterranean  relations  can 
provide good examples of both of these two processes.
All of these constructivist assumptions can be applied to Euro-Mediterranean relations in several 
ways,  most significantly by studying how the common institutions and initiatives (projects)  can 
create a common "mental space" for the Euro-Mediterranean region by forming its actors' identities 
and interests accordingly. Some space will be therefore dedicated to the development of common 
projects and institutions in the region in the second part of this dissertation to show the "power of 
socialization" in the Euro-Mediterranean arena.
1.2.5    Conclusions 
After summarizing the four theoretical areas to be applied in this dissertation to Euro-Mediterranean 
relations, we can make a few points of conclusions:
–    Security-focused neorealism as represented here by Barry Buzan's Security Complex Theory 
and applied to Euro-Mediterranean relations by Astrid Boening tells  us that the security 
concerns and threats of the two halves of the Euro-Mediterranean area are common and 
interrelated therefore the region can be analyzed as a single Security Complex. This implies 
that the closer cooperation between the two halves is determined to be mutually beneficial 
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and serves both parties' security and economic interests. This should drive -by only pursuing 
their egoistic self interests- to closer cooperation both of the parties on long term and open 
up dialogue and cooperation in several interrelated security sectors.
− Globalization and growing economic interdependencies are two other important factors of 
current IR realities, therefore they need their place amongst the analytical tools of Euro-
Mediterranean relations research as well.  As already outlined before, Euro-Mediterranean 
relations are asymmetrical, therefore we should speak of economic dependence rather than 
interdependence in this case. This fact should be the cornerstone of further research to be 
done in the next part of this dissertation, where the different policy approaches of Euro-
Mediterranean  players  towards  each  other  will  be  evaluated.  Both  the  EU  with  its 
Neighborhood Policy tools and the MENA countries with their individual economic policies 
should build their strategies on existing socio-economic connections, to be researched as the 
core element of this work.
− The assumptions of neo-functionalism predict that the next wave of functional spillover of 
the European integration process will be directed to the neighborhood of Europe. First the 
formation  of  the  EU  itself,  later  the  Eastern  Enlargement  and  now  the  European 
Neighborhood provides  a  set  of  examples  how some weak forms  of  cooperation  in  the 
beginning  can  lead  to  serious  interconnections  later,  and  how  forms  of  cooperation  in 
selected areas can spill over again and again to new policy areas bringing countries closer 
and closer. As different policy areas converge amongst states their political system adopts 
slowly  as  well,  meaning  that  in  the  case  of  Euro-Mediterranean  relations  for  example 
democracy-spillover is on long term inevitable. That how much role this spillover effect had 
in the Arab Spring is highly debatable, but we can not exclude completely this factor for 
sure.
− Finally but  not  lastly,  the  core  role  of  common Euro-Mediterranean  institution  building 
should  be  addressed  through  the  lenses  of  constructivist  IR  theories.  These  institutions 
-described in the first chapter of the second part of this dissertation- have a highly important 
role in identity-shaping for both the region's citizens and the governments of their states. A 
common Euro-Mediterranean identity could lead to common interests and therefore common 
actions in the region. Common projects are already running under the umbrella of the Union 
for  the  Mediterranean  and  the  success  and  further  extension  of  these  projects  can 
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significantly support  the  socio-economic  convergence  of  the  two sides.  With  a  partially 
similar  spillover  effect  that  was  described  by  neofunctionalism,  we  could  hope  for  an 
identity-spillover from these common institutions and projects meaning that the governments 
and citizens of the Euro-Mediterranean are coming closer to each other mentally through the 
Mediterranean Sea which will connect rather than separate them in the future.
1.3.    Methodology
1.3.1.   Introduction
There is a very diverse and colorful array of contemporary IR which has several sub-fields and 
theories (see the previous chapter), but has also several different approaches of methodology. As a 
serious contemporary work in IR can not use a single theory as background, it can't either use only 
one kind of methodology. Both of these approaches have to be diverse while trying to show the "two 
sides  of  the  same coin",  in  this  case  the  Euro-Mediterranean relations.  Before  selecting  proper 
methodologies for the current work we have to clarify some basic characteristics of it, answering the 
question what exactly is the thing we are making a study of:57
     1.   Are we examining the dominant actors of IR: states, international organizations, TNCs,    
           NGOs or terrorist organizations? What are the "objects" of our study?
1. Are we examining the dominant relationships amongst actors? Strategic political relations 
amongst  great  powers,  trade  relations,  relations  of  dominance  and  dependence  or  the 
relations of solidarity between societies are the main points of focus?
2. Are  we studying  empirical  issues  like  the  distribution  of  military and  economic  power, 
global inequality, gender, environmental or crime statistics?
3. Or  are  we focused  on  ethical  issues  mainly  like  human  rights,  just  wars,  the  ethics  of 
interventions, the maintenance of cultural and biological diversity or the global redistribution 
of wealth?
57 Based on: Theories of international relations, Palgrave, 2010
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4. Are we incorporating the philosophical background of the social sciences into our study? Do 
we engage in the methodological and epistemological debates of IR or even go further to 
discuss the nature of causality, narratives and logic?
5. And finally:  are we developing an interdisciplinary study? Can or should we incorporate 
theories  and methodologies  from other  social  sciences  like  sociology,  economics,  world 
history, psychology or others in our work?
Before choosing an approach and a work methodology for the current project, all of these questions 
should be answered to make us able to form a unique standpoint from which the whole project 
"makes sense" and shows its ability to add value to the current state of IR as a science. As the 
current  work  has  a  significant  duality  of  both  theoretical  and  methodological  approaches,  the 
following two sub-chapters will answer these questions in two different ways to show two sides of  
the same thing: first the methodological background for the security side of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations will be developed, later on a different methodology for the examination of economic ties.
1.3.2.     Research methodology for the exploration of the security sectors
The first part of examination will consist of the evaluation of the security ties between the two 
halves of the Euro-Mediterranean region including some exploration of the transatlantic connections 
as  well.  Here  the  neorealist  theory of  Barry Buzan  will  be  used  as  the  main  line  of  "thought  
organization" involving sectors and levels of inquiry as already described in the previous chapter. 
This part will use mainly non-positivist (discursive-interpretative) approaches. By following Astrid 
Boening's  lead  in  theorizing  the  security  aspects  of  Euro-Mediterranean  relations  on  neorealist 
terms, we can answer the ontological questions of this work (raised above) as follows:58
"Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1989, 5) suggest an analysis levels, including national, regional, and 
international,  and  hereby  “locate  the  actors,  referent  objects,  and  dynamics  of  interaction  that 
operate in the realm of security” (Ibid.). Furthermore, these authors suggest an expansion of the 
political  realists’ power  calculations  and  the  military  strategists’ calculations  of  offensive  and 
defensive capability by adding additional global systemic referent points (Ibid.,  e.g. pg. 8), thus 
defining  additional  sectors  such  as  environmental,  energy,  human,  societal,  financial  and 
58 Astrid Boening (2009): FROM THE BARCELONA PROCESS TO THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: SECTORS 
AND LEVELS OF INTEGRATION AND TRUST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION, University of Miami
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others. ....... Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) point out that  insecurity, often associated with 
(geographic) proximity, makes security a  relational  matter. Hence the security perceptions of the 
states in the (wider) Euro-Mediterranean region are so interlinked as to have an internal dynamic, 
and the states’ national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one 
another (Ibid.)."
This implies that the work-flow here will follow a step-by-step approach evaluating the Buzanian 
sectors separately one after the other and each sector (except for the economic) will be analyzed 
through its issue areas (Actors, Objects, Agendas, Threats and Dynamics). At first the most relevant 
actors of the given sector will be identified, then objects (fields of cooperation) will be shown and 
agendas (EU programs on these fields) will be introduced. Finally under “Threats and Dynamics” 
the developments of the Arab Spring will be evaluated as “agenda changers” for EU policies, and 
possible reform agendas for the ENP will be proposed. From here the answers to the ontological  
questions can be derived too:
1. We are examining individual actors: the EU and its southern neighbors
2. Our focus  of  interest  consist  of  mainly relational  issues  as  “proximity makes security a 
relational matter”
3. The research involves empirical issues, mainly document analysis
4. Ethical issues will be marginally involved during policy evaluation
5. The philosophical background of social sciences is not a significant focal point here
6. Finally  interdisciplinarity  is  present  as  there  is  an  economic  analysis  embedded  into  a 
neorealist IR framework in the current research.
 
The methodology for this part therefore involves the following data collection methods: a review of 
Euro-Mediterranean  institutional  developments  and  programs  since  the  very  beginning  of  the 
European  Economic  Cooperation  (1957)  until  now-days,  and  an  interpretive  reading  of  these 
activities to discover underlying norms. After exploring and interpreting the historical progress, data 
collection  turns  into  contemporary  sources  such  as  EU,  ENP and  EMP websites,  reports  from 
research institutes  focusing on socio-political  and economic  developments  in  the Mediterranean 
region and data from the foreign ministry websites of member states. The most important sources 
here will be the Action Plans of the ENP, because these documents show explicitly what the EU 
considers important about its relations with each partner country. The Action Plans will serve as a 
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starting point for the research, since they refer to most of the Buzanian issue areas (actors, objects,  
threats) that we need to identify and show the pre-Arab Spring agendas of the EU on these issues.
By a "deconstructive" analysis of official EU, ENP and EMP documents, underlying layers of norm 
transplantation, civil society learning, and different sources of motivation for regional economic and 
political cooperation can be explored. Finally, but maybe most importantly casual interviews with 
citizens, researchers and policy makers from the MENA region are undertaken to have an "insider 
look" on the subject which can give space to a discursive analysis of the current state of Euro-
Mediterranean relations. Also, some on-field participative observation is involved, as this method is 
the  most  useful  to  “best  capture  the  inter-subjective  nature  of  reality and dialogical  aspects  of  
knowledge claims”59. 
After  data-collection,  data  analysis  takes  place  involving  triangulation  by  first  identifying  and 
describing the institutionalization patterns and themes of Euro-Mediterranean relations from EU, 
ENP and EMP websites and other official resources, then comparing them to interview data and 
official  publications  by MENA governments  and institutes  and with  secondary data  from other 
researchers’ and institutes' works in the field. 
Triangulation of these sources can enhance the reliability and validity of the research results as none 
of these resources could be reliable enough to claim any "knowledge" true being based exclusively 
on only one of them. Triangulation here therefore means to develop a "third point of view" on the  
studied subject by carefully interleaving two different and sometimes contradictive sources. At the 
end,  found patterns  and trends are  incorporated into  established literature on Regional  Security 
Complexes in order to understand and explain -organize into a knowledge structure (theory)- the 
products of analysis. 
Regional Security Complexes -although being the dominant theoretical base in this part- are not 
exclusively  used  during  the  research.  As  the  diverse  methodological  tools  listed  above,  like 
discourse-analysis  and participative observation imply,  contemporary constructivism will  have a 
place in the development of this analysis as well. By not breaking neorealism's dominance in the 
theorization of Euro-Mediterranean politics,  it  can still  play a supportive/complementary role in 
"putting the puzzles together".  This supportive part  will  gain its most significant role when the 
societal effects of the Arab Spring will be evaluated as these effects have more to do with identity 
and value issues than neorealist security and power relations.
59 Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch,(2007): Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, New York: M.E. Sharpe
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1.3.3.        Research methodology for the exploration of the economic sector
The second part of the work can be seen as almost the complete opposite of the first part on terms of  
methodology as it will utilize almost entirely positivist methods to draw up the complex economic 
interdependencies between the two halves of the Euro-Mediterranean space. Here the aim is to show 
different types of economic interdependencies amongst the Euro-Med partners (EU and the MENA 
states) and provide data for IPE (International Political Economy) analysis. Different IPE theories 
(described in the previous chapter) will be tested on the grounds of Euro-Mediterranean relations 
aiming to find one which describes the best the current economic realities. 
Here  the  work-flow  will  mainly  consist  of  the  examination  of  different  economic  indicators 
(statistical numbers and their ratios) like imports, exports, GDP, FDI, HDI, amounts of aid given 
out/received and other indicators related to trade, redistribution and development. The main goal of 
analysis here will be to develop an "economic profile" for the region to make us able to evaluate the  
EU's economic policies towards its southern neighbours and to understand the prospects of these 
countries in the light of their "EU-dependence". 
As a clearly positivist approach, this part will have a significantly different set of sources and tools 
of  analysis  than  the  non-positivist  approach  described  before.  Sources  will  consist  of  different 
statistical databases available online as EUROSTAT (the EU's statistical service), MEDSTAT (the 
EUROSTAT's subdivision for Mediterranean countries) and different OECD and World Bank data-
sets. The analysis of raw data will be software-based, using tools like Excel and SPSS. The outputs  
of this kind of analyzes are expected to be graphs and info-maps containing visualized forms of 
economic realities. These products of information can be then interpreted scientifically and used to 
figure out economic trends and developments in the Euro-Mediterranean economic space. 
Finally,  after  being  done  with  the  toolbox  of  data  analysis,  results  can  be  incorporated  into 
contemporary IPE theories, which can be tested and evaluated according to how much they are 
capable of describing Euro-Mediterranean economic ties. Finding the most suitable theory for the 
region  could  add  a  significant  new  angle  to  the  overall  understanding  of  contemporary  Euro-
Mediterranean relations. Here -of course- again the method of triangulation will have to be used as 
there  is  no single  theory expected  to  come out  as  a  "winner",  rather  a  mixture of  overlapping 
theories can have the most explanatory power in the end.
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The six questions  about  the ontological  horizon of  this  project  set  out  in  the beginning of  this 
chapter will have significantly different answers in this case than in the previous non-positivist one. 
As an entirely positivist approach is being used this time, answers change as follows:
    1.   We are examining one dominant actor: the EU, and its economic policies towards other
    actors (the MENA states).
1. The main focus is still on examining the dominant relationships amongst actors: mainly trade 
relations,  relations  of  economic  dominance  and  dependence  and  the  relations  of  inter-
regional solidarity.
2. The focus here is  on studying empirical  issues  like the distribution of  economic  power, 
inequality of nations and their citizens, and economic development.
3. Here ethical issues are less represented but still, the inter-regional redistribution of wealth 
via trade policies and economic aid raise some significant ethical questions.
4. The philosophical background of the social sciences is not debated in this part.
5. Interdisciplinarity plays a crucial role here: as IR is categorized as "political science", this  
part  makes  a  "sidestep"  towards  economics  and  IPE,  which  fields  are  categorized  as  a 
different area of science, although it is clear that they are so deeply interconnected that it 
makes not much sense to talk about one without taking into consideration the others.
Finally,  after  looking through the two different methodological approaches used during the two 
“geographically generalist” sub-chapters of the current work, the methodology for the case studies 
has to be outlined as well. The four cases (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) will be split into a 
two-by-two grouping examining Mashreq and Maghreb countries separately but following the same 
methodological  approach.  Here  the  research  will  be  built  around  each  country's  Action  Plans, 
focusing  on the  contrasts  between the  EU's  articulated  policy goals  with  each country and the 
previously discovered security and economic realities. This direct comparison will make us able to 
evaluate  the  current  ENP system in  each  case  and draw some conclusions  for  possible  reform 
agendas.
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1.3.4.  Conclusions
Summarizing the methodological issues related to the current work, we can clearly see that the 
duality of approaches stays consistent in this area as well. Methodology for the security-focused 
research  will  consist  of  work  with  documents  and  participant-communications,  while  the 
exploration of economic ties will consist of mainly work with statistical data and other sources of 
“raw” information. 
As the duality of the theories, the duality of the methodologies has also a “secret” purpose: some 
relevant part of the Euro-Mediterranean realities can be explored only with “interpretative reading”, 
therefore  document  analysis  is  essential  but  the  “truth”  laying  behind  these  documents  can  be 
checked only if we dare to touch some “pre-interpreted” raw data too and try to interpret it  for 
ourselves.  This  hybrid  methodology is  expected  to  show both  the  actors'  motivations  and their 
agendas in the Euro-Mediterranean, but also tries to keep an eye on the economic realities behind 
them.  
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Part Two: 
The evolving Euro-Mediterranean regional complex
54
2.1. The history and current institutional context of Euro-Med relations 
Looking  through  the  historical  path  of  cooperation  between  the  European  Economic 
Community and the Southern Mediterranean states, we can easily identify a slow institutional 
progress from the simple bilateral agreements of the beginnings to the complex institutional 
network of now-days including the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for 
the Mediterranean (UfM). After drawing up the historical origins and the institutional context 
of  the  present  day  cooperation  forms,  this  sub-chapter  focuses  mainly  on  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy and shows that the ENP has two main directing principles: security 
and socio-economic reform. The last  sub-chapter  will  focus on how the ENP mechanism 
works  in  practice  and  this  will  be  described  through  the  critical  assessment  of  the  two 
founding  documents  of  the  ENP:  The  „Wider  Europe”  communication  of  2003  and  the 
European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper of 2004. The main tools of European soft 
power projection, the country-tailored Action Plans will be examined sector-by sector in the 
following chapter.
The other main unit, the UfM will be introduced as well but the examination will be much 
narrower than in the case of the ENP, it will only consist  of the basic description of this 
institution as the present work is focused mainly on bilateral economic and political relations 
targeted by the ENP, rather than the multilateral socio-economic relationships targeted by the 
UfM. 
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2.1.1. Historical evolution of the Euro-Med Institutions
The beginnings of cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Southern 
Mediterranean states dates back to the foundation of the EEC. Already in 1957 the Rome 
Treaty of the newborn European Economic Community had references to the future forms of 
economic  cooperation  with the  MENA region,  and in  the  following years  the number  of 
treaties  and  agreements  continued  to  grow.  The  European  Economic  Community  made 
significant efforts to build prosperous economic relations between the south and north shores 
of the Mediterranean Sea, and the states in the south started to recognize the benefits of such 
cooperation as well.
While at the end of the 1950s Algeria was still part of France, this country was originally part 
of the Rome Treaty, and the other two Maghreb states, Morocco and Tunisia expanded their 
bilateral post-colonial agreements with France to bilateral EEC agreements. These were the 
first external relations of the Community. In the 1960s the EEC continued to make bilateral 
agreements in the region, and as early as 1969 reached preferential trade agreements with the 
Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia).
As  the  EEC  grew  more  regional  weight  in  the  1960s  and  the  number  of  the  external 
agreements continued to grow, the idea of a multilateral institution for the countries of the 
Mediterranean region has turned up in Europe. The main problem with the existing bilateral 
system  was  the  unequal  treatment  of  partners,  which  were  never  satisfied  with  their 
agreements when they saw that an other partner country managed to reach a better agreement 
with the EEC in a particular field.  This problem could have been eliminated only with a 
multilateral agreement which treated all partners equally.
The  first  multilateral  institution  of  Euro-Mediterranean  relations  was  the  Global 
Mediterranean Policy in which Israel, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Syria participated. Within the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) formulated in 1972, the 
European Community negotiated a series of trade and co-operation agreements with southern 
Mediterranean countries with the exception of Libya. A special regime of agreements was 
spelt out for Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus with a customs union or eventual membership 
in mind as well.
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Unfortunately the global economic environment rapidly changed in 1973 with the first oil 
crisis,  and  this  did  not  help  the  further  development  of  the  GMP as  the  economically 
challenged EEC turned inwards. The crisis prevented the EEC from deepening the economic 
relations with it’s  Mediterranean Partners,  and the failure of the multilateral  system came 
clear as early as 1974. After the practical termination of the GMP, the community had to go 
back to the bilateral system of agreements which were ironically called GMP agreements. The 
EEC signed the first GMP agreement with Israel in 1975; then with Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia  in  1976;  and with  Egypt,  Jordan,  Lebanon and Syria  in  1977.  These  agreements 
contained three main chapters:60
1. Commercial  Co-operation.  The  EEC  imports  at  preferential  tariffs  agricultural 
products in conformity with quotas fixed per lists of products and reviewed depending 
on Europe's economic situation (so as not to interfere with the Common Agricultural 
Policy). Industrial products are exempt from custom-duties, although the importation 
of textiles, foot-wears and refined petroleum products is subject to the quota system.
2. Financial and economic cooperation. Financial protocols specify the level of aid given 
to  the  Mediterranean  partners.  The  aid  takes  various  forms:  grants,  European 
Investment Bank loans at lower market interest rates and Commission loans at an 1% 
interest rate.
3. Social Co-operation. The EEC pledges to improve the standard of living of immigrant 
workers (most  are  from North Africa and Turkey),  legalizing family grouping and 
giving them social rights equal to those of European citizens.
In 1982, the Commission articulated a new development  plan for Europe's  Mediterranean 
region  (given  Greece's  entry  in  1981  and  that  of  Spain  and  Portugal  in  1986)  and 
recommended that a new policy should be adopted with regard to the southern Mediterranean 
states. The new policy encouraged the diversification of the agricultural production to prevent 
surpluses  in  agricultural  products,  and  tried  to  reach  acceptable  trade  compromises  for 
Mediterranean  partners  aiming  to  access  European  food  markets.  These  cooperation 
agreements and financial protocols were mainly ineffective, and were renewed twice without 
significant change. In 1990 the EEC realized the weakness of it’s  bilateral  Mediterranean 
60 Source: Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=767
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policies,  and  decided  to  revitalize  the  multilateral  cooperation.  The  new  „Renovated 
Mediterranean Policy” (RMP) heralded by the European Commission had a greater budget at 
its disposal for the financial protocols with narrower objectives and strategies:61
1. Support the Structural Adjustment Programmes elaborated by the IMF and the World 
Bank, with the particular aim of softening their social counter-effects.
2. Promote the creation and development of small and medium enterprises.
3. Encourage the protection of the environment.
4. Finance actions of regional scope and thereby reinforce horizontal co-operation
5. Emphasize the importance of human rights with a new clause enabling the European 
Parliament  to  freeze  the  budget  of  a  financial  protocol  if  serious  human  rights 
violations justify it.
6. Help  societal  actors  such  as  universities,  the  media  and  municipalities  contribute 
efficiently to the development and modernization of small enterprises by setting up 
"Med" programmes of decentralized co-operation.
As we will see later, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy came as a narrow precursor for the 
next  multilateral  system,  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership.  As  the  communist  systems 
collapsed  in  Europe,  a  new  possibility  turned  up  for  the  development  of  a  multilateral 
partnership between the newly formed European Union and it’s  Mediterranean neighbors. 
This new possibility has arisen from the end of the Cold War in the Mediterranean region as 
well, which led to the disappearance of Soviet influence from MENA politics. This situation 
opened up a political space for the EU to strengthen it’s positions in the region, and to launch 
a  new  multilateral  system,  which  aimed  to  build  up  a  structured  and  close  cooperation 
between the newborn European Union and it’s southern neighborhood seeking to strengthen 
the EU’s influence in the region.
The most active members of the EEC in proposing deeper cooperation with Mediterranean 
partners were always the Mediterranean EEC member states. In 1990 Italy Spain, France and 
Portugal  together  with 4 Maghreb states  formed the so called 4+5 Cooperation Network, 
which expanded to 5+5 when Malta joined in 1991. The 5+5 Cooperation Network agreed to 
61 Source: Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=767
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deepen cooperation amongst it’s states in migration, agricultural, environmental and cultural 
issues,  and  to  develop  a  common  financial  institution.  Unfortunately  the  political 
developments in Algeria in 1992 halted the further development of the cooperation, but now-
days  we  can  easily  see  that  the  5+5  Cooperation  Network  together  with  the  Renovated 
Mediterranean  Policy  was  a  huge  step  towards  the  next  level  of  multilateral  (regional) 
cooperation: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. These positive developments were further 
strengthened by the 1991 Madrid peace conference where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was 
somewhat eased by multilateral negotiations, giving way to a possible regional cooperation.
The Barcelona Process was launched in November 1995 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
of the then 15 EU members and 12 Mediterranean partners (Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
Jordan,  the  Palestinian  National  Authority,  Egypt,  Tunisia,  Algeria,  Morocco,  Malta  and 
Cyprus), as the framework to manage both bilateral and regional relations. Guided by the 
agreements  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration,  it  formed  the  basis  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership which has became a new and innovative regional alliance based on the principles 
of joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation, seeking to create a Mediterranean region of 
peace,  security  and  shared  prosperity.  The  partnership  was  organized  into  three  main 
dimensions, which remain today as the broad working areas of it:62 
- Political and Security Dialogue, aimed at creating a common area of peace and stability 
underpinned by sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights.
- Economic and Financial Partnership, including the gradual establishment of a free-trade area 
aimed at  promoting shared economic opportunity through sustainable and balanced socio-
economic development.  During the Barcelona Conference,  the foreign ministers of the 15 
member states and the 12 Mediterranean Partners, (Maghreb and Mashrek countries including 
the Palestinian Authority as well as Israel, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus) officially approved the 
principle of the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade economic zone, planned for 2010. 
The Economic and Financial Partnership is financed by the European Investment Bank and a 
special European financial found for the Mediterranean projects called MEDA.
- Social, Cultural and Human Partnership, aimed at promoting understanding and intercultural 
62 Source: Anna Lindh Foundation: http://www.euromedalex.org/about/our-mandate/union-for-the-
mediterranean
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dialogue between  cultures,  religions  and people,  and facilitating  exchanges  between  civil 
society  and  ordinary  citizens,  particularly  women  and  young  people.  This  part  of  the 
partnership is managed by the Anna Lindh Foundation through occasional project founding.
Under the umbrella of each sector, Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meetings are being held in 
order  to  establish  the  political  commitments  which  drive  cooperation  and  activity  across 
sectors.  These  meetings  are  accompanied  by  periodic  meetings  of  Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs which evaluates the state of the partnership, its priorities and the 
progress made on different initiatives, while the bilateral cooperation based on the previous 
bilateral agreements continued in the form of standardized Euro-Med Agreements coordinated 
by a Senior Officer and a National Coordinator in each country. To develop a deeper level of  
political cooperation amongst partners, the Euro-Med Parliamentary Assembly was created to 
bring closer the members of parliaments from each participating country. Finally EuroMeSCo, 
a network of research centers based in partner countries was established to give a form of 
cooperation amongst policy makers and researchers of the region.
The structure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Source: Erzsébet N. Rózsa: From Barcelona to the
Union for the Mediterranean - Northern and Southern Shore Dimensions of the Partnership, HIIA Papers T-2010/9.
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2.1.2. The two main contemporary institutions of the cooperation: the ENP and the UfM
As the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership suffered a lot from the delays 
in the Middle-East Peace Process in the 90s,  and the created institutional framework was 
unsuccessful in deepening the cooperation, the EU realized the need to renovate again the 
relations with it’s surrounding neighbors. The first initiative, the Wider Europe concept in 
2003 was followed by a completely new system, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
in 2004. This new concept (somewhat parallel  with the GMP agreements) turned back to 
bilateral cooperation forms, and managed to reinvent Europe’s foreign policy completely.
The new geopolitical reality after the 2004 enlargement of the EU brought politically unstable 
and low-income countries directly to the EU’s external borders, and the development of the 
ENP can be interpreted as an institutional answer to the new situation as well. The ENP has a 
wider geopolitical coverage than the previous cooperation forms: it includes 10 Mediterranean 
partner  states  (Syria,  Lebanon,  Israel,  Jordan,  the  Palestinian  National  Authority,  Egypt, 
Tunisia,  Algeria,  Morocco,  Mauritania),  3  East-European  states  (Belarus,  Ukraine  and 
Moldova),  and 3 Caucasian states  (Armenia,  Georgia and Azerbaijan)  therefore it  can be 
considered as the umbrella organization for Europe’s external policy.  The states with EU-
membership prospects (Turkey, Albania and the ex-Yugoslavian states) are not involved in the 
policy, because -as a strict criteria- the ENP gives no EU accession prospect to its partners. 
Source: European Neighbourhood Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm
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The implementation of the ENP works through the bilateral Action Plans, which are set out 
for periods between 3 and 5 years. The Action Plans (APs) are designed differently for each 
country, although they have a common structure. The implementation of APs are evaluated in 
Progress  Reports  indicating  the  development  for  the  partner  states  in  each  field  of 
cooperation. The core structure of the ENP can be identified as the „enlargement template”. 
This means that after the EU’s successful enlargement in 2004 it seemed to be appealing to 
„stretch”  the  enlargement  template  further  to  the  EU’s  new  neighbors  and  to  the 
Mediterranean  partner  states,  hoping  that  this  policy  will  be  as  successful  later  as  the 
enlargement itself was. The main contradiction already rises here: the same conditionality is 
used in the ENP as was used during the accessing negotiations with the new EU members, but 
without  the  perspective  of  accession  this  time.  This  can  seriously  undermine  the  ENP’s 
credibility as we will see later. 
The idea behind the invention of the ENP was not to substitute but to complement the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. As the EMP is intended to be more like a multilateral forum for 
political cooperation, the ENP focuses on the concrete development of each partner country in 
various sectors. In order to gain influence the ENP has a system of conditionality to motivate 
partners towards the shared values of the EU: the better they perform is the closer they can get 
to the EU’s internal market and the more financial assistance they can get from the EU. This  
system we can identify as the instrumentalization of the EU’s soft power and here comes up 
already the  second  problem with  the  ENP’s  perception  in  the  south:  as  the  EMP was  a 
cooperation forum it was much more associated with co-ownership, while the mostly EU-
tailored Action Plans resemble dictates for the southern partners. The EU has to reconsider the 
possibility of value-projection through the ENP as well since the accessing states were much 
more  closer  to  the  EU  both  in  cultural  and  socio-economical  means  than  the  new ENP 
partners (except for Israel maybe), therefore the utilization of the enlargement template can be 
not  as  useful  as  it  might  seem at  the first  look.  Still,  out  of the two main contemporary 
institutions (ENP and the UfM) together often referred as the Barcelona Process (BP), the 
most effective tool is the European Neighbourhood Policy and basically the only one not 
considered as being wrecked. This is the core reason why the main part of this research is 
focused on the ENP and refer only marginally to the other elements of the BP, although the 
UfM  has  significant  advantages  too  on  the  side  of  socio-cultural  relations  and  regional 
identity building at least.
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The second contemporary policy tool of the EU dealing with its southern neighbors is the 
Union for the Mediterranean. In 2008 French president Nicolas Sarkozy keeping his campaign 
promises of revitalizing Euro-Arab relations started a new initiative called „Mediterranean 
Union”, which aimed to bring together all the states of the Mediterranean basin in one union. 
This plan was not negotiated with EU officials and was not part of the European external 
policy framework. The initiative was not supported by non-Mediterranean EU member states 
and was threatening the unity of the European Union. After several rounds of negotiations 
German chancellor Angela Merkel (the main opponent of the plan) and Sarkozy reached a 
compromise: the Mediterranean Union will be renamed as the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM), and will be build into the framework of the Barcelona Process. It will complement the 
BP with  six  new  projects  (as  a  virtual  fourth  basket  of  the  EMP)  supporting,  but  not 
substituting the original three baskets of the EMP in the following structure:
The structure of the Union for the Mediterranean. Source: Erzsébet N. Rózsa: From Barcelona to the
Union for the Mediterranean - Northern and Southern Shore Dimensions of the Partnership, HIIA Papers T-2010/9. 
63
As we can see,  the three baskets of the original EMP structure remained untouched and a 
virtual fourth basket was added which consist of six new projects. (These new projects can be 
connected to the original baskets each, therefore the „virtual” status of the fourth basket.) 
Since the main problem with the implementation of the EMP was the unwillingness of the 
Mediterranean  partners  to  cooperate  in  political  issues,  the  new  projects  are  completely 
depoliticized. They are touching mainly economic and infrastructural issues, which is useful 
but shows the EU's admittance of failing with the political basket. As the originally ambitious 
EMP was reduced to a depoliticized cooperation by the creation of the development-focused 
and project-based UfM, the „true weight” of the partnership moved to the ENP which still 
touches  political  issues  through its  Action  Plans  but  moves from the  multilateral  „unity” 
towards a system of tailor-made bilateral  cooperation.  The work-sharing between the two 
institutions can be viewed positively as well: the sensitive bilateral political issues guarded by 
the  ENP and  the  more  general,  less  sensitive  issues  of  multilateral  development  policies 
addressed by the UfM could lead to a complementary system of institutions. Still, as the ENP 
has  much more  leverage  to  implement  reforms in  the  region,  it  will  be  the  core  unit  of  
examination in the present work.
2.1.3. The ENP’s founding documents: the „Wider Europe” and the ENP Strategy Paper
After showing the two main European instruments of „making business” with the southern 
neighbors and choosing the ENP as our preferred field of study, it makes sense to have a look 
at the two funding documents of the ENP to extract the overall fundamental values of the 
policy before we go to dig deeper and make a sector-by-sector assessment of it in the next 
chapter.
1)   The „Wider Europe” Commission communication of 2003 describes the necessity and sets 
out the Commission’s plans to deal with the new geopolitical reality of Europe after the EU’s 
enlargement in the coming year.  The paper  acknowledges the interdependence of the 450 
million people living within the EU’s borders (the world’s biggest single market) and the 385 
million people living in its surrounding area (neighborhood). The EU realizes and accepts the 
challenge of taking responsibility of the well-being of people in its surroundings and develops 
this new policy to eliminate the possible emergence new dividing lines after the enlargement.
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The communication proposes that „the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a 
friendly neighborhood -a ‘ring of friends’- with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-
operative relations” and realizes that „all countries in the new neighborhood are confronted by 
the opportunities and challenges surrounding Proximity, Prosperity and Poverty.”63
By the  means  of  proximity  the  document  identifies  the  main  emerging  challenges  as  it 
„increases  the  importance  of  a  set  of  issues  revolving  around,  but  not  limited  to,  the 
management of the new external border and trans-boundary flows. The EU and the neighbors 
have a  mutual  interest  in  cooperating,  both bilaterally and regionally,  to  ensure that  their 
migration policies, customs procedures and frontier controls do not prevent or delay people or 
goods from crossing borders for legitimate purposes.” But also identifies „threats to mutual 
security,  whether  from the  trans-border  dimension  of  environmental  and nuclear  hazards, 
communicable diseases, illegal immigration, trafficking, organized crime or terrorist networks 
will require joint approaches in order to be addressed comprehensively.” As we will see later, 
this duality in the EU’s approach will turn up from time to time in the later ENP documents as 
well.
By the means of Prosperity and Poverty the EU acknowledges that „proximity policy must go 
hand-in-hand  with  action  to  tackle  the  root  causes  of  the  political  instability,  economic 
vulnerability,  institutional  deficiencies,  conflict  and  poverty and  social  exclusion.”  All  of 
these  negative  effects  can  be  effectively  cured  only  with  an  appropriate  socio-economic 
development policy, in which the EU is willing to help its neighbors and highlights that „the 
benefits of increased economic growth to all  sectors of society requires positive action to 
promote social inclusion via mutually reinforcing economic, employment and social policies. 
Attention  to  areas  including education,  health,  training  and housing is  equally important. 
Increasing environmental and economic efficiency should also proceed hand-in-hand.” But 
what are the tools/methods in the hands of the EU to provide answers to the challenges of the 
neighborhood’s proximity,  prosperity and poverty? The most the EU can do is to offer its 
neighbors  the  prospect  of  a  stake  in  the  EU’s  Internal  Market  and in  different  European 
(infrastructural) networks while making efforts to intensify security related cooperation and 
financial assistance as well.
63  EU Commission, 3003, Brussels: Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours
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The detailed list of duties is being drawn up as follows:64
- Extension of the internal market and regulatory structures
- Preferential trading relations and market opening
- Perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons
- Intensified cooperation to prevent and confront common security threats
- Greater EU involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management
- Greater efforts to promote human rights, further cultural cooperation and enhance mu-
tual understanding
- Integration to transport, energy and telecommunications networks and the European 
research area
- New instruments for investments promotion and protection
- Support for integration into the global trading system
- Enhanced assistance, better tailored to needs
- New sources of finance
As we see, the first two of the “offers” is market integration-related as the EU considers the 
possibility  of  giving  access  to  its  internal  market  the  most  appealing  opportunity  for  its 
neighbors. (And this is a true assumption.) Promoting lawful mobility and cooperation on 
security issues follows on the list. These can be considered the EU’s main threat perceptions 
from the neighborhood therefore this part we could label as the EU’S “self-defense issues”. 
Human  rights  promotion  is  also  a  priority  for  the  EU  which  predicts  already  one  core 
conditionality for  the EU’s financial  help while  integration into European networks gives 
another  possibility for  deeper  relations.  The last  four “offers” are  economy-related again: 
promoting trade integration and improving financial help.
Overall, we can say that in this very early list of „offers” we can already identify the core  
policy method of the ENP: giving economic incentives with security-related conditionality 
attached to them. The EU is ready to spend more on its neighbors and give them market 
access but only if they comply with its security and human rights-related expectations. Here 
we can’t go deeper into the examination of different offers and conditionalities, but we can 
already see the logic behind the EU’s approach which will fully surface in the next chapter 
when we make a sector-by-sector approach of the concrete and executable Action Plans.
64 EU Commission, 3003, Brussels: Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours
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2)     Second in line is the main funding document itself, the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Strategy Paper. This communication was issued right after the EU’s eastern enlargement in 
2004 with its aim stated as: „We have acquired new neighbors and have come closer to old 
ones. These circumstances have created both opportunities and challenges. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy is a response to this new situation.”65
This paper represents a much more crystallized idea of the new policy setting out details, 
mechanics and concrete aims of the ENP. Keeping most of the founding ideas from the Wider 
Europe concept, it identifies the main aim of the policy as „A Neighbourhood Policy for a 
European Union acting coherently and efficiently in the world” and names the Action Plans 
system (described in the next sub-chapter) the main tool in achieving this goal. It sets out the 
final  geographic  coverage as  well:  Eastern-Europe,  The Caucasus  and the Mediterranean. 
(Originally the Caucasus have not been included as having no direct border with the EU.) 
After describing how the ENP will complement (and not substitute) the existing institutions 
and their financial sources, it sets out the policy’s main driving principles: Joint Ownership, 
Differentiation and Added Value. Joint ownership is proposed on two levels: initially the EU 
draws in the partners from the very beginning of the process by offering co-ownership of the 
Action Plans which are developed and agreed by a commission including members from both 
the EU and the partner country. Second, the monitoring and evaluation of the process (AP 
implementation) is also done by this hybrid committee. This means to ensure co-ownership 
and commonly agreed implementation of the policy. Differentiation is ensured by the tailor-
made APs as all  of them contains special  measurements for each country adopting to the 
differences in partner’s aims and capabilities. Added value is ensured by the additionality of 
the ENP: it runs parallel to other forms of cooperation, and tries to fill the gaps amongst 
previous policies.
After identifying two exceptions (Belarus and Libya, who have limited contacts with the EU), 
the  paper  identifies  the  main  „priorities  of  action”  which  will  form the  backbone  of  the 
cooperation with all of the neighbors. The main priorities are (detailed further in the next 
chapter):
- Commitment to shared values
- A more effective political dialogue
65  European Commission, 2004, Brussels:  European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper
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- Economic and social development policy
- Trade and internal market
- Justice and Home Affairs
- Connecting the neighborhood (European Networks)
- People-to-people programs and agencies
- Regional cooperation on the EU border
How these priorities are translated to concrete  actions will  be the main topic of the next 
chapter of this work using a sector-by-sector approach by the detailed examination of Action 
Plans. The document closes with the short introduction of the legal and financial background 
of the new policy, identifying the new main financial instrument, the ENPI (originally ENI) 
and its budget for the period 2007-2013. Finally, the work on the Action Plans gets a kick-
start: „On this basis, the Commission, with the Presidency and the High Representative, will 
take contact with the partner countries concerned, with a view to completing Actions Plans 
with them before the end of July 2004. Member States will be kept fully informed of the 
development of these consultations.”66
2.1.4 The ENP’s work-flow through the system of Action Plans
After introducing its founding elements, we should have a deeper look at how the European 
Neighbourhood  Policy  woks  in  practice.  First  of  all,  we  have  to  identify  the  already 
introduced Action Plans (APs) as the main vehicles of „value and interest transport” between 
the EU and its neighbors. As already stated, APs are tailor made for each partner including 
offers for help and conditions to these offers by the EU. These plans are co-developed by the 
EU and the neighbors, but as the ENP is completely EU-financed they tend to mirror mainly 
the  EU’s  interests  and  only  marginally  the  interests  of  neighbors.  Still,  co-ownership  is 
present  as  the  process  of  implementation  is  also  carried  out  and  monitored  by  mixed 
committees including members from both sides.
To gain a deeper insight to the working mechanisms of the ENP, first  the method of AP 
implementation has to be clarified. The work flow of the ENP includes three stages through 
which the progress towards EU values can be monitored and evaluated in the case of each 
partner country. These are the following:
66  European Commission, 2004, Brussels:  European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper
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The first stage is the examination of each partner’s current status: the Commission prepared 
Country Reports assessing the political and economic situation as well as institutional and 
sectoral aspects to evaluate when and how it is possible to deepen relations with the given 
country. Twelve Country Reports were published between 2004 and 2005. Country Reports 
are submitted to the Council which decides whether to proceed to the next stage of relations.
The next stage is the development of Action Plans with each country. These documents are 
negotiated with and tailor-made for each country, based on the country’s needs and capacities, 
as  well  as  their  and  the  EU’s  interests.  They  jointly  define  an  agenda  of  political  and 
economic reforms by means of  short  and medium-term (3-5 years)  priorities.  They cover 
political  dialogue  and  reform,  economic  and  social  cooperation  and  development,  trade-
related issues and market regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs and a 
human dimension. In exchange for reforms the EU provides greater integration into European 
programs and networks, increased financial assistance and enhanced market access.
The  third  stage  is  when  the  implementation  of  the  mutual  commitments  and  objectives 
contained in the Action Plans are examined through sub-committees with each country, and 
the  outcomes  are  summarized  in  periodic  reports  on  progress  (Progress  Reports).  The 
Commission has already evaluated the overall progress of the ENP’s first period (2004-2009), 
and twelve Progress Reports were adopted on 12 May 2009. 
The findings of the Progress Reports are then effecting the new generation of Action Plans, 
which  describe  the  outputs  that  the  given  country  still  has  to  deliver,  while  the  already 
accomplished ones get to be integrated to the bilateral Association Agreements, therefore they 
become parts of the legal relations between the EU and the given country:67
Finally, it makes sense to summarize the aims and tools of the ENP in one comprehensive 
table before we jump into the detailed examination of Action plans in the next chapter:
67 Source: The author's own work (2011)
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2.2 Four sectors of EU-MENA security interdependence
2.2.1     The structure of Action Plans: revealing the sectors of interdependence
The examination of inter-regional sectors of interdependence between the two halves of the 
Euro-Mediterranean area will follow closely the structure of the Action Plans in this chapter. 
The  four  Buzanian  sectors  of  security  (Military,Political,Societal  and  Environmental)  are 
perfectly represented in the structure of APs therefore all we have to do is to categorize the 
several  „points  of  action”  in  the  APs   into  the  four  Buzanian  sectors  and  give  them a 
systematic evaluation in the light of the post-Arab Spring realities of the MENA region. The 
methodology of this chapter will therefore follow the original Buzanian structure: first we 
identify the Actors, Objects and Agenda components of each sector with the help of the APs 
which will show us the EU’s main fields of concern regarding the MENA. Second, we give a 
post-Arab Spring „reality check” to these concerns by identifying the most recent Threats and 
Dynamics in the region in the examined sectors. Finally we can conclude our examination by 
identifying areas where the pre-Arab Spring ENP architecture is „missing the point” and give 
recommendations how it could be changed to make it able to formulate better answers to 
contemporary challenges.
As  already  introduced  before,  APs  are  tailor-made  for  each  country  therefore  a  truly 
comprehensive examination would invoke the complete check of each partner country’s AP 
one-by-one. Of course this process would far exceed the limits of this current work but there 
is no reason to give up our need for a comprehensive picture: APs are individual and different 
for each partner but their structure is largely similar. The only differences are in the weight-
points of each AP but the examined „points of action” are recurrent in each document. This 
means that we can examine the structure of APs „in general” and give space occasionally to 
country-specific investigation when it’s necessary. In this introductory part we can already 
draw up the general structure of APs, showing the overall build-up of these documents and the 
list of the „priorities of action”, which priorities will be later categorized into the four sectors 
of EU-MENA interdependence. 
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The structure of the Action Plans can be divided into four main parts: 
- „Introduction” explaining the aims of the AP in general
- „New Partnership Perspectives” summarizing the EU’s offers to the cooperating partners
- „Priorities for Action” which summarizes the EU’s expectations to the partners
- „Actions” describing the EU’s expectations in details
The „Introduction” shortly summarizes the historical evolution and institutional context of the 
relations between the EU and the given country and strongly emphasizes that the ambitious 
aims of the AP are a product of joint ownership, meaning that the AP was created and agreed 
by a committee including members from both sides. The key sentence here is the following: 
„The Action Plan will take into account the balance between the acceleration necessary for 
dynamic  implementation  and  modernization  of  the  [given  country’s]  economy  and  the 
imperatives of a sustainable socio-economic development.” The „balance” means here that the 
EU  is  aware  of  the  limits  that  these  countries  can  offer  in  terms  of  socio-economic 
development, therefore it will be patient regarding the speed of such reforms. 
„New Partnership  Perspectives”  describe  what  the  EU can  offer  to  the  given  country  in 
exchange for the requested socio-economic developments. The offer is the following:68
•  The perspective  of  moving beyond the  existing relationship  to  a  significant  degree  of  economic 
integration including through a stake in the EU’s Internal  Market,  which aims to promote the free  
movements of goods, services, capitals and persons and the possibility to participate progressively in 
key aspects of EU policies and programmes.
• An upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation.
•  Deepening trade and economic relations through the continued reduction of trade barriers on both  
sides, increased access to each others’ markets including in agriculture and services and continuous  
upgrading  of  economic  legislation.  This  will  stimulate  trade  and  foreign  direct  investment  and 
accelerate  economic  growth  accompanied  by  a  sufficient  strengthening  of  the  private  sector  and 
business conditions leading to a greater economic integration with the European Union.
•  Increased  financial  support:  EU  financial  assistance  will  be  better  targeted  to  support  the 
implementation of the actions identified in the present document, as well as the implementation of the 
Association  Agreement  and  development,  modernization and  reform agenda of  the  Government  of 
Egypt,  in  particular  developing  human  resources  and  enhancing  the  business  climate  to  increase 
investment  and employment.  The European Commission is  furthermore proposing a new European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose, also covering cross-border and 
transnational  cooperation  between  Egypt  and  EU  Member  States.  There  will  also  be  support  for 
infrastructure investment as well as for the development of the private sector and partnership through 
the European Investment Bank and FEMIP;
68 Source: Egyptian Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
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•  Prospect  of  gradual  opening  of  or  reinforced  co-operation  in  relevant  European  Community 
programmes promoting cultural, educational, environmental, technological and scientific links;
• Support for meeting EU and international norms and standards and for modernization efforts including 
through  technical  assistance  and  twinning,  as  well  as  targeted  support  and  advise  for  legislative 
approximation through mechanisms such as TAIEX;
•  Enhanced direct cooperation between administrations based on the bodies set up by the Association 
Agreement  in particular  institutionalized thematic sub-committees.  In  light  of the fulfillment of the 
objectives of this Action Plan and of the overall evolution of relations, consideration will be given to the 
possibility of a new contractual relationship.
As we can easily identify, the EU tries to attract its partners already at the first pages of the 
APs.  The  most  appealing  is  probably  the  offer  of  greater  economic  integration  with  the 
European  Union  which  leads  to  gain  access  to  the  EU’s  internal  market.  The  two  main 
problem rise already here: the offer is blurred (there is no agenda set), and excludes any kind 
of (even partial) future membership prospects, which can be strongly demotivating. Increased 
financial support on the other hand is an offer which can easily convince a country that the 
ENP participation  is  useful  on  the  short  run  but  can  raise  doubts  about  the  long  term 
commitment.
The reform developments the EU expects in exchange are listed at the „Priorities for Action” 
part,  where we can already identify the two main issue areas  directing European policies 
towards  neighbor countries:  security and economics.  The following list  is  the original  19 
points mentioned in the Egyptian AP (in shortened forms):69
• Enhance political dialogue and co-operation, based on shared values 
• Enhance dialogue on security issues such as disarmament and arms control 
• Enhance the effectiveness of institutions entrusted with strengthening democracy and the
rule of law and consolidate the independent and effective administration of justice.
• Promote the protection of human rights in all its aspects
• Increase economic integration with the EU
• Improving macroeconomic governance, reforming the financial sector, strengthening the
role of the private sector, enhancing the business climate
• Boost industrial development and enterprises capabilities and competitiveness through
improved skills, better access to finance, promotion of new technologies
• Deepen and enhance the existing economic dialogue and identify areas suitable for gradual
regulatory upgrading and approximation with EU technical legislation
• Proceed in reforming the tax system, improving public finance management, and
69  Source: Egyptian Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
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upgrading public institutions.
• Promote south-south trade, through encouraging FDI participation in regional projects such
as: infrastructure, trade facilitation, energy and transport.
• Strengthen cooperation on poverty reduction throgh employment and social development.
• Promote cooperation in the area of education, science and technology
• Promote cooperation in the area of information technology and communications through promoting 
information society and its sustainability
• Strengthen co-operation on migration-related issues, including the effective joint
management of migration flows. 
• Promote cooperation on fight against organised crime, including trafficking in human
beings, fight against drugs, fight against money laundering, and police and judicial cooperation.
• Promote co-operation in the transport field, in particular on developing infrastructure
• Enhance cooperation in the energy sector, in particular through energy policy exchanges
• Strengthen the environmental dimension of public policy.
• Strengthen links and co-operation in “people-to-people” contacts in youth and sports,
culture and audiovisual areas and civil society
As we already see here, most of these points fit into our sectoral research agenda and we will 
be  able  to  gather  them  into  the  four  Buzanian  sectors  of  interdependence.  (Except  for 
economy-related issues which are the topic of the next chapter.) If we go further into details 
and check the „Actions” part, the picture becomes a bit more complicated: it includes around 
450 points of action, which count for at least 80% of the AP’s text. These „Actions” are the 
detailed specifications of the already listed „Priorities for Action”, therefore we do not have to 
„re-sectorize” them, instead they just show a deeper level of each sector from where we can 
pick issues that are highly relevant to the actual focus of our research. 
2.2.2. Military sector and hard security issues
From the APs we can gather two relevant points of action regarding hard security that have 
high importance for the EU and therefore for the ENP as well (original long forms): 
•   Enhance  dialogue  on  security  issues  such  as  disarmament  and  arms  control; 
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their  delivery systems, including the 
objective of establishing a zone free of WMD and their delivery systems in the Middle East; 
strengthening the fight against terrorism; peacekeeping.
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•  Promote  cooperation  on  fight  against  organised  crime,  including  trafficking  in  human 
beings,  fight  against  drugs,  fight  against  money  laundering,  and  police  and  judicial 
cooperation.
What are the Actors, Objects and Agenda components of these points? What are the Threats 
and Dynamics in this sector? These are the questions we try to answer in this sub-chapter. The 
first point can be examined around three main issues: 1)Co-operation on foreign and security 
policy, 2)Combating terrorism and promoting disarmament 3)Non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery. The second point can be split into two other 
areas: 4)Fight against organized crime and drugs, money laundering, financial and economic 
crime and 5)Law enforcement cooperation. Of course, here we will not be able to examine in 
depth all  of the relevant actual issues these points refer to but we can still  pick the most  
relevant ones to show some details of MENA-EU interdependence in this particular sector.
1) Co-operation on foreign and security policy is the broadest issue out of the six mentioned 
above. Here we face a really broad set of issues therefore we will have to pick and focus only 
on  the  most  important  ones.  These  are:  cooperation  in  jointly  agreed  areas  of  Common 
Foreign  and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security  and Defense  Policy (ESDP), 
participation in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, cooperation through the UN framework and 
cooperation  in  regional  crisis  areas:  Palestine,  Western  Sahara  and  Lebanon.  Finally,  the 
ongoing civil war in Syria has also high relevance.
Participation in the work of the EU’s common security-related institutions (CFSP and ESDP) 
can be described with only modest success. As CFSP and ESDP are themselves still „young” 
and quite  underdeveloped areas of the EU’s common policies one can not  expect serious 
relevance from them regarding the neighborhood either. (The only Mediterranean partner yet 
involved in CFSP dialouge is Jordan.) On the other hand some coherency can be definitely 
detected  in  the  relations  between  the  ENP and  the  CFSP/ESDP:  The  European  Security 
Strategy Paper (2003) lines out exactly the same areas of concerns we found here in the APs: 
„As such the ESS identifies a string of key threats  Europe needs to deal with:  terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states, and organized 
crime.”70 This  means  that  the  ENP-ESDP convergence  could  produce  more  EU-MENA 
security cooperation on the long term.
70 European Security Strategy Paper, European Commission, 2003
75
Participation in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue shows a more relevant engagement from 
both  sides.  This  „platform”  can  be  seen  as  the  main  tool  of  EU-MENA cooperation  on 
security issues, therefore it has a huge relevance for the ENP as well. Containing all NATO 
members plus seven Mediterranean partners (including Israel) it gives the main consultation 
possibility not only to EU-MENA army chiefs but also for consultations amongst MENA 
countries.  Furthermore,  NATO’s  relevance  in  the  region  is  obviously important  not  only 
because the EU alone have no capabilities to maintain peace in the MENA but also because of 
the active role NATO played recently in the region. Although the „Iraqi Freedom” operation 
was widely perceived negatively in the region, more recently the no-flight zone operation in 
Libya was seen more positively. This action was a common NATO-EU success which gave 
also more relevance to the Mediterranean Dialogue as well and Libya, a former NATO enemy 
got already invited: in the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO heads of states issued a declaration 
citing Libya was "welcome" as a NATO partner "if it so wishes", through the Mediterranean 
Dialogue.71
On the other hand cooperation through the UN and the cooperation in crisis areas shows a 
mixed picture. There are several crisis areas in the region, but the most problematic issues are 
as follows:  the Palestinian-Israeli  conflict,  the Western Sahara conflict  and the conflict  in 
Lebanon. UN-EU-MENA cooperation in Palestine is widespread: the EU is a main financial 
donor of the Palestinian state while the UN has a longstanding mission (UNRWA) in the area 
promoting  peace.  Jordan  and  Egypt  play  also  an  important  supportive  role  in  the  peace 
process. Unfortunately all these efforts seem to be fruitless yet  and the process shows no 
linear progress,  rather cyclical ups and downs. Still  this  conflict  remains one of the most 
important elements of EU-MENA security interdependence. The conflict in Western Sahara is 
also  a  longstanding  problem  of  the  region  where  we  can  witness  some  UN-EU-MENA 
cooperation.  As the main  source of  Algerian-Moroccan tensions,  this  conflict  has  already 
wrecked  some  regional  cooperation  initiatives  (the  Arab  Maghreb  Union  for  instance) 
therefore it’s highly relevant for the ENP as well. Here the roles are again that the EU gives 
financial help wile the UN has a mission to maintain peace (MINURSO), but in this case we 
can not talk about any supportive role of local regimes. In Lebanon the setting is quite the 
same: there is a UN peacekeeper contingent (UNIFIL) and some financial support from the 
EU, but long-term stability can’t be reached as powers in the region are not supportive of the 
peace process (Iran, Syria and Israel).
71 See: NATO Chicago Summit, http://www.chicagonato.org/
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After the three „frozen conflicts” described above, we also have to mention the ongoing civil 
war in Syria. As a UN Security Council resolution was not possible in this case, we can not  
speak  of  UN-EU-MENA  cooperation  in  this  case  but  still  this  conflict  has  a  serious 
importance for EU-MENA relations anyway. EU-NATO inactivity in this case can seriously 
backfire later as there will be far less pro-western elements in Syria’s new government once 
the current regime collapses. This could trigger problems in the implementation of the ENP in 
Sirya later which could negatively affect the „governability” of EU-Syria relations as well.
2) Combating terrorism and promoting disarmament is an other highly important issue of EU-
MENA interdependence: main actors in this area include different regional branches of Al-
Quaeda and other armed groups which are highly active in the region. Besides the already 
mentioned conflict in Syria where currently several armed groups fight the government with 
different ideological backgrounds (not all of which are West-friendly!), in Libya there are also 
several armed groups still in „operation” after the end of the civil war there. Other groups, 
like Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in Lebanon are also presenting serious concerns for the EU, 
therefore will have to be tackled through the ENP in some form. On the long term all of these 
groups will have to be disarmed and this should be reflected as a main ENP priority. The latest 
negative  developments  in  this  area  include  the  re-activation  of  Al-Quaeda  in  the  Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, which is largely the effect of the Libyan civil war and will have to 
be dealt with through the UN Security Council. AQIM is also active in Algeria, Libya and 
Mauritania which gives further challenges for the ENP’s implementation on the long term.
3) Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an other highly sensitive issue: Libya, 
Syria, Algeria and Egypt all have stocks of different WMDs: they don’t posses any nuclear 
weapons  but  chemical  and even biological  weapons  they all  have.  To ensure  that  in  the 
present turbulent times these weapons are not falling into the hands of AQIM or other armed 
groups is a high priority for the EU therefore in the ENP implementation it should have an 
important role. On the long term, disarmament of WMDs (and light weapons too) should be 
on the agenda and be implemented as one of the „hard” conditionalities for Europe’s financial 
engagement in the MENA.
4) Fight against organized crime, drugs, money laundering, financial and economic crime play 
also an important role in EU-MENA relations. Drug supply routes from Africa and South-
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America all cross the MENA before arriving to Europe therefore an other important ENP 
priority should be to deal with these „import” routes with common actions. Illegal drug and 
weapon business and human trafficking generates a lot of „black cash” which arrives mainly 
into European banks through money laundering. In this field the EU itself should be more 
effective, taking bank regulations and money-tracking more seriously. North African states 
(especially Morocco) are themselves drug producers, selling most of their products in Europe 
which  can  be  effectively pushed back not  only by more  effective  cooperation  on  border 
controls but also by the MENA local authorities’ more aggressive actions against the local 
producers.
5)  This  leads  us  to  the  last  issue:  law enforcement  cooperation.  In  this  field  EU-MENA 
cooperation improved a lot  recently.  The EU recognizing the interdependence between its 
own safety and the effectiveness of MENA law enforcement implemented several cooperation 
projects between European and North African police forces. This helped local authorities not 
only to boost human capacities and the quality of their technical equipment but also improved 
institutional capabilities through „technical assistance”. Success in this area motivates the EU 
to engage even more and open funds progressively for law enforcement cooperation projects 
in the future.
As conclusions we can identify several actors, objects and agendas in the arena of EU-MENA 
„hard security” relations. A clear agenda from the EU’s side is to engage more deeply in the 
security  issues  of  its  southern  neighbors  with the  purpose  to  prevent  itself  from security 
threats.  Common  institutional  solutions  to  fulfill  this  aim include  cooperation  within  the 
CFSP/ESDP agenda with the southern partners, but this cooperation is really underdeveloped 
yet.  An other,  more successful  form is  the cooperation  within the  framework of  NATO’s 
Mediterranean Dialogue,  which could have a progressive future in the light  of the recent 
NATO mission in Libya. Cooperation within the UN peacekeeping agenda is existing, but the 
„frozen conflicts” this cooperation deals with have shown no signs of progress in the last 
decades. Objects threatening peace in the MENA are weapons of mass destruction which are 
quite proliferated in the region. Although no MENA country has used them lately (even Syria 
withholds  them during  its  civil  war),  the  possibility  of  use  is  present.  Controlling  these 
WMDs and preventing them to fall into the hands of different radical armed groups should be 
top priority on the EU’s MENA-agenda, therefore represented widely in the ENP. Several 
different actors are making EU-MENA relations even more interdependent: Activism of the 
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Al-Quaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North-Africa and the Sahel should inform the 
EU about the need to fight terrorism more heavily and effectively in the region, while the 
disarmament of different armed groups (mainly in Libya and Mali) should be also on the top 
of the agenda. Agents of organized crime, drugs, human trafficking and money laundering are 
also heavily present in the inter-regional ties and the EU has successfully identified the best 
tool to fight these: law enforcement cooperation. Growing EU activism in these fields both 
confirms and tries to deal with these hard security threats of inter-regional interdependence, 
which are well summarized by the following map (witness trafficking routes aiming to reach 
Europe and how they cross the huge territory controlled by AQIM and its allies)72:
 Further  „hard  security”  threats  and  dynamics  emerging  from the  new post-Arab  Spring 
setting are elaborated in the last chapter of the current work but the main issue areas described 
here give already a sight of strong security interdependence between the EU and the MENA 
and pose an effective argument to deal with these two regions as a single Security Complex.
2.2.3. Political sector: good governance, human rights and freedoms
The political sector of EU-MENA interdependence (meaning here mainly domestic MENA 
political issues affecting the EU) have a high importance for Euro-Med relations therefore for 
the ENP itself as well. The recent political transitions in the MENA (Arab Spring) will not be 
72 Source: Morocco on the move, http://moroccoonthemove.wordpress.com/2011/12/13/special-report-al-qaida-
seeks-new-somalia-in-n-africa-w-sahara-dispute-cited-as-obstacle-to-counterinsurgency/ 
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elaborated in this sub-chapter as these issues will be the focal point of the last chapter of this 
work. Rather, here we will elaborate some general political improvements requested by the 
EU in the APs from its Mediterranean partners and see how these issues tackle the supposed 
interdependence. From the APs we can gather three relevant points of action regarding the 
domestic political sector (shortened forms):
• Enhance the effectiveness of institutions entrusted with strengthening democracy and the
rule of law and consolidate the independent and effective administration of justice.
• Promote the protection of human rights in all its aspects
•  Enhance  political  dialogue  and  co-operation,  based  on  shared  values  and  fundamental 
freedoms
From these three  points  five  core  issues  can  be clearly distinguished:  1)  effectiveness  of 
(government)  institutions  2)  strengthening  democracy  3)  rule  of  law  4)  independent  and 
effective  administration  (bureaucracy)  5)  protection  of  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms.
The most important out of these are the ones which intend to enhance the partner countries’ 
domestic institutional framework (1. and 4.) with the aim to promote the rule of law in the 
region (3). These requirements have a far reaching effects: the business environment depends 
largely on the  quality of  a  given country’s  institutional  background and one of  the  main 
business sector, tourism depends on it even more. We can see therefore these demands of the 
EU as the core interests of the MENA partners as well.  The World Bank’s ease of doing 
business index73 shows us that most MENA partners (with the only exception of Tunisia) were 
in the lower half of the index list which indicates that there is a lot of space to progress.
Rule of law and a stable institutional background is inevitable not only for doing business in a 
given country but it also affects all aspects of societal progress. The main backdrop against an 
effective  bureaucracy  and  good  governance  in  MENA states  is  corruption.  Transparency 
International’s  corruption  index74 places  all  MENA states  amongst  the  most  corrupt  ones 
73 World Bank ease of doing business: http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
74 Transparency International’s corruption index: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
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which indicates that this is a core problem of the region. An ineffective bureaucracy hostile to 
doing  business  together  with  corrupt  politicians  and  decision-makers  can  easily  ruin  the 
prospects  of  economic  progress  in  the  region.  This  indirectly  affects  EU-MENA 
interdependence as the gloomy economic prospects and the growing crowds of the jobless 
youth  raise  a  heavy migrational  pressure  towards  the  EU.  Also  as  these  conditions  were 
triggering economic stagnation, they indirectly (and sometimes directly) presented a source of 
political unrest  leading the region into the events of the Arab Spring.  Now we can easily 
conclude that the autocratic governments should have listened to the EU before it was too late 
as the Egyptian AP writes: „Pursue and support the government in the further modernization 
and  development  of  public  services  rendered  to  citizens,  promoting  accountability, 
transparency and contestability.”75
The  other  main  source  of  the  unrest  were  the  lack  of  democracy (2),  human  rights  and 
fundamental freedoms (5). Before the Arab Spring the „request” from the EU to strengthen 
democracy in the region was mainly a theoretical issue. MENA states were governed mainly 
by autocrats  and monarchs,  therefore there wasn’t  really a democracy to strengthen. Still, 
even pre-Arab Spring there were issues to bring up without directly challenging the regnating 
governments:  decentralization and strengthening dialogue with European partner  agencies. 
Both of these can be seen as a possible source for the (often contested) democracy-spillover 
effect,  which  states  that  connections  with  democratic  counterparts  in  Europe  through  the 
demonstration effect could change the mentality of local officials and give the establishment a 
bottom-up pressure for reform. This together with decentralization of governance (and the 
spread of internet-penetration) can help the people avoid more effectively direct government 
control and undermine the government’s monopoly on political life.
Protection of human rights  and fundamental  freedoms forms also a  relevant  set  of  issues 
within  the  political  agenda  of  EU-MENA relations.  The  most  pressing  issue  here  is  the 
brutality of sate police in each MENA autocracies which also added to the several sources of 
public unrest. (In Tunisia it was even the main triggering issue.) Human right violations were 
the parts of everyday life in MENA states, police assaults and imprisonment without legal 
verdict were common. Again, if autocrats would have listened to APs before the upheavals 
they might  have prolonged their  own careers  as  these  issues  mounted to  more and more 
popular unrest. The other serious human-rights related issue is the inequality of women in 
75  Source: Egyptian Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
81
MENA societies. This issue brings us far from the current topic (to the values of Islam) but 
still, it deserves to be mentioned as the need for more freedoms for women was recognized 
immediately after the new governments took place in the revolting countries. For example the 
EU’s request to „Promote the enhancement of women’s participation in political, economic 
and social life as well as their role in the political decision-making process by supporting the 
formulation  and  implementation  of  Egypt’s  government  policies  and  programmes”  was 
recognized even by Mohammed Morsi’s new Islamist government in Egypt who managed to 
include women in his new government.76
Finally, freedom of association and of expression and pluralism of the media forms an other 
huge set of issues within MENA domestic policies. Pre-Arab Spring media was completely 
controlled by autocratic governments and this was only lately counterbalanced by the growth 
of internet-penetration in the region. This issue was widely covered during the upheavals how 
Facebook and amateur videos of atrocities were used to maintain popular dissent and help to 
organize  resistance  against  governments.77 Pluralist  media  did  not  come  by  EU-advised 
reforms to the MENA but it came with technological development. Freedom of association 
was also  widely controlled,  therefore forcing people  to  illegally organize  themselves,  but 
when they openly started to „associate” on Tahrir Square it was again too late to recognize 
their right for it and the EU’s recommendation became enforced by the people themselves.
As the several (Buzanian) objects, actors and agendas of the political sector can not be fully 
elaborated in this short sub-chapter we just took some sample elements to show EU-MENA 
interdependence in this field as well. Because of the recent uprisings in the Arab World (Arab 
Spring), this sector will have to be examined in much more detail than the other three in this 
chapter. This is why we will give the whole last chapter of the current work to this topic and  
elaborate the effects (threats and dynamics) of the Arab Spring there. Here we just have to 
remind us again that the engagement of the EU in the uprisings and the turmoil in EU policy 
making that they caused in Brussels gave a clear confirmation to this interdependence, which 
was far less admitted before.
76 See: Mohamed Morsi to pick woman and Christian as Egypt's vice-presidents,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/26/mohamed-morsi-christian-woman-egypt 
77 See: Facebook and Twitter key to Arab Spring uprisings: report by Carol Huang
http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/facebook-and-twitter-key-to-arab-spring-uprisings-report 
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2.2.4. Societal sector: employment, education and migration
EU-MENA societal ties and interdependence is often an overlooked sector of inter-regional 
relations.  After  politics,  economics  and  „hard  security”  sectors  of  interdependence,  the 
societal sector might seem to be as having only second priority but this can not be confirmed 
if we have a deeper look into the concrete set of issues. Surprisingly high number of „points 
of action” tackles the societal  sector in the APs which indirectly confirms that this  sector 
enjoys high priority amongst EU decision-makers (shortened forms): 
• Strengthen cooperation on poverty reduction, employment and social development (1)
• Promote cooperation in the area of education, science and technology (2)
•  Promote cooperation in the area of information technology and communications through 
promoting information society and its sustainability (3)
• Strengthen co-operation on migration-related issues, including the effective joint
management of migration flows (4)
• Strengthen links and co-operation in “people-to-people” contacts in youth and sports,
culture and audiovisual areas and civil society (5)
Far the most important issue is poverty reduction and employment (1) which is closely related 
to the „management” of migration flows (4). The EU realizing that the main security threat 
steaming  from the  MENA is  uncontrolled  migration  flows  to  it’s  territory  made  several 
bilateral arrangements with MENA governments on migration, rewarding them for „keeping 
home” their potential migrants. The temporary collapse of these arrangements during the Arab 
Spring led to the uncontrolled flow of migrants to EU territory triggering a humanitarian crisis 
(most affected was Italy). On the other hand, assimilation problems with already EU-citizen 
migrants gave an other boost of priority to this issue even before the recent „floods”. 
The following map shows the main MENA-EU migrational patterns:78
78 Image Source: Medsec project: http://www.medsecnet.org/ 
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The „realist  and short  term solution” to  migrational  threats  is  being treated as only half-
effective  among  EU  policy  makers  now-days  as  it  became  clear  that  these  bilateral 
arrangements treat only the symptoms but not the real causes of the migrational problem. The 
real causes are at least twofold: poverty and youth unemployment. These two issues are of 
course interrelated and again, they also played at least a partial role in the recent uprisings. 
Poverty levels are high and growing throughout the Southern Mediterranean: 
The issue is the most pressing in Egypt and Morocco, where a significant percentage of the 
population have to live under the poverty line, Jordan and Tunisia are less affected. Poverty 
reduction in these states works mainly through food subsidies, which also forms a huge chunk 
of government expenditure. When food price shocks occur or government budget deficits rise 
allowing less subsidies for basic foods, it immediately generates societal tensions within these 
societies. Reducing poverty is a really complex issue and there are no „magic recepies”, but 
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developing the economy forms the only possible answer on the long term. (More about this in 
the economic chapter.)
The  other  really  hard  issue  is  youth  unemployment.  The  demographic  boom  of  MENA 
societies led to an „overload” of young people in these states. The „classic” answer to this was 
securing „fake” governmental jobs for them and prolonging their educational career. Both of 
these  strategies  turned  out  to  be  only  short-term  solutions  and  generated  even  more 
government  expenses  and  educated  youngsters  with  no  real  work  prospects  after  their 
graduation. Unemployment (and the under-employment of educated people) gave an other 
boost to societal tensions and contributed significantly to the causes of the recent uprisings in 
the region. Both youth- and overall unemployment is the highest in the MENA amongst the 
world’s regions:
 
An  other  closely  related  but  a  little  bit  less  significant  issue  is  education,  science  and 
technology (2) information society(3). Education presents a two-sided problem as not only 
over-education (as discussed above), but in parallel with this under-education is also present. 
Women illiteracy is a serious problem in poorer MENA societies (Jordan and Tunisia are both 
richer and have almost 100% literacy rate)79: 
79 Source: Population Reference  Bureau 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/PolicyBriefs/EmpoweringWomenDevelopingSocietyFemaleEducationinthe
MiddleEastandNorthAfrica.aspx
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The overall illiteracy rate is 42% in the whole MENA which signals a serious weakness of the 
educational system. Higher education shows a more bright picture in numbers, but this could 
be at least partially the effect of the already discussed over-education problem. Both (higher-) 
education and science-technology cooperation forms exist between the EU and MENA states, 
but  this  is  again a  field where the EU can not  contribute significantly into solving these 
problems, this will be (together with unemployment) one of the biggest challenges for the new 
post-Arab Spring MENA governments.
Progress  in  the  field  of  information  society  shows  a  different  picture.  Not  because  of 
government  incentives  but  because  of  the  rapid  spread  of  wireless  technologies,  the 
traditionally low internet-penetration of MENA societies started to change in the recent years 
significantly:80
As we see, internet penetration grew almost tenfold in most of MENA societies during the last 
decade (witness also the significant rate of Facebook usage), which prevented governments to 
sustain media-monopolies and control the flow of information centrally, also partially adding 
to the set of sources for the current upheavals.
80 Source: Internet World Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm
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Growing  internet  usage  automatically  strengthened  links  and  co-operation  in  “people-to-
people” contacts in youth and sports, culture and audiovisual areas and civil society (5) which 
was an other EU „wish” in the Action Plans. Growing virtual EU-MENA “people-to-people” 
links  through the  internet  had  an  undeniable  demonstration  effect  about  the  lifestyle  and 
values  of  their  European  counterparts  amongst  the  Arab  youth.  European  lifestyle  and 
economic wealth in contrast with the day-today miseries of their own societies documented on 
internet videos mounted additional pressure against  the authoritarian regimes. The already 
suggested „democracy spillover” effect might not came to MENA societies mainly through 
the ENP and its civil NGO cooperation programs as EU officials planned, but it flooded the 
minds of youth people through the internet. (Of course this doesn’t implies that these ENP 
programs are useless.)
Concluding on the societal sector of EU-MENA interdependence, employment, education and 
migration seem to be the most pressing issues, in which the EU can provide only little help for 
progress. Taming the migration pressure is  one of the top EU priorities and Action Plans 
reflect this but on the other hand tools in the EU’s hands to tackle this problem are limited. 
(Except for short-term administrative solutions.) MENA governments themselves will have to 
come up with solutions in these areas and this group of problems can easily become their 
biggest challenge in the coming years, even capable to decide their success or fail in the long 
term. On the other hand, progress in the field of information society is significant although 
this is not the fruit of any government policies (or the ENP), but the simple consequence of 
technological progress. Loosing the capability to control the flow of information played a 
significant role in the collapse of authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring, and internet-
transmitted demonstration effects played a key role in generating popular dissent. Case studies 
in the las chapter of this work will also elaborate these issues further.
2.2.5.    Environmental sector and the EU’s energy dependence
The last set of EU-MENA interdependence issues are found in the environmental sector. Here 
we  will  use  a  wider  definition  for  this  sector,  which  will  include  not  only  purely 
environmental cases but also other ones closely related to them like energy usage. The APs 
are providing us only two „priorities of action” closely related to environmental and energy 
issues (short forms):
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• Enhance cooperation in the energy sector, in particular through energy policy exchanges(1)
• Strengthen the environmental dimension of public policy(2)
But here we can include two flagship projects of the UfM as well: The De-pollution of the 
Mediterranean Sea(3) and the Mediterranean Solar Plan(4).
What  the  EU wants  to  achieve  through  energy policy  exchanges(1)  is  to  make  partners 
„cooperate in the development of an overall long term energy strategy converging towards EU
energy policy objectives.” This includes several issues and involves also the environmental 
improvement of the MENA’s energy sector infrastructure but the dominance of a „hidden 
aim” here is undeniable: As EU dependence on MENA hydrocarbon reserves proves to be 
highly significant, the EU really would like to take some control of this issue and secure the 
stability of its incoming energy supplies. The APs formulate this as to „Enhance energy policy 
cooperation through information exchange (eg workshops on general energy policy; energy 
statistics, data mining and forecast systems; energy investments; energy technologies transfer 
and  industrial  cooperation;  and  electricity  and  gas  markets  and  interconnections.” 
Interconnectedness of the Euro-Med gas markets is undeniable as we can see on this map 
showing MENA hydrocarbon resources and MENA-EU trade routes and pipes:81
81 Image Source: MEDSEC project, http://www.medsecnet.org
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Southern EU members import most of their gas and oil supplies from North Africa therefore 
we can suspect that green technology transfer and industrial cooperation here enyojs only a 
lower  degree  of  EU ambitions  and  the  real  aim is  the  building  of  forecast  systems  and 
securing of smoothness of supplies.  The ENP here shows clear  signs of a  highly „realist 
approach” aiming to take as much control of MENA supply routes as possible. This can be at 
least partially the consequence of bad experience with the EU’s other main energy suppler, 
Russia. Strategically thinking, EU oil and gas companies try to acquire as much shares of 
MENA oil companies as possible and they also take concessions to produce gas and oil in the 
region themselves. This tendency was also recognized by Russia and Gazprom made efforts to 
gain control over MENA reserves effectively building an EU-supply monopoly for himself. 
The final outcome of this race is yet to be seen.
An  other  significant  energy cooperation  project  is  the  Mediterranean  solar  plan(4).  Here 
environmental motivations are much more obviously present but the EU’s economic interests 
are also widely involved. The plan itself is to bring North African solar power into the EU 
through the connected „Euro-Med energy ring” (which is  the planned connection of EU-
MENA  electricity  transmission  networks)  and  the  development  of  solar  power  plants 
throughout the Sahara. This could have a special importance for both of the partners: „The 
development  of  solar  power in  North Africa,  which could bring carbon-free electricity to 
Europe, might easily be the most important trans-Mediterranean cooperation of future years. 
The  potential  is  vast.  The  Desertec  project,  backed  by  a  consortium of  mainly  German 
companies, dreams of 100,000 megawatts (MW) of solar-generating capacity – enough to 
satisfy all of North Africa’s burgeoning electricity needs, and 15 percent of Europe’s as well – 
by 2050, for a €400 billion investment. The (mainly French and Spanish) Medgrid consortium 
is aiming for 20,000 MW by 2020, with a quarter coming to Europe.”82 Of course, beyond the 
environmental  significance,  economic  interest  are  also  embedded:  Germany,  the  biggest 
electricity user of Europe will soon phase out its nuclear power plants and plans to substitute 
them with renewable energy sources. This need is coupled with the supply of German (and 
other  EU) companies’ solar  power products  therefore  the plan  generates  both supply and 
demand for European industries. The plan itself is far from completed and it’s only scheduled 
to be ready by 2050, but a prototype plant will be installed in Morocco as soon as 2015. 
82 Nick Witney and  Anthony Dworkin: A Power Audit of EU-North -Africa Relations, ECFR, 2012
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The final „Euro-Med energy ring” will bring solar power from high direct normal irradiation 
(DNI) MENA countries by the following infrastructure:83
Other, non-energy-related environmental dimensions of public policy(2) cooperation issues 
are widespread. Some mentioned by the APs are: „co-operation with the EU to implement 
multilateral  environmental  agreements  with  particular  emphasis  on  climate  change, 
desertification,  biodiversity  and  waste  management”,  „co-operation  to  achieve  the 
commitments by the parties with regard provisions under the Kyoto Protocol and the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change”, „co-operation with the EU for protecting marine 
environment through the adoption of specific actions”, „co-operation regarding the integrated 
coastal zone management” and several others. Desertification and water scarcity (affecting 
seriously agriculture and food resources) form the most pressing issues being present on both 
shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Parts of Spain, Italy and Greece are seriously threatened by 
desertification,  while  on  the  southern  shore  the  process  is  already  highly  visible.84 
Desalination and the use of underground water resources will play an even more important 
role  in  the  future  of  the  Mediterranean  Basin.  The  deeper  elaboration  of  all  the  issues 
mentioned  by  APs  is  far  beyond  the  length  limitations  of  the  current  work  and  with 
mentioning these subjects we only aimed to show again how the APs indirectly admit EU-
MENA interdependence in this sector by raising this really huge set of issues.
83Surce: REACCESS project, http://reaccess.epu.ntua.gr
84 See: MEDSEC, http://www.medsecnet.org/index.php/en/maps/thematic-maps/desertification.html 
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Finally, two areas of the environmental cooperation deserve special attention as both of them 
are connected with the Mediterranean Sea itself therefore have a symbolic significance. One 
is the UfM project „De-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea”(3) and the other, closely related 
one  is  fisheries.  The pollution  effects  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea  could  serve  as  a  perfect 
example  of  EU-MENA interdependence:  North  African  sea  pollution  reaches  EU  shores 
quickly and vice versa. This broad sea-centered project encompasses many initiatives that 
target  good  environmental  governance,  access  to  drinkable  water,  water  management, 
pollution reduction and protection of the Mediterranean biodiversity. Here again we have no 
space for a deeper elaboration but the common management of the common Sea could easily 
turn out to be one of the most important projects bringing together governments and other 
social  actors  throughout  the  whole  Mediterranean  Basin  while  making  a  good  case  for 
cooperation.
The case of the fisheries is closely related to Sea management issues but as it has special 
importance within this field we have to explain it a bit more detailed. One of the problems is 
the overfishing of the Mediterranean Sea. This was „committed” together by the Northern and 
Southern Mediterranean states, therefore gives no right of accusation to any of them. We can 
only recognize the fact that the Sea has reached the limits of its regeneration capabilities and 
can not provide more fish resources for the people, its already unsustainably over-fished.85 
This  should  imply  common  EU-MENA action  in  this  field  as  it’s  mentioned  in  APs: 
„Reinforce the cooperation in order to implement the actions identified in the Declaration of 
the Ministerial Conference for the Sustainable Development of Fishery in the Mediterranean 
(Venice, 25-26 November 2003) in the framework of the relevant international instruments.” 
The platform of cooperation therefore seems to be existing but results have yet to come. 
The other geographical area of common fisheries is the Atlantic coast of Morocco. In contrast 
with the Mediterranean Sea, this area is still one of the richest fish resources in the world and 
therefore a highly valued asset. Fishing rights are exclusively in the hands of Morocco but EU 
companies (mainly Spanish) are „renting” the fishing rights there. Overfishing of the area by 
EU vessels raises problems for local Moroccan fishers therefore raise tensions in EU-MENA 
relations as well. This issue (coupled with the Western Sahara problem) recently rose to high 
EU policy making levels,86 proving the case of high EU-MENA interdependence again.
85 See: National Geeographic Online, http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/03/02/overfishing-leaves-
much-of-mediterranean-a-dead-sea-study-finds/
86 See: Public service, http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1267/eu-morocco-fisheries-deal-is-illegal
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Concluding on the environmental sector of interdependence we can state that the sector has a 
really huge set of issues, out of which some are surprisingly high on the list of priorities. 
Energy cooperation between the two regions is widespread and beyond the obvious economic 
reasons  it  is  also  very  important  for  the  „greening”  European  industries.  (It’s  worth 
mentioning here that this is one of the rare cases of EU-MENA interdependence when the EU 
is  much more  dependent  on  the  MENA than  vice  versa.)  Cooperation  on  desertification, 
biodiversity, waste management and other environmental issues is less significant yet but the 
APs show real EU interests in deepening cooperation in this field. Finally de-pollution of the 
Mediterranean Sea and the common management of fisheries gives us a symbolic and very 
important field of interest for both of the cooperating partners.
2.2.6     Conclusions: EU-MENA interdependence and the inter-Regional Security Complex
Summarizing the discovered four sectors of interdependence we can agree with Barry Buzan 
in that „Adjacency is potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short 
distances than over long ones. The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is 
is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal and environmental sectors.”87 
(Although as we will see in the next chapter, economic ties are also highly visible.) These 
impacts of geographical proximity are widespread but the most important ones we discovered 
in this chapter are already making the case to treat EU-MENA interdependence as a ground 
for a common inter-Regional Security Complex:
− Hard security challenges, especially fighting transnational terrorism and the instability 
in the Sahel brings EU-MENA security interests close and form a possible base of 
common military  actions.  (This  could  happen  in  the  current  situation  in  Mali  for 
example.)  Nonproliferation  of  WMDs  is  an  other  example  where  inter-regional 
interests could converge.
− Political ties are close as the recent uprisings (Arab Spring) in the MENA affected 
seriously the EUs policy making agenda, even triggering military intervention in the 
87 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003): Regions and Powers, Cambridge University Press, p.45
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case of Libya. Establishing good governance and the rule of law after the uprisings is 
the main challenge in front of the new MENA governments, and the EU is capable to 
give technical and financial help for the process.
− Societal  EU-MENA interdependencies  are  -again-  widespread:  Unemployment  and 
poverty in the MENA are the main causes of migration pressure towards the EU and 
this pressure is even strengthened by the demonstration effect of modern media outlets 
showing Arab youth how different their lives in Europe could be. Migration is high on 
the  EU's  agenda  as  well:  recognizing  the  unsustainability  of  the  previous  purely 
administrative migration prevention system, the EU will have to turn towards more 
sustainable options. These options involve the different economic improvements that 
the EU could support to its Arab partners which will be the core focus of the next 
chapter.
− Environmental and energy issues are showing again a high degree of interdependence. 
Energy connectedness -both hydrocarbon and electricity- is an already obvious fact, 
but there are several plans to develop connections even further. New gas pipelines and 
the  possibility  of  transporting  clean  solar  energy from the  MENA to  Europe  will 
deepen EU-MENA interdependence  in  the  future even further.  On the other  hand, 
overfishing  and the  pollution of  the  Mediterranean Sea are  common inter-regional 
„crimes”  and have to  be resolved also on an inter-regional  level  giving  space  for 
further fields of cooperation in the future.
Reading through all these sectors and issues of interdependence, we can recite again Barry 
Buzzan and wonder if his definition of Regional Security Complexes allows us to call the 
Euro-Mediterranean  space  a  unified  inter-Regional  Security  Complex.  Are  they  „so 
interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from 
one  another?”88 Our  answer  to  this  question  is  a  definite  yes.  Southern  Europe  is  so 
interdependent with the MENA that its (and therefore the EU's) security cannot be resolved 
apart from it. EU-MENA interdependence and the ENP just seems to exactly fulfill Buzzan's 
definition of an (Euro-Med) Regional Security Super-complex: „Strong inter-regional level of 
security dynamics arising from...spillover into adjacent regions.”89
88 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003): Regions and Powers, Cambridge University Press, p.44
89 Ibid., p.62
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2.3     The sector of EU-MENA economic interdependence
2.3.1. Introduction: Action Plans and EU-MENA economic ties
In this chapter several forms of EU-MENA economic interdependencies will be tested and 
evaluated. The absence of economic issues from the previous chapter was on purpose: this 
sector will be elaborated much more in detail therefore it takes up a structurally distinct place 
from the other four sectors and forms an entire chapter of this work. Economic issues are 
widely represented in ENP Actions Plans, six of the 19 “priorities of action” is formed around 
economic questions (shortened forms):90
• Increase economic integration with the EU
•  Improving macroeconomic governance,  reforming the financial  sector,  strengthening the 
role of the private sector, enhancing the business climate
•  Boost  industrial  development  and  enterprises  capabilities  and  competitiveness  through 
improved skills, better access to finance, promotion of new technologies
• Deepen and enhance the existing economic dialogue and identify areas suitable for gradual 
regulatory upgrading and approximation with EU technical legislation
• Proceed in reforming the tax system, improving public finance management, and upgrading 
public institutions.
• Promote south-south trade, through encouraging FDI participation in regional projects such 
as: infrastructure, trade facilitation, energy and transport.
90 The list is an excerpt fom the Egyptian Action Plan 
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Here we will not go through each of the six priorities as we did in the previous chapter with 
the other four sectors, rather we will follow a different methodology based on a local imple-
mentation of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory. First we will go through different 
forms of EU-MENA economic interactions in each sub-chapter and only after we evaluate the 
ENP’s economic “wing” in the conclusions mainly by comparing our results to some of the 
six “priorities of action” listed above. Out of these six points the first one will have especially 
great  significance:  “Increase  economic  integration  with  the  EU”.  What  economic  factors 
(types of interdependence) this integration can be based on and how this integration can be 
enhanced forms the most crucial question of the current work. Who would benefit most from 
a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean free trade area (EMFTA, what is proposed by several 
experts) is another important question which can be answered only by the detailed examina-
tion of the existing economic relations.
Examination of the ENP through world-systems theory “glasses” is not common in the con-
temporary literature. One of the rare authors who picked up the subject is Andreas Marchetti, 
who writes: “the ENP can be understood as a manifestation of the EU’s will to create a ring of 
states in its vicinity to serve its purposes of protecting itself and of exercising influence. To 
put it differently, the EU in its function as regional centre intends to create – or maintain – a 
functioning periphery (via its neighbors) in order to create a buffer-zone”91. He also criticizes 
the neo-Marxist preoccupations of the theory and applies a “smoother” version of it to the 
ENP. Here we will follow his theoretical path with a slightly different geographical applica-
tion.
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory explains asymmetrical interdependencies by sig-
nifying different geographical areas as core, semi-periphery and periphery. While economies 
in the central areas (core) represent high value-added economic activities with highly product-
ive labor and good infrastructure, economies in the periphery represent low value-added sec-
tors and low productivity with weak infrastructure. Semi-periphery countries possess a place 
somewhere in between these two. As in our case it’s quite obvious that the EU forms a core 
and its neighborhood forms a periphery, the relations between the two can be easily described 
with Wallerstein’s world system theory. By the means of geographical coverage, these Waller-
steinian “zones” of Europe can be approximately visualized with the following map:92
91 Andreas Marchetti (2009): The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery 
(Discussion Paper, C 158), University of Bonn: ZEI
92 Image Source: The author's own work (2012)
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Within the EU we can identify three different “zones”: the central “Blue Banana”, which is 
the de-facto industrial core of Europe, the “wider European core”, which includes the most 
developed regions of Europe and the EU’s “inner semi-periphery”, which forms a ring of less 
developed European regions around the core. The most external (and least developed) areas 
fall into the “periphery” and this area covers almost entirely the EU’s Neighborhood. (The 
eastern periphery overlaps with the Russian semi-periphery, what can be a source of the cur-
rent EU-Russia rivalization in this area, but the Eastern Neighborhood is not in the focus of 
the current work). Finally, “margin” areas are those where the presence of core-EU economic 
involvement decreases to a marginal level.
To prove the southern neighborhood’s economic dependence on the core-EU on Wallersteini-
an terms will be the main task of the current chapter. Euro-Mediterranean trade and produc-
tion patterns will be evaluated and the role of EU FDI and different forms of financial assist-
ance in the MENA region will be tracked.
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On the other hand, the research on this asymmetric dependence will not suggest any Marxist 
conclusions casting the EU as the rigid exploiter of its neighbors, rather it will focus on pos-
sible forms of cooperation which could benefit both partners in the long term, and the idea of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) will be evaluated according to the find-
ings. ENP and its demand for “Increase economic integration with the EU” will also be meas-
ured against the discovered economic realities showing pros and cons of the proposed deeper 
integration for both partners.
2.3.2. Economic dependence testing: EU-MENA trade relations
The best tool to test economic interdependence between the two examined regions is to draw 
up the trade relations amongst them showing how big “slices” they take from each others 
trade activities. As a country’s imports affect the available supply of goods for its population 
and the exports affects its income, the more engaged two countries are in these transactions is 
the more they depend on each other. The question of economic interdependence can be there-
fore effectively translated to the examination of relative import/export ratios. As we cannot 
check here each EU country one-by-one we will have to choose one representative from the 
Union and see how it relates to the MENA. The most obvious selection from the EU can be 
France because of its dominant role in Euro-Med political and economic affairs. The follow-
ing diagrams show that both French exports and imports are largely dominated by EU part-
ners (blue areas, around 60%), while MENA countries (light green, around 10%) play only a 
marginal role in the French economy:93
93 The trade pattern diagrams are taken from The Observatory of Economic complexity (2012)
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The other EU member states (and also the non-member European nations) have surprisingly 
similar trade ratios: both in exports and in imports they prefer European partners for at least  
60% of their trade. 
Selecting a representative example from the MENA is much more difficult as the trade pat-
terns within the region vary significantly. As we will see, there is a serious Maghreb-Mashreq 
division on trade issues, therefore we will have to examine all the countries in the region to 
show this difference. 
On the other hand, showing both exports and imports is not necessary because they tend to 
have similar geographical coverage in each case. As we see, the Maghreb’s exports and im-
ports are largely dominated by the EU (blue areas, around 60%), while regional MENA part-
ners (light green, less than 10%) play only a marginal role. We also see that the EU’s share in 
the  Mashreq  is  only around 33% on average.  The EU takes  the  biggest  “slice”  from the 
Maghreb countries’ trade portfolios, while in the Mashreq it comes only second or third be-
hind Asia and the US:94
94 The trade pattern diagrams are taken from The Observatory of Economic complexity (2012)
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(Syria and the Palestinian territories are absent because of technical reasons.)
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As conclusions, we can identify already three important factors of EU-MENA economic inter-
dependencies:
- First is the fact that EU countries tend to realize most of their trade within Europe. 
Both imports and exports of European countries (even non-EU members!) come at 
least in 60 percent from/to other European nations. MENA countries have only a small 
portion of European trade even in the case of the most “engaged” EU members like 
France and the other Mediterranean member states. This means that European eco-
nomies do not depend on MENA exports or imports.
- Second finding is that the Maghreb countries realize a significant portion of their trade 
with Europe. EU states altogether tend to take at least half of the Maghreb’s imports 
and exports which shows that the EU plays a very important role in the Maghreb sub-
region’s economy.
- On the other hand, the third finding shows that in the Mashreq the EU does not take a 
leader role in export/import relations, it comes only second or third behind other play-
ers like the US and Asia. This sub-region is therefore far less EU-dependent but even 
within  the  Mashreq  there  are  differences:  Lebanon  and Egypt  trades  a  significant 
amount with Europe, while Israel focuses mainly on the US and Jordan on the MENA 
itself.
By summarizing these findings we can already draw some conclusions for the prospects of the 
ENP and the proposed Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) as well. The economic 
“wing” of the ENP and the economy-related incentives that Europe can offer to its Mediter-
ranean partners can obviously be the most effective in geographical areas where the EU has a 
significant economic leverage. This geographical area seems to be the Maghreb where the role 
of Europe in the overall trade is dominant. In the Mashreq the EU is far less dominant and 
other players like Asia and the US pose strong competition to Europe’s influence. When using 
the ENP as an economic “semi-coercive” tool, this limit on the geographical coverage should 
be kept in mind. Also, when a comprehensive EMFTA (opening “everything but institutions”) 
comes  into  realization,  the  effects  of  it  will  differ  in  the  two  sub-regions,  therefore  the 
strength of motivations to implement it will also differ. Starting to implement the EMFTA first 
as a cooperation with Maghreb states (with the Arab-Maghreb Union for example) seems to 
fit EU-MENA economic realities well.
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2.3.3. Economic asymmetries: production patterns and different added values
As Wallerstein’s world systems theory suggests, examining trade patterns and dominance only 
in itself can not satisfy the need to prove one region’s economic dependence on another. We 
will have to gain insight into the given economies’ development levels as well. Development 
economics and all the knowledge areas that are connected to economic development form a 
huge academic field and because of length limitations we cannot make an all-comprehensive 
study of the development status of MENA economies here. But what we can definitely do is 
to explore the production patterns of both the EU and the MENA and make observations of 
the sectoral composition of their economies in each case. The more developed EU is expected 
to have more sophisticated industries having high added-value figures, while the MENA is ex-
pected to show signs of a typical “periphery economy” dominated by low added-value indus-
tries. To prove these assumptions, we will study the export products of each region which will 
show indirectly the dominant industrial sectors in each economy. As EU countries have more 
or less similar industrial development levels, here again we will examine only the most relev-
ant one in MENA issues, France:95
95 The trade pattern diagrams are taken from The Observatory of Economic complexity (2012)
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As we see, France exports mainly high added-value products like mechanical and electronic 
machines (the two blue areas) and medicaments and other chemicals (pink areas). Even while 
being one of the most agro-dominated countries in the EU, the share of agro-products and 
food (yellow and orange areas) in France’s exports are not dominant. Exports of the low ad-
ded-value textile industry (in green) and minerals (in brown) are also less significant. Accord-
ing to this export portfolio, France (and the other EU countries) has a developed, sophisticated 
economy dominated by high added-value industries. 
On the other hand, MENA countries cannot be represented by only one nation-economy again 
as they can be split into three categories at least. Israel –as an exception- has an “EU-like” de-
veloped economy and exports sophisticated high added-value goods mainly.  Other MENA 
states  have  far  less  developed  economies  and  they  export  mainly  minerals  and  low  ad-
ded-value products like food and textiles, therefore they can be split into two categories: pet-
ro-states and agro/textile-states. Israel exports mainly jewelry, machines and chemicals, all of 
which representing high added-value:96
96 The trade pattern diagrams are taken from The Observatory of Economic complexity (2012)
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In contrast, almost all of the Arab states’ exports are dominated by low added-value products. 
It makes sense to group them as petro- and non-petro-states according to their exports:97
(The Palestinian territories are absent because of technical reasons.)
97 All export product diagrams are taken from The Observatory of Economic complexity (2012)
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As we see, the Algerian, Syrian, Libyan and Egyptian economies are widely dominated by hy-
drocarbon production. (Egypt being the less dependent on oil exports while having significant 
food and textile industries as well.) Contrary, the non-petro-states are quite divergent in indus-
trial production: Morocco is dominated by the textile industry (green), but agro-products, food 
and fisheries (orange and yellow) are also significant. Tunisia has a significant textile industry 
but machine production (blue) is also present, which tells us that the Tunisian economy is 
already a bit more developed. Jordan’s exports consist of mainly medicaments (pink) which is 
a sign of high added-value capabilities, but the textile and food industry is still significant. Fi-
nally, Lebanon can be seen as the most advanced economy by its product composition, with 
its exports pattern close to Israel’s but with a more dominant agriculture. (Also, the Lebanese 
GDP/capita level is the second highest in the region after the Israeli.)
As conclusions, we can add three more factors to our observations of EU-MENA economic 
interdependencies:
- The EU’s member states have advanced economies with high added-value industry 
domination in their production and export patterns. Contrary, most of the MENA states 
have low added-value industries dominating their economies and exports. The only 
exception is Israel, who has an industrial base which closely resembles the EU’s.
- Arab  MENA countries  can  be  split  into  two  categories:  petro-states  and  non-pet-
ro-states. Economies of petro-states are almost entirely dependent on hydrocarbon pro-
duction (Libya and Algeria) or dominated by it while having other low added-value in-
dustries in their portfolio as well (Syria and Egypt).
- Non-petro-states have more heterogeneity: going from the western edge of the region 
eastwards we can see a line of development from the mainly low added-value Moroc-
can economy through Tunisia and Jordan having some more advanced sectors until 
Lebanon whose production pattern is close to Israel’s.  
By summarizing these findings we can again draw some conclusions for the prospects of the 
ENP and the proposed Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) as well. After the trade 
patterns, production patterns again confirm our assumption that MENA countries form a Wall-
ersteinian peripheral zone in the southern neighborhood of Europe. 
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With the exception of Israel, MENA states tend to have inferior economies compared to the 
EU’s, which means that in a common economic area (like the planned EMFTA) they would 
become low added-value “client economies” in relation to the EU core. This result should in-
form not only the EU policy makers and the designers of the ENP about asymmetric relations 
but it should be recognized by MENA policy makers as well to double-think about the pros 
and cons of a proposed Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA). Accordingly, the ENP 
Action Plans’ push to “increase economic integration with the EU” can be seen as a mainly 
self-serving action of the EU as this integration would mainly serve the high added-value ex-
port industries of Europe and imply a fierce competition to the weak and underdeveloped 
MENA industries.
Two other smaller conclusive findings can be added to the main result outlined above. First is 
that Israel (who showed some interests in EU membership prospects recently but was refused 
as  being  non-European)  has  a  highly developed economy,  therefore  on economic  basis  it 
could be smoothly integrated into the EU. This will certainly not happen on a full-scale level, 
but partial integration and a comprehensive free trade agreement is highly plausible. (Industri-
al products are already customs-free.)
The other observation is that beyond the Wallersteinian centrum-periphery dependency pat-
tern we can also find signs of interdependency between the EU and the MENA. Low ad-
ded-value export products of the non-petro-states can be easily “ignored” and replaced in 
European imports but on the other hand, hydrocarbon exports of the petro-states make the EU 
partially dependent on them. (This pattern of hydrocarbon-dependency is also present in the 
eastern neighborhood.) 
This creates a certain degree of interdependence as petro-states need EU markets to secure 
their income from oil and gas exports but the EU needs them as well to secure its incoming 
supplies.  (Energy interdependence  was  already explored  in  the  “security  chapter”  of  this 
work.) Although the EU has a high-priority strategy to change its energy usage to renewables, 
this hydrocarbon-based interdependence is set to remain in the foreseeable future.
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2.3.4. The role of European FDI in MENA economies
Another good indicator of EU-MENA economic interdependency is the role of EU Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to MENA economies. FDI can be seen as the private eco-
nomic players’ (firms, banks, investment groups) main external financial contribution to a 
country’s economic development. Not only brings it the necessary capital for development to 
less developed countries but it plays also a significant role in technological and managerial 
learning (technology transfer) and therefore facilitates economic progress. In the last decade 
FDI inflows to the MENA grew steadily compared to the region’s traditionally low levels:
On the other hand, FDI inflows to the MENA were still far lower than to almost any other re-
gion of the world with comparable size. Weak economies and business-unfriendly investment 
regulations kept global FDI flows away from the region and global investors (EU, USA, Ja-
pan) preferred to invest in more stable developing regions with better economic growth poten-
tials. Even the EU, the most engaged player in MENA economies invested only a marginal 
portion of its extra-EU FDI flows into MENA economies. As we see on the following map 
showing  global  EU  FDI  flows,  they  are  dominated  by  North  America  (34%)  and  other 
European states (25%) and the share of MENA countries represents only a marginal 3%:
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Global FDI outflows from the EU, 2010. Source: EUROSTAT
This means that the EU gives clearly no investment priority to its southern neighborhood 
which is  especially interesting in contrast  with the impressive number of “Other Europe” 
(which covers mainly the eastern neighborhood). 
Another side-finding is that if we study carefully this map we can see that the main bulk of 
EU-investment  goes  to  the  most  developed partner,  North-America  (and this  is  true  vice 
versa), which gives an empirical example that investment policies in general favor developed 
areas against non-developed ones. This gives an argument against the modernization theory 
which expects that markets will mitigate development inequalities on the long term by mov-
ing capital from the developed countries to the poor ones. This side-finding will be used in the 
conclusions of this chapter when we decide which IPE theory is the most appropriate for use 
in the case of EU-MENA economic relations.
The marginal 3% of EU FDI directed to the MENA would suggest that we should not spend 
too much time examining this part of the economic interdependence given its nearly insigni-
ficant volume. This might be true from the EU’s point of view, but from the MENA’s per-
spective things look very different. FDI inflows to the MENA form a steady base of the eco-
nomies of these countries and as we saw these inflows are rapidly growing therefore the im-
portance of FDI is growing rapidly as well. If we accept the fact that EU-MENA FDI relations 
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are important for the southern partners (but not so much for the EU), we have to come up with 
some further questions to clarify the nature of this relations. The most significant questions 
are:
- How important is the role of FDI in MENA economies? How big are their FDI flows 
compared to their GDPs?
- How is FDI distributed in  the region?  Which are the biggest  receiver  regions and 
countries?
- How profitable is to invest in the MENA? Which countries can offer the best profits 
for foreign investors?
- And the most important from our perspective: How dependent is the MENA on EU 
FDI inflows? How much of the region's FDI inflows come from European sources?
To answer the first question, we have to compare the MENA’s FDI/GDP intensity to the EU’s, 
which is shown by the following graph:
As we see, external FDI flows into the EU reached only 2% of its GDP in 2009 and the value 
was even less in 2000. (Similarly to trade, FDI flows in the EU are also dominated by in-
tra-EU players.) On the other hand some MENA countries had far exceeded this ratio. While 
most of the regional players stayed under the 2% ratio, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon far ex-
ceeded it making double, triple and quadruple values respectively. A significant growth in all 
of the countries values can be also witnessed confirming our first assumption on the growing 
role of FDI in the region. (In Israel and Palestine the value decreased because of the accumu-
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lating political instability.) Another observation can be also derived from the graph, that the 
highly restrictive foreign investment policies of Morocco, Algeria and Syria made their mark 
on the investment intensity in these countries giving them a visible disadvantage in the race to 
attract foreign investment to the region. The aim of the ENP to open up these countries for 
foreign investment is still unfulfilled, but the positive development of the last decade is un-
deniable. We can answer the first question with the conclusion that FDI has an already import-
ant role in MENA economies and the trends of the last decade shows that this importance is 
steadily growing with the more opened economies radically “speeding up”.
The second question is about the geographical pattern of FDI flows in the region. The follow-
ing table gives a summary of the geographical distribution in the first half of the last decade:
As a reference point, Turkey appears to be the main receiver of EU FDI in the region exceed-
ing all other countries and taking up more than a third of EU FDI. If we examine southern 
ENP partners (and take the 2001-2005 average as reference since the values are hugely volat-
ile) we find that Maghreb and Mashreq countries equally take a share of 27% while Israel 
takes 6.4% on average which is quite significant compared to its relatively small population. 
Almost half of the Maghreb FDI goes into Morocco, which can be explained by the multiple 
factors of Libya and Algeria being extremely closed and Tunisia relatively small economies. 
Close to 80% of Mashreq FDI is heading to Egypt which is a surprisingly high value even if 
we consider its relative huge population. If we focus on southern ENP members and do not 
count Turkey, we can conclude that the European FDI inflow to the region is equally shared 
between the Maghreb and Mashreq sub-regions but in both areas the main bulk of investment 
goes to the biggest countries, Morocco and Egypt.
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An interesting side-examination can be included here by answering the third question: Which 
countries in the MENA can offer the best profits for foreign investors? The following graph 
gives us a surprisingly clear answer:
Rate of return on EU FDI in the MENA , 2001-2004. Source: EUROSTAT
Return on EU investment tends to be double in Mashreq countries than in the Maghreb. While 
Maghreb countries produce a 10% yearly average profit on FDI (which is close to the world 
average), in the Mashreq this value is close to 20%. Because of length limitations we cannot 
go into details to explain this difference here but the conclusions are clear: driving factors for 
FDI inflows are more stronger in the Mashreq as EU investors obviously choose the subre-
gion which can offer more profit for their investment. This fact further strengthens the poten-
tial  of  Mashreq-directed  FDI  to  dominate  MENA markets  which  pattern  we already dis-
covered with the FDI/GDP figures on the first graph. These tendencies of FDI flows can be 
hugely (although not entirely) explained by the differences in Maghreb-Mashreq foreign in-
vestment policies as Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt became more opened lately while most of the 
Maghreb stayed relatively closed for foreign investors.
The last and most important question is also the hardest one to answer: How dependent is the 
MENA on EU FDI inflows? What percentage of total foreign investment in the MENA comes 
from the EU? Unfortunately there are no comprehensive sets of statistics to answer this ques-
tion but from different sources we can still gather enough information to give a clear answer. 
If we examine the two most important FDI receivers in the region, Morocco and Egypt, we 
can find a similarly high percentage of EU sources in their FDI portfolio:
- Most of the FDIs injected in Morocco came from the European Union with France, the ma-
jor economic partner of the North African kingdom topping the list with investments worth 
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$1.86bln, followed by Spain ($783mln). The influx of European countries in Morocco's FDI 
represents 73.5% of the global amount received in 2007.98
- The EU is the number one investor in Egypt. In FY 2011/2012, 80% of Egypt's gross inflows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) originated in the EU, compared to 60% in the previous 
fiscal year. Among EU Member States, UK, Belgium, France, Italy and Germany have been 
the most important sources of FDI for Egypt in the past 5 years.99
As detailed data is not available on other MENA countries we have to extrapolate here and 
say that in general around 70% of the regions incoming FDI comes from the EU. This might  
not be true only in the exceptional case of Israel where American investments dominate. In 
petro-states the interest of EU oil companies (as already explained with the energy interde-
pendence before) causes a huge EU FDI involvement therefore in Algeria and Libya we can 
expect  similarly  high  levels  as  in  Egypt.  The  relative  openness  of  Lebanon,  Jordan  and 
Tunisia also suggests that EU FDI presence is dominant in these countries. We can conclude 
that contrary to the low (3%) share of global EU investments going to the MENA, this 3% 
forms around 70% of the MENA’s FDI incomes which shows that in this field relations are 
hugely asymmetrical.
By summarizing all of these findings we can draw some conclusions on the scale of EU-
MENA FDI interdependence and therefore for the prospects of the ENP and the proposed 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) as well. Or several findings include that:
- FDI inflow was historically low in MENA economies but the last decade witnessed a 
rapid growth in this field.
- For the EU, MENA countries are not very important FDI destinations as they absorb 
only 3% of Europe’s global foreign investments.
- FDI did not play a significant role in MENA economies but in the last decade the more 
open countries experienced a growth in FDI intensity, reaching up to 8% of their GDP 
which  makes  them more  FDI-dependent.  The intensity grew more  significantly in 
Mashreq economies, in the Maghreb it stayed low.
- The Maghreb and Mashreq sub-regions received equal amounts of FDI from the EU. 
Egypt and Morocco were the biggest absorbers.
98 Source: FDI report by Souraya Ouali of the Moroccan Direction of Investments.
99 Source: delegation of the European Union to Egypt.
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-  Profits on EU FDI in the MENA were double as high in the Mashreq than in the  
Maghreb suggesting that the Mashreq will be preferred in future investor decisions.
- Around 70% of the total FDI inflows to the MENA came from EU countries and this 
shows a huge asymmetry in investment interdependence among the two regions mak-
ing the EU the biggest FDI donor but the MENA only a marginal EU FDI receiver.
The six findings above show mixed prospects of the ENP and the proposed Euro-Mediter-
ranean Free Trade Area. FDI-wise the MENA keeps being an underachiever compared to oth-
er developing regions but this can slowly change by the rapid catch-up of some of its states.  
These more open and more FDI-intense states can be found in the Mashreq sub-region, which 
can become the “FDI-engine” of the whole region showing the way forward to the others for 
opening up. Although the quantities of EU FDI are yet equal in the two sub-regions, openness, 
intensity and produced profits all point to the direction that the Mashreq is becoming a more 
and more important FDI destination for European investors. EU-MENA FDI interdependence 
can be summarized therefore with a notion that the MENA is highly dependent on EU FDI ex-
ports, while for the EU the region is not yet an important investment partner making this rela-
tion highly asymmetric. This relation can change in the future with the “rise” of the Mashreq 
as significant FDI absorber showing also a positive example for the Maghreb. Surprisingly, 
FDI-wise the weights of the sub-regions proved to be opposite than in trade: the Mashreq was 
less trade dependent on the EU than the Maghreb, while its EU FDI dependency seems to be 
stronger than the Maghreb’s. 
Lessons for the ENP and the EMFTA can be also derived from this dependence-summary: 
Opening up MENA economies for European investments should be a main purpose for the 
ENP because this investment inflow can serve as a source of modernization for these coun-
tries and also bind them more closely to the EU while aiming to “Increase economic integra-
tion with the EU”. In the Mashreq sub-region some positive changes started to appear lately, 
which should be honored with differentiated ENP conditionality showing all the partners that 
the EU values investment-friendliness highly. If other regional players also start to catch up in 
FDI-attraction, the outcome will be favorable for the European investors and the MENA pop-
ulations as well. This would also boost the chances of building a comprehensive EMFTA in 
the long term, which could be based not only on free trade but also on extensive FDI ex-
changes between the EU and its Mediterranean partners.
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2.3.5. The role of EU development assistance: aid and development loans
Our last area of interest -development assistance- has a much lower impact on EU-MENA 
economic interdependencies than the other two areas, trade and FDI. Still, a short examination 
of EU aid “exports” to the MENA can underline our main assumption of MENA economic de-
pendence on the EU. Although cash quantities of development assistance will never reach the 
level of quantities involved in EU-MENA trade and FDI interactions, their impact on political 
relations is undeniable.
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD acts as the main global channel of 
aid allocation throughout the globe. DAC members are the greatest aid donors of the world 
and amongst them EU members (altogether) are the biggest donors. The United States suppor-
ted  around 31 billion  USD assistance  throughout  the  globe  in  2010,  while  Japan offered 
around 19 billion, becoming the first and second biggest single donors respectively. But if we 
add up only the three biggest EU donors (Germany, France, UK) we can see that with a sum 
of around 41 billion they easily surpass the US:100
But where does all the assistance go? Which developing regions are the biggest aid receivers? 
And what are the assistance patterns, which are the preferred regions each of these donors? 
100 Source: OECD/DAC (2010)
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All these questions can be answered by examining the following table:
We can see that the biggest aid recipient is the Sub-Saharan Africa region taking up around 
the third of the total aid amounts, while the MENA comes second, taking around a fifth of the  
sum. Examining the weights of each developing regions within the supporting countries’ port-
folios we can reach interesting findings about the importance of these regions in the national 
aid policies. The US shows a balanced portfolio giving both Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA 
regions around the third of its support. Japan -understandably- gives a higher priority to its 
neighbors in Asia and Oceania directing 60% of its aid to these regions and “leaving” Africa 
and the MENA to the others. Examining EU countries and the EU institutions themselves, we 
can find a much more mixed and sometimes even surprising picture: Most of the EU members 
prefer Africa, but some of them clearly prefer the MENA.
We could expect that southern EU members will be more engaged in the MENA than north-
erns but they also have stronger links to Africa as well, making the relative weights mixed. 
From the biggest EU donors France,  Portugal, Spain,  the Netherlands and the UK clearly 
prefer Africa but Germany and Italy clearly prefer the MENA. Surprisingly, EU institutions 
support Africa overwhelmingly better than the MENA.
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Making some calculations (total amount x MENA’s share) from these data-sets we can arrive 
to the conclusion that the US is the single biggest aid supporter of the MENA, giving around 
10 billion yearly, while Germany comes second with around 5 billion. If we add other EU-
member contributions to Germany’s, we can calculate around 13-14 billion dollars of total EU 
assistance to the MENA, with which the EU clearly occupies the pole position. On the other 
hand this number is not that bigger than the US contribution therefore we cannot find a clear 
EU aid dominance similar to the trade and FDI ratios. MENA aid incomes are not monopol-
ized by the EU, rather “duopolized” by the EU-US “team”.
The role of the European Union (as an institution) in aid support is miniscule compared to the 
individual states’ but to “extract” its preferences we should still look at the figures of its as-
sistance patterns. We already saw that most of the EU institutional aid goes to Africa and only 
a 17.6 percent of the sum is received by the MENA. If we are interested in what the regional  
pattern looks like within the MENA, we should look at the following table showing ENPI 
contributions to the entire EU neighborhood:
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As we see, the yearly ENPI average for the entire neighborhood is only around 1.3 billion 
EUR which is really small compared to the 13 billion USD coming to the southern neighbor-
hood alone from individual member states. The three biggest ENPI receivers are all MENA 
states: Palestine, Morocco and Egypt. The most interesting observation here is the fact that 
these numbers do not correlate with the size of the recipient 
countries at all. Palestine, the smallest gets nearly 400 mil-
lion, while Egypt the biggest gets only 142 million. While 
in the case of Morocco and Egypt the EU-aid doesn’t reach 
1% of their respective GDPs, in the case of Palestine this 
ratio reaches 10 percent! (The estimated nominal GDP of 
Palestine is  around 4000 million EUR.)  This  means  that 
Palestine can be pronounced a highly aid-dependent coun-
try. If we check the other donors as well, the picture is even darker: altogether around half of 
Palestine’s GDP (2000 million USD) comes from aid contributions, the US being the largest 
donor and the EU, UN being second and third respectively.
Concluding on EU-MENA aid relations we can make some summarizing observations:
- EU countries together are the biggest aid donors of the world, the US and Japan being 
second and third respectively.
- Global aid is directed mainly to Sub-Saharan Africa, which takes up the third of the 
sum. The MENA is second taking around a fifth of it.
- EU countries have different priorities: France, Spain and the UK focuses on Africa, 
while Germany and Italy on the MENA.
- From recipient perspective, the MENA gets most of its aid incomes from EU mem-
bers, but closely followed by the US. EU aid is therefore not entirely dominating the 
MENA.
- EU institutions in particular have a miniscule aid budget relative to the member states.
- Relative to trade and FDI, aid has little role in MENA economies. 
- Still, in the case of Palestine the role of aid is highly significant. Earning half of its 
GDP from aid incomes makes Palestine highly aid-dependent.
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These findings offer a few relevant lessons for the prospects of the ENP and the proposed 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. ENPI, as the budget of the ENP has a small significance 
compared to the bilateral assistance programs of the member states. This decentralization of 
EU aid policies can be seen positive from the perspectives of the member states, but clearly 
negative from the coherency of EU aid policies. A more centralized EU aid policy could signi-
ficantly raise the effectivity of the ENP as allocating more money to the ENPI could posit -
ively change the effectiveness of its financial incentives. Concentrating otherwise bilaterally 
spent aid funds in the hands of the EU and raising ENPI funds significantly should be a main 
goal for EU external policy makers as the ENP tends to be measured by the means of “hard 
cash” by some partner states and for them the “more for more” principle could be convin-
cingly fulfilled only by more cash.
The only case in the MENA where the ENPI has already a significant role is Palestine, which 
is highly dependent on its aid donors (US, EU and UN). This aid dependency could be turned 
to EU trade/FDI dependency once Palestine gets integrated to the proposed Euro-Mediter-
ranean Free Trade Area together with other MENA countries. This “aid for trade” scheme 
should also play an important role when policy makers formulate future ENP incentives for 
the long term.
2.3.6. Conclusions: ENP in the light of EU-MENA economic interdependence
Before summarizing our findings on EU-MENA economic interdependence, first we have to 
go back to the beginnings of this chapter and ask ourselves what the exact purpose of this ex-
amination was. We will find that the exact purpose here is to use all of these findings to sys-
tematically prove some of our original assumptions (hypotheses) which were:
1. Theory  selection:  EU-MENA  economic  interdependence  is  highly  asymmetrical, 
therefore can be better understood by a theory focusing on economic dependence (as 
Wallerstein’s) rather than one focusing on modernization by free trade (as Rostow’s 
for example.)
2. Proving the existence of a Wallersteinian “periphery belt” in the southern neighbor-
hood of Europe and assessing the impacts of this for the ENP.
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3. For this purpose, showing several forms of economic dependency and asymmetries by 
quantitative analysis. 
Going backwards on this list and starting with (3.), we can list the quantitative findings we 
made during this research in the four previous sub-chapters: 
- We have found that trade relations are highly asymmetrical as EU members tend to 
trade mainly amongst themselves and only tenth of their trade volume is directed to 
the MENA, while  MENA trade is  directed to the EU between 30 and 60 percent. 
Maghreb countries are much more dependent on EU trade than Mashreq countries.
- We identified the production pattern asymmetries as well, and found that MENA eco-
nomies are mainly based on low added-value industries as agro, textile and hydrocar-
bon production.
- We saw that FDI inflows to the MENA were insignificant historically as these eco-
nomies were closed to foreign investments by business-unfriendly regulations. In the 
last decade however, FDI inflows started to soar and foreign investments became a 
significant factor in MENA economies, especially in the Mashreq.  The EU largely 
dominates the MENA FDI market.
- Finally, we saw that aid directed to the MENA comes from two main sources: EU 
member states and the US. EU institutions have a miniscule budget (the ENPI) com-
pared to the member states aid budgets. The only MENA country where aid plays a 
significant role is Palestine which earns half of its GDP from assistance sources.
Summarizing all these four groups of findings, we can say that we succeed in proving the ex-
istence of a Wallersteinian “periphery belt” in the southern neighborhood (2.), therefore we 
have to make an assessment of the ENP in the light of this discovery. This assessment will in-
form us about the plausibility of the two main economic aims of the ENP: the core request in 
the Action Plans to “increase economic integration with the EU” and the first step of opera-
tionalization, the establishment of the proposed Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. By as-
sessing the ENP in the light of our findings, we can state that:
- An established comprehensive free trade area (EMFTA) would be beneficial to both of 
the partners, although it would carry some negative effects as well. Existing trade de-
pendency and production patterns suggest that further integration (especially with the 
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Maghreb) would fix the MENA’s role as a “low-cost client region” in the Euro-Med 
economic structure. As in the classical Wallersteinian model, the core EU could gain 
more access to markets for its sophisticated goods in the peripheral MENA, while us-
ing it as a cheap labor and commodity resource in the same time. The short term back-
drop for the EU would be the loss of some of its low added-value production (espe-
cially agriculture) by the cheap MENA competition but this would be a definite gain 
for the MENA.
- On the other hand, FDI flows could move upwards MENA economies on the value 
chain by technology transfer and managerial learning. On the long term this could be 
the only way for MENA economies to develop and balance their dependency on the 
EU. The EU would also benefit from the “investment boom” created by the increased 
economic integration and the EMFTA because as we saw, MENA countries tend to 
produce more-than-average profits for foreign investors. Mashreq countries tend to be 
better in attracting foreign investments but once they show progress, the Maghreb will 
be under pressure to follow. 
- The role  of  direct  assistance (aid)  is  far  less  significant  than the factors  discussed 
above, but a coherent European aid policy could definitely play an important role in 
facilitating a positive MENA-environment for ENP implementation. As we saw, EU 
member states together are the biggest source of aid worldwide and this plenty of aid 
given out by them could be organized better to serve common EU interests. First of 
all, the current role of the MENA in the EU’s aid portfolio should be improved to 
make the southern neighborhood top priority in EU assistance. (Currently it’s second 
behind Africa.) This would be another wise strategic move from the EU to bind its 
neighborhood even closer to itself. Second, the fragmented bilateral aid give-outs by 
member states should be at least partially centralized in EU institutional hands to make 
the EU “speak in one voice” in this issue area as well. Improved EU aid budget would 
not only mean a more coherent common aid policy, but the raised amount of ENPI 
funds could give the ENP itself a far greater significance as well. If the EU wants to 
follow its own “more-for-more” doctrine in ENP implementation, the needed “more” 
in cash could come from the centralization of national aid budgets and this would 
therefore not decrease the cash support of other common policy areas.
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Finally, assessing our theory selection (1.), we can confirm the plausibility of our choice: the 
Wallersteinian dependency theory is generally well-usable in the Euro-Med economic system. 
There are some extremities of course: Israel is clearly far less dependent on the EU than any 
other MENA state, while Palestine -on the other hand- is extremely dependent. Another im-
portant finding is the dual difference of dependency factors between the Mashreq and the 
Maghreb. The Maghreb shows a far bigger trade dependency and a significantly lower FDI in-
tensity than the Mashreq. Both of these factors imply that in the case of a deeper EU-MENA 
economic integration the Mashreq would be far more resistant of EU “economic colonialism” 
than the Maghreb. Having other main partners of trade and being much more able to attract 
FDI, the Mashreq can be capable of a relatively EU-independent development,  which the 
Maghreb can certainly not afford. This should inform ENP policy makers about the different 
prospects of the “sticks-and-carrots” incentive structure of the ENP in the two sub-regions and 
make their choices of policy tools accordingly. An enhanced cooperation with the Maghreb 
based on EU-rules seems to be more likely than the same outcome in the Mashreq.
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2.4. EU-MENA interdependence and the Arab Spring: four case studies
2.4.1. The economic and demographic background of the Arab Spring
After the detailed exploration of the different areas of Euro-Arab interdependencies in the 
previous chapters, which resulted in the recognition of how deep these interdependencies are, 
we have to turn to the most recent history of the MENA region and ask ourselves how the 
Arab  Spring  affects  these  interdependencies.  As  the  “Arab  Spring”  covers  several  and 
sometimes very different set of events, we will have to pick and select some individual cases 
and follow them closely while trying to make sense of the “whole”. The main question here 
-of course- will be the connection of these events to the ENP and how they affect the future 
prospects of Euro-Med relations. This is why only a small introductory part of the case studies 
will deal with the concrete revolutionary events and their roots in political-economic causes, 
while the focus will be largely on the EU’s response and future prospects of engagement.
As the concept of the “Arab Spring” signifies a heterogeneous set of events, it’s really hard to 
choose only one representative case to properly track all the related issues. On the other hand, 
exploring all the states and events involved in this huge arena would be a far more ambitious 
plan than the current work could afford. A usable compromise can be done if we select a few 
cases,  which  cover  most  of  the  differences  in  these  events  and  therefore  show  a  good 
representation of the whole. 
The  four  selected  case  studies  here  -Tunisia,  Morocco,  Egypt  and  Jordan-  can  give  an 
appropriate representation as they cover both geographically, demographically and politically 
most of the appearing differences in the MENA. Egypt and Jordan represent the Mashreq 
while Tunisia and Morocco the Maghreb. Tunisia and Egypt represent the revolutions, while 
Jordan and Morocco had only reforms. Finally the demographics of Egypt and Morocco make 
them dominant regional players, while Jordan and Tunisia are marginal. The following matrix 
represents well this grouping of our case studies:101
101Image Source: the author's own work (2012)
121
This chapter will therefore follow a simple structure: it will elaborate one-by-one these four 
case studies, summarizing first shortly the concrete political events in each and then drawing 
conclusions on the further possible trajectories of the events with a special attention to the 
outcomes affecting the ENP. The final sub-chapter will summarize all the findings of the case 
studies and synthesize them in order to make us able to answer one of the most important 
questions of the current work: how does the Arab spring affect Euro-Med relations and what 
are the post-Arab Spring prospects of the ENP?
Before starting with the case studies, it makes sense to address another important question as 
well:  which  economic  and  demographic  factors  drove  Arab  populations  to  the  extreme 
resistance and uprisings against their rulers? If there was a decades-long balance between 
repression  and  economic  stagnation  in  the  region,  what  reasons  were  behind  the  sudden 
collapse of this  balance? Before turning our attention to  the concrete  political  events,  we 
should check first the economic and social structure behind them to answer these questions.
First of all,  population growth rates of the MENA have to be examined and compared to 
provide us a picture on the demographic dynamism in the region. We can assume that regions 
with higher population growth rates have a stronger economic pressure on them to provide the 
necessary economic circumstances (jobs, income, etc.) for their faster growing societies. The 
following diagram shows MENA population growth rates:102
102Data Source: EUROSTAT
122
As we see, population growth in the MENA was far bigger in the last decade than the EU 
average and especially big in the Mashreq, while in the Maghreb it was more moderate. Faster 
population  growth  makes  younger  generations  dominant  in  age  groupings  and  the  more 
youngsters a society has is the more new jobs it has to provide for them. Age trees in the 
MENA countries are the following:
As we see, the under-15 generation in the MENA takes up more than 30 percent of the society 
in each country and this means that -to absorb the rapidly growing new workforce- MENA 
economies  have  to  produce  better  than  average  GDP growth  rates.  A rapidly  expanding 
population needs also a rapidly expanding GDP to make the society able to provide higher (or 
at least similar) GDP/person incomes for the new generations. This challenge was not met by 
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most of the governments in the MENA, which created stagnation or only small increase in 
personal incomes in the last decade:
 
As we see, not only the huge difference in GDP/capita levels between the MENA and the EU 
is shocking, but also the observation that the levels were stagnating or in some cases even 
decreasing in MENA economies throughout the last decade. While in Morocco and Tunisia 
we can witness a very slow pace of progress, in Egypt and Jordan GDP/capita levels have 
clearly stagnated.
As conclusions, we can already recognize MENA population boom and economic stagnation 
as one key factor leading to the uprisings of the Arab Spring. Also, we already see that in the 
Maghreb these factors are weaker than in the Mashreq, therefore we would expect Mashreq 
states more vulnerable to “public rage” than their Maghreb counterparts. Still,  we see that 
both in the Maghreb and in the Mashreq we find reforming and revolting states as well, which 
fact signals that the Arab Spring cannot be explained by purely socio-economic indicators. 
This makes the case for us to expand our research deeper and concentrate on the unique 
circumstances in each of our case studies to explain their political trajectories.
The following four short case studies will therefore have a dualist structure: the first half of 
each will contain a short introduction to the given country's political turmoil and the economic 
reasons  behind  it  and  the  second  half  will  contain  some  analysis  of  the  given  country's 
connections  with  Europe.  This  later  part  will  focus  mainly  on  the  ENP and  answer  the 
questions what the ENP intended to achieve in the given country and what it managed to 
achieve until now.
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2.4.2. Jordan: a “slow boiling” society in the shadow of economic challenges
While Jordan is considered widely as one of the most stable countries in the MENA, having a 
reasonably working political structure (monarchy), the events of the Arab Spring did not leave 
it  untouched either.  The series of ongoing protests  in Jordan began on January 2011 and 
resulted in the firing of the cabinet ministers of the government. In its early phase, protests in 
Jordan were initially against unemployment, inflation, corruption along with demanding for 
real constitutional monarchy and electoral reforms. The protestors' demands then escalated to 
a call for the resignation of King Abdullah II and for the end of the Hashemite monarchy rule 
during the latest protests.
Amongst  the  main  causes  of  the  protests  are  corruption,  inflation,  low  salaries, 
unemployment, restricted freedoms and ethnic tensions (with Palestinian refugees), while they 
also gained inspiration from other regional protests, mainly from the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions. As in the previous sub-chapter we already identified the economic roots of the 
protests (demographic boom and GDP stagnation), the everyday consequences of these root 
problems as inflation, low salaries and unemployment are not needed to be explained much 
deeper. It’s enough to remind ourselves the fact that Jordan’s GDP growth (while flourishing 
in the previous years) fell dramatically after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 started:
This radical decrease in GDP growth led to a rising government debt, which was ought to be 
counteracted  by  the  subsidy  cuts  announced  by  Prime  Minister  Abdullah  Ensour.  These 
subsidy cuts (together with the gas supply disruptions from the politically unstable Egypt) 
caused the price of gas (a main burden on the budgets of low-income families) rise by 54% 
and also serious food and electricity price hikes. This angered a public already suffering from 
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high unemployment, poverty and inflation.103
As public pressure grew on the government to ease cutbacks and engage in job creation, the 
government quickly reversed some its fiscal tightening measures by increasing subsidies on 
energy and basic food goods, hoping that a loosening of the cutbacks might be sufficient to 
avoid unrest.  However,  by then protests  already assumed a political  edge and beyond the 
economic reforms, the political system of King Abdullah’s monarchy became itself a target of 
criticism. The main popular demands included the urgent need of tracking state-corruption 
along  with  demands  for  a  real  constitutional  monarchy  and  electoral  reforms.  The  king 
therefore  needed  to  act  on  the  political  front  as  well,  and  ordered  his  newly  created 
government to “undertake quick and tangible steps for real political reforms.”104
In March 2011, the king established a National Dialogue Committee (NDC) to draft  new 
electoral and political laws and in April he created the Royal Committee for Constitutional 
Reforms (RCCR) to look at amending the constitution. The king appointed the members of 
both  bodies  and  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  (the  main  opposition  organization)  refused  to 
participate,  demanding  the  formation  of  a  government  led  by the  parliamentary majority 
before  reform  could  advance.  In  general,  political  demands  now  aim  to  strengthen 
parliamentarism and decrease the king’s power, which need is acknowledged by the king but 
he upholds that the process would take several years before it could be implemented.
The other central focus of reform efforts appears to be a campaign against corruption and a 
number of senior level figures have been already arrested on this charge. However, insiders 
claim that the anti-corruption committee has not been given a powerful mandate and has been 
barred from prosecuting certain high-level figures. Meanwhile, street protestors seem to be 
unsatisfied, with demonstrators in early 2012 calling for the “real thieves” to be brought to 
justice.105
Concluding on the general economic and political atmosphere in Jordan, we can state that 
although King Abdullah seems to be handling effectively the popular unrest in the country, the 
103 See: Political and economic problems fuel Jordan protests, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
20357743
104 See: “Jordan’s king sacks government, appoints new PM amid street protests”, the Globe and Mail, 1 
February 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/jordans-king-sacks-
government-appoints-new-pm-amid-streetprotests/article1889831
105 See: Jordan's corruption puzzle by Christina Satkowski, 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/16/jordans_corruption_puzzle
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fragility of the situation is undeniable. Since the unrest began, the kingdom has been led by 
three different governments, highlighting the Hashemite monarchy’s longstanding policy of 
defusing popular pressure through government changes, but also putting some light on the 
scale of the country’s ongoing political crises. The slow-motion reform agenda of the king 
might or might not withstand political unrest on the short term, but in a country drowning in 
debt, corruption and economic stagnation, the long-term prospects of the regime are quite 
black.
After the short introduction of Jordan’s slowly boiling society, our focus has to turn to Europe 
and ask what the EU can do in this situation through its foreign policy tools and the ENP to 
motivate progress. To gain some insight to the EU's intentions, we have to analyze the main 
document expressing explicitly these intentions, the Jordanian Action Plan. Then we have to 
answer the question how successfully these “Actions” were carried out by analyzing Progress 
Reports and other EC communications dealing with Jordan's “performance” and contrast it to 
the AP's original  directives.  The Jordanian Action Plan  contains  a list  which sets  out  the 
eleven  main  objectives  that  the  EU  wishes  to  see  being  implemented  by  the  Jordanian 
regime:106
• Take forward a national dialogue on democracy and political life within the framework of the national 
political development plan. 
• Continue to develop an independent and impartial judiciary. Further reinforcing of the administrative 
and judiciary capacity. 
• Take steps to develop further the freedom of the media and freedom of expression
• Further promote equal treatment of women, by preparing a plan to increase women’s participation in 
political and economic life. 
•  Strengthen  political  dialogue  and  co-operation  on  issues  of  international  and  regional  interest  
including the Middle East Peace Process and the fight against terrorism. 
• Take measures to improve business conditions to enhance growth and increase investment in Jordan. 
•  Enhance  Jordan’s  export  potential  by:  further  liberalisation  of  trade,  in  goods  and  agriculture,  
simplifying  and  upgrading  customs legislation  and  procedures,  improving  industrial  standards  and 
modernisation of the sanitary and phytosanitary systems. 
• Take steps to prepare for a progressive liberalisation of trade in services. 
106 Source: Jordanian Action Plan http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/jordan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
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• Effective management of migratory flows and facilitation of movement of persons in conformity with 
the acquis, in particular examine the scope for visa facilitation for short stay for some categories of  
persons to be defined jointly. 
•  Implement  the  Jordanian  Sustainable  Development  Strategy,  and  implement  the  government’s  
strategy to reduce poverty 
•  Develop  the  transport,  energy  and  information  society  sectors  and  networks  through  sector 
liberalisation, investment in infrastructures and interconnection with EU networks. 
• Strengthen co-operation on science and technology
As we see these eleven points cover most of the interdependency sectors we outlined before, 
but here we will focus only on the two most important ones: the political sector (points 1-5) 
and the economic sector (points 6-8). We already saw that exactly these are the two main 
sectors in which the lack of progress is causing turmoils in the Jordanian society right now. 
But what is the opinion of the EU on the progress that Jordan has made in these sectors since 
the inauguration of the ENP? Running through the latest (2012) Progress Report that the EU 
created  about  Jordan,  it  seems  that  the  EU  is  quite  satisfied  with  the  country's  overall 
performance.  This is really surprising in the light of the ongoing protests  that the regime 
experiences  at  home.  Touching  both  political  and  economic  issues,  the  EU  admits  the 
difficulties that the regime is facing, but also gives credits for the shallow political reform 
agenda that we just criticized before:107
“2011  was  a  politically  and  economically  challenging  year  for  Jordan:  three  successive 
governments  in  nine  months,  a  worsening  economic  outlook,  increasing  unemployment,  a 
deepening budget deficit, the decline of foreign investments and increasing energy supply costs  
all add up to a volatile picture…...Despite the difficult context, Jordan made an important quality 
leap  in  its  political  reforms’  process  through  the  adoption  in  September  of  far-reaching 
constitutional amendments. The latter address a number of priorities agreed in the framework of 
the new EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan negotiated in 2010, in particular the establishment of an 
independent electoral commission, greater accountability of the government, the empowerment of 
political parties through the revision of legislation and the prohibition of torture. In other cases, 
the amendments go beyond Jordan’s ENP Action Plan commitments, i.e. the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court, limitation of the government’s ability to enact provisional (temporary) law 
and new, more restrictive, rules on the dissolution of the Parliament.”
107Source: Jordanian Progress Report 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_jordan_en.pdf
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We see that the political reforms implemented by the country even “go beyond Jordan’s ENP 
Action Plan commitments”, therefore the country deserves the best “mark” the EU can give 
for  the  progress.  Here  we have to  refer  back to  one of  our  first  findings,  that  autocratic  
stability serves the EU's security interests better than a possible revolution. This could be the 
main  reason  why the  EU welcomes  these  shallow reforms  so  enthusiastically.  The  good 
performance is also honored with some extra money. In a document issued nearly a year later  
(2013), we see that Jordan already got its deserved extra amount of financial support in the 
form of an EUR 70 million “envelope”. Another interesting observation from this text is that 
we finally witness the real “micro-physics” of the ENP: Jordan is entitled for 70 million, but  
gets only 30 million now and the remaining 40 million is “linked to” further progress:108
“King Abdullah II, partly in response to the winds of change blowing over the region in connection 
with the Arab Spring, initiated a broad process of political and economic reforms, including increased  
parliamentary control and oversight of the government as well as a new electoral law which, though not 
uncontroversial, ensured a broadly representative parliament via the recent elections that were seen by 
observers to be in line with democratic standards. In line with its commitment to support the reform 
processes in the Southern Mediterranean countries, the EU provided to Jordan an additional allocation 
of €70 million from SPRING. This was announced by HR/VP Ashton during the first meeting of the 
EU-Jordan Task Force held in February 2012, in effect doubling the amount of money available to 
Jordan from the EU's Neighbourhood programme for 2012. The additional financial envelope is made 
available in two tranches of 30 and 40 million, with the second tranche linked to progress achieved in  
terms of  democratic  reform. SPRING funding is  used to  support  the electoral  process,  to  assist  in  
reforming the justice system, to support efforts targeting public finance management, education and  
social security, and to help develop the private sector and foster job creation.”
This linking is necessary, but the effectiveness of this “conditionality” can be questionable as 
the overall EU assessment on political progress is far too optimistic, which can make the 
Jordanian  regime feel comfortable with the shallow reform agenda they performed. However, 
on the economic front the EU seems to be much more pessimistic. Jordan managed to come 
out from the economic crisis by 2010, just to get hit by the Arab Spring and fall back again to 
recession in 2011.  This weak performance is identified by the EU not only as the effect of the 
revolts but also as the effect of the weak and outdated economic governance:109
108 Source: EU's response to the Arab Spring: State-of-Play after Two Years (2013), http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_13134_es.htm
109 Source: Jordanian Progress Report 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_jordan_en.pdf
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“Following a period of modest growth and gradual recovery from the global financial crisis throughout  
2010, the Jordanian economy was affected by the Arab Spring events and the conflict in neighbouring 
Syria, notably through the external sector and the fiscal-policy response to domestic social pressures. 
The emergency fiscal  measures  adopted  by the  government  in  early 2011 could  possibly interrupt 
progress towards fiscal consolidation, while delaying reforms in the public subsidy system. At the same  
time, the development and modernisation of the tax system remains a challenge and a major objective of 
the public finance management reform program supported by the EU.”
The economic liberalization and modernization process lags behind the EU's expectations and 
this contrasts the perceived “good performance” of the country on the political front. We can 
agree with this assessment but also notice that these liberalization reforms are also in the 
interest of the EU itself and the “conditionality” here reflects the EU's economic expansion 
plans  (FDI  and  trade  expansion)  at  least  as  much  as  it  advocates  for  genuine  domestic 
economic progress. 
Concluding  on  the  current  Jordanian  “state  of  affairs”,  we  can  identify  the  stagnation-
corruption-repression triangle as  the  main set  of  challenges  confronting  Jordanians  today. 
Unfortunately,  stagnation  comes  mainly  from  external  economic  factors  like  the  current 
financial crisis and the demography-boom therefore it’s less manageable domestically. On the 
other  hand,  the  other  two factors,  corruption  and repression  are  inherent  to  the  domestic 
political system of Jordan, therefore more changeable. King Abdullah manages to maintain 
social peace by promising reforms in all the three mentioned areas, but this peace is really 
fragile  and  needs  to  be  upheld  by a  faster  and  deeper  reform agenda  than  the  currently 
existing one. 
The EU comes into the picture here, because its neighborhood policy advocates exactly for 
these reform steps. Jordan’s case shows therefore a unique constellation, where the interests of 
the people, the EU and even the king fall into the same basket. This basket contains political 
and economic reforms already outlined in the ENP Action Plans as “priorities of action”, and 
now being enforced by popular pressure. Although Jordan’s reform agenda should be original 
and domestic-born, the EU has now several opportunities to intervene into the process by 
implementing its “more-for-more” directive. 
Still,  instead of pushing for more reforms, the EU seems to be already satisfied with the 
reached progress of the regime and offers extra  funds for the government to continue its 
reform agenda.  In  our  opinion this  approach reflects  a  shallow understanding of  what  is 
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happening in Jordan and a far too optimistic interpretation of the political reforms. In the 
economic sector the EU's assessment seems to be much more realistic and identifies the right 
external and also internal reasons of the country's economic decline. However, pushing Jordan 
towards economic liberalization serves not only the interests of the Jordanians, but also the 
interests  of  EU  investors  and  export  firms  waiting  to  acquire  a  decent  share  from  the 
Jordanian markets.
2.4.3.   Egypt: the dominant MENA player with ongoing political turbulence
As the Egyptian Revolution was widely reported by media outlets and the series of events are 
well-known amongst IR academics, here we do not intend to give a detailed explanation of 
the revolt itself. Our focus -again- will be on the exploration of the root causes of the popular 
dissent and the possible European policies that could give decent answers to them. However, 
first a very short introduction of the political events seems to be necessary.
The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 took place following a popular uprising that began on 25 
January 2011. It  was mainly a campaign of non-violent civil  resistance,  which featured a 
series of demonstrations, marches, acts of civil disobedience and labor strikes. Millions of 
protesters  from  a  variety  of  socio-economic  and  religious  backgrounds  demanded  the 
overthrow of the regime of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Despite being predominantly 
peaceful in nature, the revolution was not without violent clashes between security forces and 
protesters with hundreds of people killed and thousands injured. Protests took place in Cairo, 
Alexandria, and in other cities in Egypt. The demands of Egyptian protesters were focused on 
legal  and political  issues  including police brutality,  state  of  emergency laws, lack of  free 
elections  and  freedom  of  speech,  corruption,  and  economic  issues  including  high 
unemployment, food price inflation and low wages. The core aims of the protesters were the 
end of the Hosni Mubarak regime and the establishment of a non-military government. On 11 
February,  following weeks of determined popular  protest  and pressure,  Mubarak resigned 
from office.110
110 Source and more details on the revolution: Egypt Revolution 2011: A Complete Guide To The Unrest, 
Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/30/egypt-revolution-2011_n_816026.html
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Shortly after Mubarak’s resignation, the interim governing group of army leaders (Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces, SCAF) headed by effective head of state Mohamed Hussein 
Tantawi,  announced that  the  constitution  would  be  suspended,  both  houses  of  parliament 
dissolved and that the military would rule for six months until elections could be held. The 
prior cabinet, including Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, would continue to serve as a caretaker 
government until a new one is formed. 
Although the military played a positive role in the revolution itself, by delaying the elections 
and the power transition to civilian leaders the SCAF lost most of its popular support and by 
the end of 2011 several protests turned up against the military rule. EU and US officials also 
urged SCAF leaders to speed up the transition and hold free elections as soon as possible. 
Finally, on 24 June 2012 after the first free elections of Egypt, it was announced by the State 
Election Commission that Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi had won the 
presidential election. On 30 June, Morsi was inaugurated as the first democratically elected 
President of Egypt.111
The  reputation  of  the  currently  ruling  Morsi  government  is  contradictory.  Morsi,  as  a 
politician associated with the Muslim Brotherhood was expected to turn Egypt onto a more 
Islam-based development trajectory with a domestic law system based on sharia and with an 
anti-western and anti-Israel foreign policy direction.  However, most of these fears had no 
bases as Morsi himself declared that the new Egypt will be built on civilian bases and he 
seeks to influence the drafting of a new constitution that protects civil rights, yet is enshrined 
in Islamic law. Also the foreign policy he pursues shows signs of “Islamic pragmatism”, as he 
maintained good relations with Gulf states and also reconciled with Iran, but in the same time 
he greeted Israel, the US and the EU as Egypt’s friends as well.
As  conclusions  on  Egypt’s  recent  democratic  transitions  we  can  gather  a  few important 
elements shaping the country’s development trajectory for the close future and identify some 
important  factors  that  should inform the EU about  the prospects of the ENP in the most 
powerful southern partner. These factors are:
- The balance of power in Egypt between the Mubarak-era officers, the SCAF, 
the liberal opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood is sliding to favor the later.
111 Source and more details on the revolution: Egypt Revolution 2011: A Complete Guide To The Unrest, 
Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/30/egypt-revolution-2011_n_816026.html
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- President Morsi manages to expel his SCAF and old-era rivals from power 
one-by-one, but tries to gain sympathy from the liberals.
- His domestic policies therefore are only “moderately religious”, meaning that 
while  he openly turns the country into an Islamic democracy,  he balances this 
process  by  strengthening  civil  rights  and  advocates  for  the  fair  treatment  of 
minorities.
- His  foreign  policy  can  also  be  described  best  as  “pragmatic  Islamism”112, 
meaning  that  while  he  establishes  good  relations  with  other  Muslim  states 
(including Iran), he does not turn his back on his European and American allies 
either. The case of Israel is more sensitive, especially with the recent incidents in 
both  Cairo and Gaza,  but  open hostility against  the Jewish state  is  not  on his 
agenda, indeed he tries to keep good relations.
If we ask what the EU can do in this political context through its foreign policy tools and the 
ENP to ensure the best possible outcomes for EU-Egypt relations, we can gather some general 
observations  as  answers.  As  in  Egypt’s  case  (in  opposition  with  Jordan’s)  the  political 
freedoms became (at least officially) guaranteed after the revolution but economic problems 
stayed or even deepened, this circle of issues for Egypt will be more economy-centered. 
Even before the revolution, Egypt’s economic problems were dire: “Figures from the Central 
Bank of Egypt for early 2011 show the country’s total external debt at $35 billion, its highest 
level in more than five years. In terms of GDP per capita, Egypt has the lowest level in the 
region and this level stagnated in the last few years. According to the World Food Programme, 
19.6  percent  of  the  population  of  Egypt  lives  below the  lower  poverty  line.  During  the 
revolution, tourism –a main income source- suffered a 20% backdrop.” 113
The revitalization of the country’s economy stays mainly a domestic issue, but as we have 
shown in the previous part of this work, EU-US-MENA economic interdependencies suggest 
that a lot depends on the two western entities’ positive attitudes. The financial crisis –similarly 
to Jordan- broke the development path of the GDP progress and the economic effects of the 
revolution deepened the crisis even further:
112 See: Ian Black, Brothers in pragmatism: riding the wave of change in the Arab spring, Guardian on-line, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/on-the-middle-east/2013/mar/01/egypt-islamists-tunisia-tunisia-morsi
113 Source: EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A BOLDER EU  APPROACH Anthony Dworkin, Daniel 
Korski and Nick Witney, ECFR 2012
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But what did the EU expect from Egypt and how was this communicated? What “Actions” 
were  requested  from  the  Egyptian  side  in  exchange  for  the  much  needed  economic 
contribution from the EU? To get the answers, we have to turn to the Egyptian Action Plan. 
The list of prescribed actions regarding the political and economic sectors is the following:114
• Enhance political dialogue and co-operation, based on shared values 
• Enhance the effectiveness of institutions entrusted with strengthening democracy and the
rule of law and consolidate the independent and effective administration of justice.
• Promote the protection of human rights in all its aspects
• Increase economic integration with the EU
• Improving macroeconomic governance, reforming the financial sector, strengthening the
role of the private sector, enhancing the business climate
• Boost industrial development and enterprises capabilities and competitiveness through
improved skills, better access to finance, promotion of new technologies
• Deepen and enhance the existing economic dialogue and identify areas suitable for gradual
regulatory upgrading and approximation with EU technical legislation
• Proceed in reforming the tax system, improving public finance management
• Promote south-south trade, through encouraging FDI participation in regional projects
• Strengthen cooperation on poverty reduction through employment and social development.
As we expected, here the economic sector gets the majority of action points (4-10), while the 
political  sectors  gets  only  the  first  three.  Improving  economic  governance  and  financial 
management and opening up for trade, FDI and a deeper economic integration with the EU 
can be identified as the key issue areas that the EU was concerned with at the time this AP 
was issued. This is quite contradictory again (as was in the case of Jordan), because the AP 
was written during the Mubarak-era,  when political  reforms would  have  been at  least  as 
114 Source: Egyptian Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
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important as the economic ones. This is again a sign of the EU's pragmatic approach and a 
hidden support for autocratic stability. 
But autocratic stability did not last long after the AP was issued and the latest Progress Report 
was issued already after the revolution (in 2012). This report is quite the opposite of what we 
saw in the case of Jordan. Both the political  and economic issues are seen by the EU as 
negative developments and the Egyptian transition seems to be more problematic for the EU 
than the Jordanian non-transition:115
“During the transition period the military’s respect for basic human rights and democratic standards has 
not been satisfactory. Police and military personnel who resorted to excessive use of force during the 
demonstrations,  notably against  women,  have  yet  to  be  investigated.  Thousands  of  activists  were  
arbitrarily detained. Military courts were used to try activists and bloggers. Reports of the use of torture 
and degrading treatment in detention and prison have continued.“
Not only the democratic standards were found unsatisfactory, but the economic performance 
of the interim government also didn't meet the EU's expectations.  The interim government 
seems  like  it's  not  a  partner  in  economic  cooperation  and  if  we  would  like  to  be  very 
provocative, we could say that the EU seems to be contrasting this performance to “the good 
old Mubarak-era days”. Of course, this is an exaggeration but in our opinion the text is highly 
contradictory:116
“Ongoing political and economic uncertainty meant that progress on the structural reforms outlined in 
Egypt's  Action Plan was limited. On the positive side,  the work to overcome technical  barriers  to  
exports  advanced  when  Egypt  became  an  associate  member  in  the  European  cooperation  for 
accreditation, the process for creating a business was simplified and a competition authority was set up. 
Following the 2011 events the need for thorough social and economic reform has become more evident 
than ever. The interim authorities have been unable to engage on achieving long-term objectives..... No 
progress was achieved on trade-related issues or on market and regulatory reform. The EU adopted on 
14  December  negotiating  directives  for  a  Deep  and  Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Area  (DCFTA). 
However,  the  interim  Egyptian  authorities  are  not  ready  to  engage,  given  their  limited  mandate.  
Similarly, they have declined the offer made by the EU to start a dialogue on Mobility, Migration and  
Security, in order to conclude a Mobility Partnership.”
115 Source: Egyptian Progress Report 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_egypt_en.pdf
116 Ibid.
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This means that the EU did not recognize that Egypt had more important domestic issues to 
handle during the transition than the EU's Action Plan and if  we contrast  this analysis  to 
Jordan's, who -despite being still autocratic- got the best possible comments, we will have 
some serious concerns about the EU's values and assessment criteria. However, a year later (in 
2013) things have turned upside-down. The EU seems to have accepted the transition and 
seeks close cooperation with the first elected president of Egypt. This new assessment is the 
exact  opposite  of  the Progress  Report  issued just  a  year  earlier  and gives  credits  for  the 
country's new president for democratization and also for the EU for supporting this process, 
which is a bit ironic in the light of the above cited document:117
“Since the first protests erupted in Tahrir square two years ago, the EU has consistently supported the  
movement  for  democracy  and  human  rights  in  Egypt,  calling  for  a  peaceful  and  inclusive  
transition.....One of the first foreign visits undertaken by the newly-elected President Morsi of Egypt  
was to Brussels which resulted in agreement to resume bilateral contacts through the structures of the  
EU-Egypt Association Agreement and a restart  of negotiations on a new ENP Action Plan. At the 
invitation  of  the  government,  the  EEAS  sent  two  electoral  experts  to  assess  the  conduct  of  the 
Presidential elections in May-June 2012. The technical mission concluded that the elections had been 
fair and were held in a peaceful environment. Ahead of the parliamentary elections planned for the 
first  semester  of  2013,  the EU has reiterated its  offer  to  deploy,  upon invitation of  the Egyptian  
authorities, a fully-fledged EU Election Observation Mission (EOM). ”
And if there was so much political progress and reiteration between the EU and Egypt, then 
the  promised  economic  help  should  be  delivered  as  well.  The  offer  seems  to  be  quite 
impressive:  from different  sources,  Egypt  will  get  altogether  more than EUR 1 billion in 
financial assistance and development loans:118
“In terms of financial support for the transition, the EU has already made available €449 million for the 
period 2011-2013. Furthermore, the EU, together with EIB and EBRD pledged an additional financial 
package of  €5 billion during the EU-Egypt  Task Force in November 2012. The €750 million EU 
contribution was composed of €90 million of  assistance from the SPRING programme to support 
socio-economic  reform  measures,  €163  million  from  the  Neighbourhood  Investment  Facility  and 
subject to the endorsement of an IMF arrangement, the EU may provide up-to €500 million Macro-
Financial Assistance to Egypt with up-to €50 million in grants and up-to €450 million in concessional 
loans. The additional SPRING funds of €90 million are earmarked for supporting, in partnership with 
other  donors  (World  Bank  and  African  Development  Bank)  the  government’s  socio-economic 
117 Source: EU's response to the Arab Spring: State-of-Play after Two Years (2013), http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_13134_es.htm 
118 Ibid.
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programme. In the framework of the Task Force, the EU and Egypt agreed to jointly explore how to 
deepen trade and investment relations, including. the possible negotiation of a deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement (DCFTA).”
We can absolutely agree with this final assessment, and welcome the decision which provides 
this extensive rebuilding assistance for Egypt.  However, we have to remind ourselves that the 
EU “made up it's mind” again a bit late and in the value confrontation between the short term 
stability and the long term democratization first it chose the wrong option.
Concluding on Egypt’s current political and economic state of affairs and the prospects of an 
effectively  working  ENP in  this  country,  we  can  summarize  our  findings  in  a  few core 
observations. President Morsi as a “pragmatic Islamist” can be wisely engaged by the EU, 
best through economic incentives. Debt relief and immediate monetary help for economic 
revitalization could definitely help the EU to play an important and positive role in Egypt’s 
transition and in the light of the most recent EU communications we can expect the Union to 
offer this much needed help. With this action the EU coordinates its economic leverage well 
and makes itself even more “embedded” in Egypt’s future.
The original ENP action plan designed for Egypt was mainly concerned with economic issues 
and this area keeps playing the central role between the two actors. However, the political 
arena became much more significant during the revolutions and despite its initial aversions to 
the transition process, the EU later learned to engage wisely the new Egyptian leadership. 
This doesn't mean that the EU gained more significance in the country, but now the relations 
are seemingly “back to normal” and even have the potential to develop to be a well-working 
pragmatic partnership.
2.4.4. Tunisia: an EU-dependent state in the front-line of democratization
As the Tunisian revolution was also widely covered in media outlets and analyzed frequently 
by academics, here again we do not need to go into details in describing the political event 
itself. We will therefore give only a short introduction to the revolution and concentrate more 
actively on the causes and effects of it, including the outcomes most relevant to Europe.
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After the famous self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on the 17th, Tunisian Revolution 
began on the 18th of December 2010 and led to the ousting of longtime President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali on the 14th of January 2011. The demonstrations were –here again- triggered 
by high unemployment,  food inflation,  corruption,  a lack of freedom of speech and other 
political  freedoms and poor  living  conditions.  The protests  constituted  the  most  dramatic 
wave of social and political unrest in Tunisia in three decades and have resulted in scores of 
deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of action by police and security forces 
against demonstrators. 
Following  Ben  Ali's  departure,  a  state  of  emergency  was  declared.  An  interim  coalition 
government was created, including members of Ben Ali's party, the Constitutional Democratic 
Rally  (RCD)  in  key  ministries  but  also  including  opposition  figures  in  other  ministries. 
However, some newly appointed non-RCD ministers resigned almost immediately because 
street protests in Tunis and other towns around Tunisia continued, demanding that the new 
government have no RCD members and that the RCD itself be disbanded. On 27th January 
new Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi changed the government,  removing all  former 
RCD members other than himself and later the party itself was dissolved, as protesters had 
demanded.119
Following further public protests, Ghannouchi himself resigned on 27 February, and on 3rd 
March 2011, the president announced the elections for the Constituent Assembly, which were 
held on 23rd of October 2011 with the Islamist Ennahda Party winning the majority of seats. 
On 12 December 2011, former dissident and veteran human rights activist Moncef Marzouki 
was elected as president of Tunisia by a ruling coalition dominated by the Ennahda Party. This 
government now has the prospect to become the “poster child” of the Arab Spring as Tunisia 
has the brightest prospect in the region to develop a stable democratic state even in the face of 
the persisting political and economic challenges that are very similar to its neighbors’.
After “shortlisting” the events of the Tunisian revolution, we have to turn to the analysis of 
the economic background of it to understand deeper the dynamics behind. As we already saw, 
unemployment, food inflation, corruption and the absence of political freedoms were the main 
drivers  of  popular  dissent,  very  similarly  to  Egypt.  The  difference  is  that  the  Tunisian 
119 Source: Tunisia Revolution News, Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/14/tunisia-revolution-live-u_n_809294.html
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economy was in 2009 ranked the most competitive in Africa and the 40th in the world, which 
is a far better place compared to Egypt’s. This would invoke a different economic background 
for the revolution but if we take a closer look, we see that Tunisia’s economic progress was 
also severely hit by the economic crisis:
As we already saw in the introduction of this chapter, Tunisia is one of the most developed 
and mature countries in the MENA. Both economics and demographics look better here than 
in  most  of  the  region:  the  GDP/capita  level  is  second  highest  in  North  Africa,  while 
population growth and the ratio of young people within the society is the lowest. Still, youth 
unemployment is as high as in any other MENA country and the already examined “sickness” 
of MENA economies, over-education and under-employment highly persists. In addition, the 
revolution made also some short-term losses: 120
“The interim government  puts  the cost  of  the  uprising to  Tunisia’s  GNP at  €6-8  billion,  but  with a 
different sector on strike each day, it is hard to see how growth can be kick-started. The governor of 
Tunisia’s  Central  Bank,  Mustapha  Nabli,  has  said  that  social  pressures  are  the  major  challenge  to 
economic recovery in the next few months. This adds to investor uncertainty:  in the aftermath of the  
revolution, Moody’s downgraded Tunisia’s credit rating to Baa3 from Baa2, and it may still drop further.  
It also does not provide a very encouraging image to the tourists that Tunisia badly needs to encourage to 
come back – bookings with Tunisian travel agents are down 50 percent for the first three months of 2011  
compared with last year.”
How could Europe help in a situation like this?  What could the EU do to help Tunisia carry 
out the most promising transition of the region? Although Tunisia is one of the smaller states 
in the region with significantly lower “weight” than Egypt or Morocco, the stakes are still 
high:  If  the  Tunisian  revolution  can  succeed  to  provide  better  economic  and  political 
opportunities for the country’s citizens in the long term and stabilize a civilian democratic 
120Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney: AFTER THE REVOLUTION: EUROPE 
AND THE TRANSITION IN TUNISIA, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011
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system, that could show an example for the other countries in the region and motivate them 
strongly  to  copy  the  Tunisian  success.  On  the  other  hand,  if  even  the  most  promising 
transition  fails  to  deliver  better  livelihood  for  its  people,  that  would  mean  a  serious 
disillusionment for the whole region and also for Europe. The first reaction of the EU came on 
the day of Ben Ali’s escape: 
"We are following with the utmost attention the events in Tunisia. We want to express our support and 
recognition to the Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations, which should be achieved in a 
peaceful way. In this regard, we urge all parties to show restraint and remain calm in order to avoid  
further  casualties  and violence.  Dialogue is  key.  We reiterate our engagement  with Tunisia and its 
people and our willingness to help find lasting democratic solutions to the ongoing crisis.”121
This weak statement and also its timing reflected well the EU’s failure not to support protests 
from the  beginning  and  stand  behind  Ben  Ali  until  the  very  end.  Tunisian  people  were 
strongly disappointed by the EU’s previous behavior, but they also recognized that the EU is 
the only player who they can count on in the post-revolutionary times: 122
“Tunisians are well aware that the EU’s neighborhood policy, which was, in theory, aid and trade in 
return for progress on democracy and human rights, operated very differently in practice. Leading  
politicians from EU member states had largely uncritical relations with Ben Ali, and although the 
European Commission delegation tried to take a tougher line on political questions, it was frozen out 
by the regime and, in more recent years, has concentrated on technical collaboration on a project level. 
Useful co-operation projects with non-state actors on issues such as rural poverty had restarted in the  
last few years. However, the commission largely ignored the failure of Ben Ali’s regime to live up to  
its commitments to reform in return for aid. The Union for the Mediterranean, with its clear focus on 
commercial  projects,  added  further  to  this  impression  of  EU  hypocrisy….However,  despite  this 
history, Tunisian civil society does still seem to be open to the right kind of EU support. The EU is by 
far Tunisia’s most significant trading partner, with €9.9 billion of Tunisia’s €11.8 billion exports going  
to the EU and two-thirds  of foreign investment coming from the EU. The EU also represents an  
important group of democracies with recent experience of democratic transitions. The US is not that  
visible in Tunisia, Maghreb integration has failed and, in any case, other Arab states are likely to be 
consumed by their own post-revolutionary transitions or will have few stakes in seeing the revolution  
succeed. The EU therefore still has a chance to make amends for past failures by offering prompt and  
generous help with the transition.”
121Joint statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle on the events 
on Tunisia, Brussels, 14 January 2011
122Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney: AFTER THE REVOLUTION: EUROPE 
AND THE TRANSITION IN TUNISIA, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011
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But  what  did  the  EU originally  expect  from Tunisia?  And  how were  these  expectations 
fulfilled?  We  have  to  check  the  Tunisian  Action  Plan  for  answers.  The  list  of  expected 
“Actions”  are  quite  general  and  vague,  treating  equally  the  political  and  the  economic 
sector:123
• the pursuit and consolidation of reforms which guarantee democracy and the rule of law; 
• enhancing political dialogue and cooperation in areas such as democracy and human rights, 
•  the  development  of  conditions  conducive  to  foreign  direct  investment,  growth  and  sustainable 
development; 
•  improving  the  climate  and  conditions  for  the  development  of  competitive  businesses  and 
entrepreneurship; 
• facilitating trade in goods and services, including the negotiation of free trade agreements
The political expectations of the AP were definitely fulfilled as the latest Progress Report 
recognizes  that  the  “revolution  experienced  by  Tunisia  in  January  2011  introduced 
perspectives for radically different relations with the European Union. Turning to democratic 
openness and respect for fundamental  freedoms and human rights,  Tunisia  has initiated a 
transition process including a fundamental step, the first free and democratic elections in its 
history.”124 But what can we say about the economic side? A year later (in 2013) the EU 
concludes (after giving itself some unearned credits for supporting the revolution) that “A 
political agreement was reached on the text of the new ENP action plan towards a “Privileged 
Partnership”  in  November  2012.  Resumption  of  negotiations  on  liberalisation  of  trade  in 
agricultural and fisheries products is pending....Negotiations are being prepared for a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DFCTA)”125
This means that with Tunisia the EU is quite satisfied and even hopeful in respect to the 
potential of future cooperation. Tunisia could easily become the “eminent” of the region in the 
EU's eyes and this could motivate strong European engagement. The EU could conclude that 
most of the “Actions” prescribed in the AP were fulfilled and Tunisia is ready for the next 
step. 
123 Source: Tunisian Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/tunisia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
124 Source: Tunisian Progress Report, (translated from French) 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_tunisia_fr.pdf
125 Source: EU's response to the Arab Spring: State-of-Play after Two Years (2013), http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_13134_es.htm
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The Union also expresses its satisfaction by financial support: “Since the revolution, overall 
EU financial  support for Tunisia  has increased from €240 million for 2011-2013 to €390 
million  over  the  period  2011-2012....  €100  million  was  provided  through  the  SPRING 
programme to support political/governance reform and inclusive economic growth”126 This 
amount is bigger than the one offered for Jordan (which has a comparable size), therefore we 
can conclude that Tunisia is definitely (and rightfully) the EU's favorite partner in the region.
2.4.5.  Morocco: a “progressive monarchy” balancing against public dissent
During the Arab Spring there was no revolution in the Kingdom of Morocco but it has not 
been left untouched by the events either. Like most other states of the region, Morocco has 
seen the growth of a protest movement demanding political freedoms, democracy, economic 
reform and an end to corruption. Although Morocco is one of the few states in the region 
having  a  stable  political  system  (monarchy,  like  Jordan)  and  is  also  seemingly  more 
“democratic” than any of its neighbors, the rule of the king and his allies (the “makhzen”) is 
far from a truly democratic government. Inspired by the uprisings and protests in the region,  
Moroccans also took the opportunity to demand reforms.
On 20 February 2011, thousands of Moroccans protested in the capital to demand that King 
Mohammed give up some of his powers, chanting slogans such as "Down with autocracy" and 
"The people want to change the constitution." They were heading towards the parliament 
building, and police did not intervene. The protests were organized by the 20 February Youth 
Movement, a group largely consisting of students.127
Thousands  took  to  the  streets  of  Rabat,  Casablanca,  Tangier  and  Marrakech  in  peaceful 
protests demanding a new constitution, a change in government and an end to corruption. 
During  a  march  on  Hassan  II  Avenue  in  the  capital,  demonstrators  demanded  a  new 
constitution  to  bring  more  democracy  to  the  country.  They  shouted  slogans  calling  for 
economic opportunity, education reform, better health services, and help in coping with the 
rising cost of living.
126Source: EU's response to the Arab Spring: State-of-Play after Two Years (2013), http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_13134_es.htm
127 Source and more details: Morocco protests fill Casablanca streets, BBC Africa News,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18231125
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After weeks of sometimes violent demonstrations on the 9th of March 2011, in a live televised 
address,  King  Mohammed  VI  announced  his  decision  to  undertake  a  comprehensive 
constitutional reform aimed at improving democracy and the rule of law, and underlined his 
"firm commitment  to  giving  a  strong impetus  to  the  dynamic  and deep reforms...  taking 
place". The monarch announced the formation of a commission to work on the constitutional 
revisions, with proposals to be made to him by June after which a referendum would be held 
on the draft  constitution.  The commission was widely criticized by the protest  movement 
leaders as its members were handpicked by the king himself and refused to participate in the 
commission's work.128
The proposed reforms passed through a national referendum on the 1st of July and gave the 
prime minister and parliament more executive authority and empowered the prime minister 
with the authority to appoint government officials and to dissolve the parliament - the powers 
previously held by the king. However, the king remains the military commander-in-chief and 
retains his position as the chair of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Security Council, 
the primary bodies responsible for the security policy.  A new constitutional provision also 
confirms the king's role as the highest religious authority in the country.
This  “skillful  management” of the crisis  from the king’s side and the lower demographic 
pressure (as showed in the introduction, population growth in Morocco is the second lowest in 
the region) together with a less visible economic shock led Morocco to stay stable.  GDP 
growth did not suffer as much here than in the other three examined cases:
128Source and more details: Morocco protests fill Casablanca streets, BBC Africa News,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18231125
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In this sense, Morocco definitely turns out to be an exception from the “quartet” explored in 
this chapter: unemployment, food inflation, corruption and the absence of political freedoms 
persisted in Morocco as well but the general sentiment is much more against the unchecked 
rule of the “makhzen”, than any other socio-economic reasons seen in the other cases. It is  
widely accepted that the revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 have been 
sparked by four  factors:  unequal  economic  development;  demography;  a  lack of  political 
freedom; and corruption. While Morocco is usually seen as more stable, more advanced and 
more democratic than many other countries in North Africa, it too is vulnerable in each of 
these four areas. Poverty, corruption and youth unemployment are just as problematic here as 
in any other state in the region and if we recognize that the per capita income is still far lower 
than  in  Tunisia  –where  a  revolution  actually  happened-  we  can  see  the  potential  for  an 
ongoing turmoil here too.
But what could the EU do to help avoid future turmoil but in the same time persuade strongly 
the king and the “makhzen” to continue the reforms? As Morocco is economically highly EU-
dependent (as seen in the previous chapter) the EU could do a lot if it  uses its economic 
leverage wisely. As it’s widely recognized amongst experts:129
“In light of the surface-level efforts by the monarchy to present Morocco as being on a path towards  
democracy the EU awarded Morocco “advanced status” within the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
has cultivated it as a key partner. By taking limited steps which satisfied the EU’s box-ticking approach  
to promoting political reform in the neighborhood, and cooperating with the EU and the US on key 
issues such as migration and counter-terrorism, Morocco thus attained a kind of privileged position, 
perceived  as  the  only state  in  the  region  that  was  able  to  offer  both  stability  and  (albeit  limited)  
democracy.  [While  beyond  the  already discussed  economic  dependence,]  many political  and  civil-
society actors think of “Europeanisation” as a powerful tool to trigger domestic reform and compensate  
for  the  lack  of  domestic  will  for  deep  reform among the  political  elites.  EU standards  are  widely 
accepted and considered legitimate yardsticks with which to assess the depth and adequacy of political,  
economic or social reform. All these aspects of the EU-Morocco relationship add up to a certain level of  
potential for the EU to insist on political reform in Morocco, should it choose to. In this sense, Morocco  
is currently sensitive to pressure from the outside. Added to this, there is now a palpable fear in Rabat  
about the possibility that Tunisia and Egypt’s revolutions might deprive Morocco of its privileged status 
and  divert  funding  towards  the  countries  showing  greater  promise  of  genuine  reform,  exposing 
Morocco’s efforts as only going skin deep. This provides the EU with a limited window to encourage  
Morocco to turn this fear to good use and earn its right to advanced status through a genuine effort at  
deeper political opening.”
129 Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu and José Ignacio Torreblanca: A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU 
CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO, European Council on Foreign Relations, 
2011
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But what could the EU use this “limited window of opportunity” for? In our opinion in the 
case of Morocco the best that the EU could do is to “secure the democratic dividend” of the 
current pressures on the “makhzen” by strengthening civil society and encouraging further 
reforms. The original Action Plan (2005) for Morocco did not include too many incentives for 
political reform:130
• pursuing legislative reform and applying international human rights provisions; 
• enhanced political dialogue on the CFSP and ESDP and enhanced cooperation on combating terrorism; 
• negotiation of an agreement on liberalising trade in services; 
•  the  development  of  a  climate  conducive  to  foreign  direct  investment,  growth  and  sustainable  
development; 
• cooperation on social policy with the aim of reducing poverty and vulnerability and creating  jobs; 
The one and only request concerning political issues seems to be very weak compared to the 
list of the other examined countries. This approach was definitely not the right way to use the 
EU's leverage in order to reach democratization. Surprisingly, in the latest Progress Report 
(2012), the priorities have changed and political issues became important: “The year 2011 was 
characterized by major political developments: following claims expressed by the public, the 
King, in his speech of March 9, announced a deep constitutional reform....which paves the 
way for major reforms for democracy.”131 And although still keeping some reservations on the 
quality  of  the  Moroccan  democracy  (“However,  barriers  to  the  exercise  of  freedom  of 
association  and  assembly  have  persisted,  as  well  as  intimidation  and  repression  against 
journalists and the media. The new press law has still not been adopted.”132), Morocco gets 
credits  in  general  for  its  positive  overall  performance  and  for  its  huge  steps  forward  in 
democratization.
A year  later  (2013)  we  already  see  the  EU's  gifts  for  the  good  performance:  several 
liberalization agreements were signed and Morocco became entitled for the biggest amount of 
direct financial assistance (with only EU origin) in the region: 133
130Source: Moroccoan Action Plan, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/morocco_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
131 Source Moroccoan Progress Report, (translated from French),
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_maroc_fr.pdf
132Ibid.
133Source: EU's response to the Arab Spring: State-of-Play after Two Years (2013), http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_13134_es.htm
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“Negotiations for a new ENP Action Plan for the period 2013-2017 on the basis of the Advanced Status 
were concluded in November 2012 and the procedure for formal adoption is ongoing. As regards the 
proposed new EU-Morocco “Mobility Partnership”, negotiations are advancing at a satisfactory pace and 
agreement on a political declaration is expected already sometime during the first semester of 2013. As 
regards trade issues, negotiations on liberalisation in the area of trade in services were continued in 2012, 
the issue will be taken up in the context of the future Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)  
negotiations. A scoping mission for a future DCFTA took place in July 2012, with negotiations expected 
to start in early 2013. In the meantime, the agreement on liberalisation of trade in agriculture entered into 
force on 1 October 2012....Morocco remains the largest  recipient  of  EU assistance in the ENP-south 
region with €580.5 millions earmarked for 2011-13 with a focus on social and economic development,  
environmental protection, institutional support (i.a. justice and human rights). Additional funding under 
SPRING  amounted  to  €80  million,  supporting  a  human  rights  programme  and  inclusive  economic 
transition, targeting notably education, health and rural development.”
This means that the EU sees the original AP more or less completed and it's ready to make a 
huge  step  forward  in  the  relationship.  We  can  expect  Morocco  together  with  Tunisia  to 
become the most advanced partners in Euro-Med relations and also the greatest beneficiaries 
of it. This is quite contradictory since Morocco is still a monarchy (unlike Tunisia) and still 
gets equal treatment to its democratic peer, but on the other hand, reforms in Morocco are 
deeper than in Jordan for example, therefore the country somewhat deserves the EU's preferal 
treatment.
2.4.6    Conclusions: The effects of the Arab Spring on EU-MENA interdependence
After the short assessment of the four case studies, our main goal with this chapter to evaluate 
the  effects  of  the  Arab  Spring  on  EU-MENA interdependence  has  to  be  fulfilled.  This 
evaluation can be worked out effectively by a four-step approach checking four different but 
closely related sub-fields of this question. A comparative approach of the case studies can be 
effectively used in the four following areas to discover similarities and differences:
1. The mainly common socio-economic background of the uprisings with slight 
differences in the details, especially in demographics.
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2. The very different political build-ups of the case countries and their different 
answers  to  the  political  crises  leading  to  divergent  effects  on  EU-MENA 
security and economic interdependence in each case.
3. The EU’s different leverage (both “soft” and geoeconomic power) in the case 
countries and the different capabilities this leverage gives the EU to act in each 
case. (Especially the Maghreb-Mashreq difference.)
4. The EU’s original plans with each country (as expressed in the ENP Action 
Plans),  the  assessment  of  their  performance  (As  expressed  in  the  Progress 
Reports) and the outlined new plans for the post-revolutionary cooperation.
1.   The  already  well-described  socio-economic  background  of  the  uprisings  can  be 
summarized with only a few sentences here. The lack of economic opportunity together with 
rapid demographic expansion is strongly present through the whole MENA region and this 
factor  lies  behind most  of  the  public  dissent.  The  decades  long  “repressive-redistributive 
equilibrium” of these states reached an unsustainable stage when there weren’t enough state 
resources  to  redistribute  to  the  ever-growing  population  any  more  to  justify  the  brutal 
repression.  This  natural  breakup  of  the  equilibrium  together  with  the  spread  of  new 
communication technologies which removed the state-monopoly of mass-communication led 
to the sudden outbreak of popular dissent.
However -beyond the common structural problems- the socio-economic background in the 
four  examined countries  looks slightly different.  Staring  “from the  bottom”,  the  situation 
looks worst in Egypt, where fast demographic expansion is paired with the lowest GDP/capita 
level in the region and which was severely hit by the global recession and also by the negative 
economic effects  of its  revolution.  Egypt  is  also highly aid and tourism dependent which 
makes it very vulnerable to external shocks. 
Second is  Jordan,  which  was also  severely hit  by the  global  recession and has  a  rapidly 
expanding population and stagnating GDP. However, as it managed to mitigate public dissent 
until now, it didn’t have to face the negative economic outcomes of a revolution. As Jordan is  
also very vulnerable externally, a global economic rebound could save it from collapse, but an 
ever-lasting recession could easily tear its weak economy apart. 
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Morocco  is  already  in  a  far  better  position  than  its  Mashreq  counterparts:  demographic 
expansion is far lower here, and although the GDP/capita level is quite similar to the other 
two players, it did not suffer as much from the global recession and from the revolutionary 
wave neither. It even started to rebound economically in the most recent period. 
Finally, Tunisia is the best-performing state in the region according to the socio-economic 
indicators as it has the lowest population growth in the region and a GDP/capita level almost 
double than in the other three cases. Although it was severely hit by both the recession and the 
revolution, it stays the most promising economy out of the examined four.
Summarizing these findings we can show a few persisting patterns of the MENA’s economy 
through these case studies. First is that the socio-economic background produced very similar 
problems in the whole region: inflation of food and energy, youth unemployment and the lack 
of  social  mobility can  all  be tracked back to  the  stagnating  economies  and the  booming 
populations. On the other hand, Maghreb-Mashreq differences can be easily witnessed: the 
Maghreb has lower population growth therefore somewhat lower pressure on the job market. 
Another  difference  can  be  found  in  the  revolution-reform  division:  reforming  countries 
avoided  the  economic  backdrop  of  the  “revolutionary  chaos”  therefore  have  now  lower 
economic pressure on themselves.  Finally,  the GDP/capita level  cannot be used as a  sole 
indicator of popular satisfaction as in Jordan there was no revolution yet, while the richer 
Tunisia was the first to uprise.
2.     Another aspect of examination is the type of regimes and the answers they gave to the 
upheavals. This aspect is also important from the EU’s perspective to evaluate the effects on 
EU-MENA relations.  Two  types  of  regimes  can  be  clearly  identified:  monarchies  and 
autocratic  republics.  Monarchies  (Jordan  and  Morocco)  managed  to  navigate  themselves 
through the hardship while the less responsive and more rigid autocracies (Tunisia and Egypt) 
failed. From the perspective of EU-MENA security and economic interdependence there is a 
decisive split between the two groups: while the more or less stable monarchies stayed “in 
order”, posing no security challenges to the EU and maintaining the usual economic ties, in 
the cases of the uprisings quite a lot has changed.
Both  of  the  ex-autocratic  revolutionary  states  are  now more  complicated  from the  EU’s 
perspective in terms of security and in terms of economics as well. Security-wise there is a 
definite deterioration in both cases: Tunisia is far less able to control migration flows then 
under Ben Ali and Egypt is even worse as it approaches an Islamic trajectory of development 
which cant threat the peace agreement with Israel and lead to regional destabilization. Almost 
all of the security sectors examined before (military,  political,  societal and environmental) 
show a decrease  of  stability but  as  Tunisia  has  a  more  pro-western elite,  there is  only a 
problem in the societal sector, while Egypt “under Islamization” poses a military, political and 
societal threat as well. 
The greatest problem is that exactly Egypt is the leading force of the region so even if the 
monarchies and Tunisia stays stable and pro-Western, a negative turn in Egypt could drag all 
the region with itself into a spiral of security deterioration. Economic ties are stringed as well,  
because the revolutions produced GDP losses and capital flight from both revolutionary states 
and the EU has to face now less productive and even more aid-dependent partners. Trade 
disruptions and the disappearance of investments and tourism will force the EU to intervene 
more broadly in these economies with the purpose of reinstalling normal economic relations.
3.      A third useful approach is the examination of the EU’s acting capability in each case. 
With both of the monarchies the EU will be able to maintain the “old system” of relations as 
both politically and economically they remained mostly unchanged. On the other hand, using 
the fragility of Jordan and the economic EU-dependence of Morocco with skillful diplomacy, 
the EU could definitely have now a stronger presence in both states and put its weight more 
effectively behind the domestic reform movements in both cases. 
The ex-autocratic revolutionary states look much more divergent and complicated form the 
EU’s perspective than the monarchies. First of all, the revolutions happened in spite of the 
EU-support to the autocrats and not because of any European help to the opposition. This 
leaves a bitter memory in the new governments of these states and seriously erodes the EU’s 
leverage to have any say into the further political developments. 
On the other hand, as the EU changed rhetoric and acted supportive after the breakout of the 
revolutions it corrected its image and has now a more positive perception in the region. The 
following map shows the results of a questionnaire on the prospects of sustainable democracy 
and the assessment of the EU's role during the upheavals : 134
134 Image Source: Democracy Digest, http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2012/07/us-eu-navigating-minefield-of-
arab-spring/
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We can see that the public in the monarchies saw the EU’s role supportive for their oppressing 
governments (second row, yellow), while the public in the ex-autocratic revolutionary states 
sees the EU as more supportive for their case (first row, green). Another observation is that 
the two Maghreb states see themselves more potent for sustainable democracy (darker green), 
than their Mashreq counterparts (light green and orange), which together with the Maghreb’s 
stronger  economic  EU-dependence  can  give  more  potential  for  success  to  the  EU’s 
democratization efforts in this subregion. 
Summarizing these effects, we can say that in the Maghreb the EU has now more leverage to 
act as in Morocco the regime is more flexible now to accept reforms in the light of the “Arab 
Spring  pressure”  and  in  Tunisia  the  public  turned  to  be  more  pro-European  somewhat 
forgiving the EU’s support for Ben Ali before.  Moreover,  both of these countries depend 
heavily on European trade, tourism and investments making the EU’s position even stronger.
The case of the Mashreq states is more complicated: while in Egypt the EU faces a positive  
attitude from the public but a negative turn in political developments, in Jordan it faces a 
slightly more cooperative regime but a somewhat antagonistic public sentiment. Moreover -as 
we already saw before- the Mashreq is far less dependent on the EU economically, therefore it 
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could more easily turn its back on Europe if political dynamics take it into that direction. 
Altogether this mix of post-Arab Spring variables add up to a somewhat decreased space of 
maneuver for the EU in this sub-region.
4.       Finally, the last aspect of our examination should be focused on the concrete steps that 
the EU  planned and did before during and after the revolutions with each case countries. 
These steps are the following: (A) The EU’s original plans with each country (as expressed in 
the ENP Action Plans), (B) the latest assessment of their performance (As expressed in the 
Progress Reports) and (C) the outlined new plans for the post-revolutionary cooperation.
The EU’s original plans with each country (A) were laid down in the ENP Action Plans (APs) 
formulated around 2005 for all the four case countries. These extensive documents line out a 
detailed list of what societal and economic reforms the EU expects from its southern partners 
and what kind of support it's willing to provide in exchange. They are based on the same EU 
system of  goals  and incentives,  but  as  they were  co-authored  by Brussels  and the  given 
partner countries, each AP looks different. Weights diferr on political and economic reforms 
and  the lists of expected actions are highly dependent on the given partner's acting abilities.
In  our  four  cases  we  can  witness  a  core  difference  between  the  Maghreb  and  Mashreq 
countries. In the pre-Arab Spring era the EU was far less demanding on the political front 
with Tunisia and Morocco and more demanding with Jordan and Egypt. This is interesting as 
we would expect that here we find an autocracy-monarchy fault line, but this line turned out 
to  be  geographical  instead.  The  reason  for  this  could  be  that  the  EU had  more  smooth 
relations with the Maghreb regimes, therefore it was less demanding to reform them. On the 
other hand, economic "actions" turned out to be more similar. The EU's prescriptions include 
economic liberalization and regulatory modernization in all the four cases.
The latest EU assessment of the case countries' socio-economic progress (B) can be found in 
the 2012 Progress Reports in each case. These reports are far more divergent than the Action 
Plans as here each country gets its special evaluation. The most interesting thing about these 
reports is that they were created just after the revolutions therefore they still show a somewhat 
"surprised"  EU and  therefore  communications  seem to  be  sometimes  confused.  Here  we 
definitely find the expected autocracy-monarchy fault line as the "survival monarchies" get 
really positive assessments (maybe in the hope that they stay stable and manageble) while 
Tunisia gets a careful encouragement and Egypt gets a really negative assessment. This shows 
that  in  2012  the  EU  was  just  at  a  turning  point  between  being  suspicious  about  the 
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revolutionary developments  (in  Egypt)  and slowly accepting  the  new "fait  accomply"  (in 
Tunisia). In the meantime it stayed supportive with the monarchies and encouraged the reform 
processes that these states initiated as a response to the "Arab Spring pressure." The shallow 
Jordanian  reform  agenda  gets  some  positive  remarks  from  the  EU,  while  the  deeper 
Moroccoan reforms get even more applause and promises for advanced relations in exchange.
Finally, the outlined new plans for the post-revolutionary cooperation (C) can be found in the 
latest  document the EU issued in this field (February 2013).  This doccument summarizes 
what the EU did during the revolutions and what it offers for the future. Afer giving itself 
(somewhat  unearned)  credits  for  its  supportive  role  during  the  transition  period,  the  EU 
identifies the sucessful transistions as the closing scenes of the first ENP era and prepares 
itself for the next period. New action plans are being worked out for each case country for the 
period  between  2013 and 2017.  The  political  reforms  of  the  monarchies  and  the  regime 
changes  of  the  ex-autocracies  seem to  satisfy the  EU and  this  makes  it  see  the  original 
prescribed reforms (of the APs) regarding the political sector fulfilled. 
However optimistic the document is about the political changes, the issue area of economic 
reforms is still does not seem to be satisfactory enough. With each case country the goal is 
still economic liberalization and modernization with the final aim of some kind of economic 
integration with the EU in the end. This part of the original Action Plans is clearly not being 
fulfilled yet, therefore here some further stepps are necessary. In each case the EU offeers 
Deep  and  Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Area  (DCFTA)  agreements  to  push  the  process  of 
economicc integration forward and how this integration could be imagined and why it is the 
single most important issue of Euro-Mediterranean relations today will be the main subject of 
the last conclusive part of the current work.
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Part three 
Hypotheses evaluation and conclusions
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3.1 Hypotheses evaluation
3.1.1. Security and economics: ties of EU-MENA interdependence
As in the respective sub-chapters we already reached some conclusions on EU-MENA security 
and economic interdependence, in the following short sub-chapter we will just summarize these 
findings and make a final conclusion on the basic statements of our two hypotheses accordingly. 
These base statements were:
H1: The Euro-Mediterranean area has several sectors of security interdependencies which are 
deep enough to transform the area into a single security complex.
H2: The Euro-Mediterranean area is economically interdependent but this is asymmetrical: the 
Arab states are much more dependent on the EU than the EU on them.
In chapter 2.2. we explored several sectors of security interdependence between the EU and its 
southern neighbors. Examination of military, political, societal and environmental issues led us 
to recognize the depth of these ties and prove the assumption that both the MENA and the EU 
faces their  main security challenges from the opposite shore of the Mediterranean Sea.  This 
means that we succeeded in proving that the Euro-Mediterranean area fits Buzzan’s definition of 
security  complexes,  therefore  forms  a  united  inter-regional  security  complex  as  it  exactly 
represents “a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently 
closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”135, 
which is the definition itself. 
Furthermore Astrid Boening’s assumption on the existence of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional 
Security Super Complex (EMRSSC) got proved too as we showed in detail by exploring all the  
relevant sectors that "The Euro-Mediterranean, according to the parameters outlined by Buzan, 
135 Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder, CO and London, England: Lynne Rienner.
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Waever  and de  Wilde  (1998,  16),  could  be  termed a  heterogeneous  security  complex,  as  it 
abandons  the  assumption  of  being  locked  into  specific  security  sectors,  but  rather  features 
interactions  across  several  sectors  such  as  states,  nations,  firms  (incl.  NGOs)  and 
“confederations” (in the widest sense, the EU), and across the political, economic, and societal 
sectors.”136
In chapter 2.3. we showed that the “Euro-Mediterranean area is economically interdependent but 
this is asymmetrical” by following closely trade and production patterns and assessing the role of 
European aid and FDI in the MENA region. Production patterns showed the inferiority of MENA 
economies  in  comparison  to  the  EU’s  and  trade  patterns  suggested  that  the  MENA  is 
asymmetrically dependent on the commercial ties it has with the EU and this is especially true in 
the case of the Maghreb. Finally we saw that too that aid and FDI contributions from the EU to 
the MENA are essential in “keeping afloat” the region’s economy therefore the asymmetry is 
even stronger. All these findings point to the fact that dependence theories are the right tools to 
use here to describe reality, out of which Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory is the 
most accurate by describing core-periphery economic relations exactly the way they are present 
in our case. 
Altogether these findings move us in the direction to accept the basic statements (first sentences) 
of both of the two Hypotheses and conclude that EU-MENA relations can be best described by a 
strong security and economic interdependence where economic ties are highly asymmetrical. 
This  asymmetry gives  the EU some structural  power over  the region which should be used 
wisely.
Evaluating  what  these  forms  of  interdependence  should  invoke  for  the  future  of  the  EU’s 
Mediterranean policies (especially the ENP) and how this interdependence interacts  with the 
events of the Arab Spring will be the main task of the following two subchapters. The second and 
third statements (sentences) of both hypotheses will be evaluated by testing first the effects of the 
Arab upheavals, then showing the EU’s current role in reality and a hypothetical possibility of its  
enhanced agenda.
136 Astrid B Boening (2008): Pronouncements of its Impending Demise were Exaggerated:The EuroMed Partnership Morphing 
into a Regional Security Super Complex
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3.1.2. The Arab Spring: taking EU-MENA interdependence to the limelight
In chapter 2.4 we already reached some conclusions on how the Arab uprisings affected  EU-
MENA interdependence and evaluated the different policy challenges that the EU faced during 
the revolutions. However, here again we will have to make a summary of these findings and 
combine them with our previous findings on interdependence in chapters 2.2 and 2.3 to make us 
able to evaluate the second statements of the two hypotheses. These were:
H1: This interdependence was highlighted by the Arab Spring,  which posed new challenges to 
EU policy makers.
H2: This dependence gives the EU a potential economic leverage in the region especially as the 
Arab Spring was triggered by mainly economic reasons.
H1  states  that  the  security  interdependence  between  the  EU  and  the  Mediterranean  was 
highlighted by the Arab Spring and challenged the EU’s  regional  policies.  Several  issues  of 
security interdependence -detailed in chapter 2.3- came to surface during the Arab Spring and 
needed immediate answers from the EU. In the military sector the Libyan “intervention” could 
be  mentioned as  the  most  obvious  case  but  the  behind-curtains  bargaining process  with  the 
military leaders of Egypt could serve as another example. 
Regarding the political sector, we saw in chapter 2.4 that in each case study there was several 
proofs of interdependence. Monarchs in both Jordan and Morocco look towards the EU in the 
hope  to  gain  political  and  financial  support  for  their  reform  programs,  while  in  post-
revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia the new governments are in urgent need of European help to 
somehow reignite their economies. Finally, in the societal sector we also saw serious signs of 
interdependence, the main issue being the uncontrolled migration flows during the revolutions 
from North Africa to southern Europe. This case also showed that security-wise the dependence 
is symmetrical as the EU needs the MENA’s cooperation at least as much as the MENA needs 
European support. 
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The sum of all these factors is pressing us to accept the second statement of H1 and confirm that 
the Arab Spring gave a  good example of Euro-Mediterranean interdependence and therefore 
posed several challenges to the EU’s policy makers. How these challenges were met will be the 
topic of the next subchapter where we will evaluate the EU’s policy answers.
H2 states that the EU has a certain level of economic leverage over its Arab partners as it plays a  
dominant  role  in  EU-MENA economic  relations.  Furthermore,  it  argues  that  this  potential 
leverage could be especially effective now to “govern relations” as the Arab Spring brought the 
economic weakness of MENA states into the limelight. 
In  chapter  2.3  we  showed  several  factors  of  economic  dependence  suggesting  that  MENA 
countries have inferior economies compared to the EU’s and they depend heavily on European 
trade,  aid  and  FDI.  In  chapter  2.4  we  showed  that  the  Arab  countries  have  several  socio-
economic problems like demographic expansion, GDP stagnation, inflation and high levels of 
unemployment which were listed amongst the top reasons of public dissent in all of the four case 
studies. These two groups of findings taken together imply that the EU could affect Arab states 
on their most sensitive issues and has a potential leverage to govern relations through economic 
incentives more effectively. This confirms the second statement of H2.
However, it’s needed to make some very important refinements of these findings as the region is 
not  homogenous and there is  a  serious Maghreb-Mashreq difference in some issue areas.  In 
general,  the  economic  problems  come  from  the  same  –already  listed-  sources,  but  the 
dependence on EU-relations is way different. Both Jordan and Egypt are much less dependent 
economically on the EU than Morocco and Tunisia, which makes the EU’s space of maneuver 
much bigger in the Maghreb than in the Mashreq. An interesting side-finding is that the political 
structure  does  not  play such an  important  role  in  these  relations  as  economics  does.  Being 
located in the Maghreb or the Mashreq has a much stronger effect on the attitude of a state 
towards the EU than the political system or the demographic size (“weight”) of it. This important 
geographical factor will have to be taken seriously when –in the next subchapter- we evaluate the 
different policy options of the EU in the MENA. 
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3.1.3. Europe’s answers: increased engagement and the review of the ENP
As the third step of hypotheses evaluation, we have to turn our focus to the assessment of the last 
statements, which give an evaluation of the EU’s policy tools towards the Mediterranean in the 
light of the discovered interdependence and the happenings of the Arab Spring. These are:
H1: The level of interdependence is not reflected by the current set of EU policies therefore they 
do not meet these challenges and their review is unavoidable.
H2:  Current  EU policies  do not  coordinate  this  potential  leverage  efficiently,  therefore  their 
revision  is  highly desirable  and reaching a  deeper  Euro-Mediterranean economic  integration 
should be the main aim of this revision.
H1 is about how the EU’s current policies (mainly the ENP) fail to effectively govern or at least 
tackle  the  discovered  deep  security  interdependence  with  MENA countries.  As  we  saw  in 
chapters 2.2 and 2.4, there are several issue areas connecting the two regions in the field of  
common security threats and the “toolbox” of the EU is highly fragmented and ineffective to deal 
with these. As in chapter 2.4 we already listed some policy options that should be considered in 
the future to  improve this  “toolbox”,  we can now turn to the EU’s official  communications 
regarding  the  review  of  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  and  contrast  it  with  our 
observations outlined before.  The three most relevant documents regarding the reform of the 
ENP are: 
1. “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” 
communicated  in  March,  2011 lines  out  the  main  tracks  of  the  EU’s  policy reforms 
arising from the Arab Spring.
2. “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” communicated in May, 2011 gives the 
concrete steps that will have to be taken in the coming reform of the ENP.
3. “Support  for  partnership,  reforms  and inclusive  growth (SPRING)” communicated  in 
September, 2011 shows the form of implementation of the steps outlined in the previous 
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papers and allocates money (altogether 350 million euros) to each identified task. This 
paper can be seen as a “project plan” for delivering the ideas in paper (1.) and (2.)
As paper (2.) is the enhanced version of paper (1.) and paper (3.) is only an implementation plan 
of it, it’s enough to list here the main issues from only paper (2.) to get a correct view of the EU’s 
response  to  the  Arab  Spring  and  the  insight  it  provided  into  Euro-Mediterranean  security 
interdependence. According to paper (2.), the EU should:137
•  adapt  levels  of  EU  support  to  partners  according  to  progress  on  political  reforms  and  building  deep 
democracy
•  establish partnerships in each neighbouring country and make EU support more accessible to civil society 
organisations through a dedicated Civil Society Facility
• support the establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy to help political parties, non-registered 
NGOs and trade unions and other social partners
• promote media freedom by supporting civil society organisations' (CSOs') unhindered access to the internet 
and the use of electronic communications technologies
• reinforce human rights dialogues
• enhance EU involvement in solving protracted conflicts
• make joined-up use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other EU instruments
• promote joint action with European Neighbourhood Policy partners in international fora on  security issues
• pursue the process of visa facilitation for selected ENP partners and visa liberalisation 
• develop existing Mobility Partnerships and establish new ones
• support the full use by Member States of opportunities offered by the EU Visa Code
•  undertake Comprehensive Institution-Building programmes similar to those implemented with the eastern 
partners
•  launch a dialogue on migration, mobility and security with Tunisia,  Morocco and Egypt (as a first  step 
towards a Mobility Partnership)
•  focus  the  Union  for  the  Mediterranean  on  concrete  projects  with  clear  benefits  to  populations  of  the  
Mediterranean region
• enhance dialogue on employment and social policies
•  enhance sector co-operation, with a particular focus on knowledge and innovation, climate change and the 
environment, energy, transport and technology
•  Focus ENP Action Plans and EU assistance on a smaller number of priorities, backed with more precise  
benchmarks
137 Excerpt from:  "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood" (2011) 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf
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These  several  points  of  reform  initiatives  cover  most  of  the  introduced  sectors  of  Euro-
Mediterranean security interdependence. This means that EU policy makers discovered more or 
less the same factors as we did and offered some solutions at least on paper. This list therefore 
indirectly confirms H1 and that the “external governance” of the EU in the several sectors of 
security interdependence did not meet real-life needs before the Arab Spring and the uprisings 
shed some light on these shortcomings. Helping political reforms, engaging civil society, easing 
mobility, involving MENA militaries in CFSP programs all confirm that the EU takes now more 
seriously the  military,  political  and societal  sectors  of  interdependence  and even tackles  the 
environmental question.
However  some  issues  are  still  missing  from  the  list,  out  of  which  the  most  important  is 
differentiation.  As  we  learned  from the  case  studies  in  chapter  2.4,  there  are  very  serious 
differences  in  the  EU’s  perception  throughout  the  MENA.  A system of  dual  differentiation 
should be “processed” at least to differentiate between Maghreb and Mashreq states and also 
between monarchies and “new democracies”. 
Maghreb states are much closer to the EU both politically and economically, which means that 
the EU has much more space to maneuver here and also has more leverage to progress on its 
current  ambitious  neighborhood  agenda.  Mashreq  states  have  far  less  interest  in  the  EU, 
therefore they require a different approach with a much looser EU association and a far less 
ambitious  neighborhood  agenda.  This  means  that  the  EU  should  consider  a  different  ENP 
framework for these sub-regions as the one-size-fits-all approach clearly doesn’t work. 
The  other  line  of  differentiation  should  address  the  political  form of  the  MENA states.  As 
monarchies and “new democracies” have really different domestic political  settings, different 
“toolboxes”  are  undoubtedly  necessary  to  deal  with  them.  With  the  “new  democracies” 
communication and agenda-forming can be more open and direct,  while  in  the cases of  the 
monarchies, a much more sensitive and pragmatic approach could be needed. Here again, the 
one-size-fits-all  approach  clearly  doesn’t  work  which  means  that  ENP ambitions  should  be 
curtailed accordingly.  However,  this difference is  not strategic but only tactical therefore the 
long-term agendas could converge but the short-term agenda still needs sensitivity.
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H2 states that the EU does not use its leverage (steaming from economic dependence) effectively 
in the MENA, therefore its economic policies should be redesigned. The same document (paper 
(2.)) gives a clear indication that EU officials agree with H2 and outlines several points of reform 
priorities accordingly:138
•  support  partner  countries'  adoption of  policies  conducive  to  stronger,  sustainable  and more  inclusive 
growth, to the development of micro, small and medium-sized companies and to job creation
• strengthen industrial cooperation and support improvements to the business environment
• help to organise events to promote investment
• promote direct investment from EU SMEs and micro-credit
• build on the pilot regional development programmes to tackle economic disparities between regions
• launch pilot programmes to support agricultural and rural development
• enhance the macro-economic policy dialogue with partners making the most advanced economic reforms
• improve the effectiveness of Macro-Financial Assistance by streamlining its decision-making 
• strengthen Euro-Mediterranean industrial cooperation
• launch pilot programmes to support agricultural and rural development
• advance sub-regional cooperation
• negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with willing and able partners
• further develop trade concessions, especially in those sectors most likely to offer an
immediate boost to partners’ economies
• enhance sector co-operation, with a particular focus on knowledge and innovation
These points again confirm indirectly H2 and that the EU’s toolbox on economic cooperation 
with the MENA is weak and fragmented. On the other hand, these points give a strong and useful 
reform agenda for the ENP, tackling most of the issues that arose during our research in chapters 
2.3  and 2.4.  Especially  to  “negotiate  Deep and Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Areas”  could  be 
regarded positive as this was one of our main recommendations (to develop an EMFTA) and to 
strengthen  trade,  investment  and  cooperation  in  cross-regional  production  networks.  This 
enhanced economic cooperation is the sole most important recommendation we can identify and 
also the most important product of this dissertation is the provision of a detailed and firmly based 
argument for this closer cooperation, which will be outlined in the next chapter.
138 Excerpt from:  "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood" (2011) 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf
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Our argument on the need of the “dual differentiation” approach stays true in this case as well,  
but  some  vague  hints  on  differentiation  can  be  already  found:  “advance  sub-regional 
cooperation”. This could support our arguments both on the Maghreb-Mashreq division and on 
the need of an effective south-south cooperation, both explained in detail in chapter 2.3.
H2 also states that “a deeper Euro-Mediterranean economic integration should be the main aim 
of this revision.” Although here (and also before) we already touched this issue, the clarification 
of  this  concept  will  be  more  deeply  elaborated  in  the  next  chapter  because  this  could  be 
considered  as  the  main  conclusive  finding  of  this  dissertation,  namely  that  not  short-term 
financial help and political actions, but long term economic integration is the way to “shared 
prosperity” and balanced Euro-Mediterranean relations.
Finally, merging our findings here with the ones in the previous two subchapters, we can say that 
H1 and H2 were confirmed. However, we will have to add some clarification to these findings 
and highlight the most important ones to make the results of our research more understandable 
and give it some policy-relevance as well. This will be the task of the next, final chapter.
162
3.2.   Conclusions and questions of the future
3.2.1. Fragmentation and statism: roots of the MENA’s economic decline
Before we turn to our final arguments for a closer Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation, we 
have to give a deeper assessment to the MENA’s current economic problems. This assessment 
will “make the bed” for our arguments on economic integration and also give a background for 
understanding the socio-economic dynamisms of the Arab Spring. Furthermore, it will give an 
even  stronger  support  for  H2,  namely  that  behind  the  Arab  Spring  the  main  reason  is  the 
MENA’s economic decline, therefore the biggest impact that the EU could have in the region 
could come from enhanced economic cooperation.
To  summarize  the  problems  of  Arab  economies,  we  have  to  mention  two  deeply  rooted 
phenomena:  the  “heavy arm” of  the  state  which  prevents  the  development  of  a  competitive 
private sector and the fragmentation of both domestic and regional economic and administrative 
structures. These problems form the main obstacles of economic development in the MENA. 
These two factors, statism and fragmentation need some deeper examination to make us able to 
come up with some possible solutions.
The  domestic  side  of  the  problem -statism-  can  effectively  be  understood  as  the  economic 
heritage of the monolithic state form that historically developed in the Middle East and North 
Africa.  The  different  generations  of  leaders  and  ideologies  that  governed  the  post-Ottoman 
MENA had one common denominator: they treated not only political but also economic activity 
as a threat to their systems if it was not controlled by the state. This long-running policy pattern 
persisted throughout the last century well into now-days. As Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah 
(2011)  notices:  "The  state  in  most  Arab  economies  is  the  most  important  economic  actor,  
eclipsing all independent productive sectors. When it comes to essentials of life, such as food, 
energy, jobs, shelter and other public services, the state is often the provider of both first and last 
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resort....While a centralized, bureaucratic systemhas worked well for ruling elites....it has failed 
to deliver prosperity and social justice for ordenary citizens."139
Even the last wave of reforms, the neo-liberal “opening” of the 90s did not ease centralization as 
IMF-advised  policies  on  privatization  were implemented  by MENA elites  as  only enriching 
themselves with the privatized state assets. (Very similarly to Eastern-Europe.) We can agree 
with Ibrahim Saif’s (2012) conclusion on the neo-liberal “miracle”:140
“Looking back at the growth levels achieved over the past decade before the outbreak of protest movements, 
economic growth in the Middle East seemed high by all standard measures, and some countries (namely  
Tunisia and Jordan) were touted as “success stories.” Yet when countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Jordan  started  applying economic  reform programs in  the  early 1990s (Syria  also  witnessed  economic 
transformations, though its policies came later than the other countries), an imbalanced formula emerged:  
economic growth combined with declining equality in education and basic services. Rather than stabilize,  
growth benefited only specific groups—becoming a source of tension that increased the frustration of those 
not reaping the benefits. What was missing from these growth estimates was an assessment of the economic 
expansion’s  impact  on  overall  prosperity,  the  parity  of  basic  services,  and  the  effectiveness  of  social 
expenditures.”
Neo-liberal reforms therefore only implified, rather than weakened the social polarization of the 
MENA and helped to even strengthen the ruling elite and its semi-private economic interests 
against  the  truly  private  domestic  small  and  medium enterprises  (SMEs).  The  absence  and 
weakness of these enterprises (the number of SMEs/person in the Arab world is only the quarter 
of the global average) gives direct way to the lack of economic competitiveness, which in turn 
produces low GDP and high unemployment levels. As we already saw, this polarization of wealth 
and lack of economic opportunity gave fuel to the Arab revolts and in this sense the neo-liberal 
“opening” led indirectly to some kind of political liberalization, although not the kind what either 
the IMF or the ruling elites imagined. The other big obstacle to economic growth, fragmentation 
can be described best as the lack of regional economic cooperation withinin the MENA, which is 
especially interesting in the light of the fact that the Arab people were histoically one of the 
139 Adeel Malik  and Bassem Awadallah: The economics of the Arab Spring, CSAE Working Paper WPS/201123, 
December 2011
140 Source: The Daily Star Lebanon, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2011/Dec-19/157273-even-
with-arab-economies-spring-is-increasingly-visible.ashx#axzz2HEcB82kQ
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greatest traders of the world: "the Middle East remains one of the most fragmented regions of the 
world in terms of production, trade and economic linkages. With a population of 350 million 
people that share a common language, culture and a rich trading civilization, the Arab world 
doesn't  function as one economic market  [which makes them] playing the role  of bystander 
rather than an active participant in the role of globalization."141
This absence of trans-Arab economic linkages can be again connected to the statist development 
modell of the MENA: as domestically any political or economic “alternative” was regarded as 
threat to the rule of the actual elite, so was any external connection regarded “dangerous”. This 
external “danger” led to the isolation and autarky of many MENA states, cutting of traditional 
routes of trade and investment. 
This mistrust, rivalry, isolation and fragmentation has several negative economic effects on Arab 
economies. The most obvious losses are coming from the loss of the regional trader role and the 
loss on the “economies of scale” that could be realized on a gigantic unified pan-Arab single 
market. The MENA is perfectly situated for (and was historically involved in) regional trade: 
between East and West, with long sea coasts and crossing trade routes it has a real potential to 
facilitate high scale trade. Also the market which it represents could be one of the biggest in the 
future as it already has more than 350 million inhabitants and could overtake even the EU in size 
if current demographic trends continue.
Summarizing our findings, we can approve the assumptions that the two greatest obstacles of 
economic growth in the MENA are domestically statism (especially the absence of SMEs) and 
externally the economic fragmentation of the region. Correcting these two shortcomings should 
be on top of the agenda for post-Arab Spring governments together with other initiatives like 
infrastructure building and institutional reforms if they want to meet their constituencies aims for 
better economic welfare and more just societies. However, this challenge is really a hard one and 
even if we are optimistic about the new governments’ capabilities we cannot assume that they are 
fully capable of delivering positive results alone. This is where a supportive EU could play a 
significant role in the MENA helping to solve both external and domestic obstacles for economic 
141 Adeel Malik  and Bassem Awadallah: The economics of the Arab Spring, CSAE Working Paper WPS/201123, 
December 2011
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progress and therefore gain legitimacy for asking reforms in other societal sectors as well. How 
this help could be carried out will be the focus area of the next subchapter.
3.2.2. The future of the ENP: should economic integration be the way forward?
As we already saw, most experts understand that the core question of the Arab upheavals lies in 
economic progress, or more precisely in the absence of it. Let’s identify the reasons once again 
why an effective economic response to the Arab Spring is the single most important task of both 
the EU and the MENA: "The real struggle for change in the Arab world will only begin when the 
dust  from  its  youth  revolutions  has  finally  settled  down.  After  emergency  laws  are  lifted, 
constitutions are drafted and elections are held, policymakers in the Middle East will be faced 
with  a  though  practical  challenge:  how  to  create  economic  opportunities  for  its  teeming 
millions?"142
But how could be this “though practical challenge” met? We already identified some of the main 
factors in the previous chapters and the EU also included the key elements needed for progress in 
the long list proposed as the review of the ENP. Here, once again we collect the most important 
steps: beyond infrastructure and institution building and the facilitation of “inclusive growth”, 
the re-unification of the fragmented regional economy and the diversification of the monolithic 
statist  domestic  economies  are  the key factors.  Most  of these can be regarded as  “domestic 
MENA issues”, but also all of them could be positively affected by appropriate external EU 
policies. How this external help could be singled out is the core issue of the current chapter.
Infrastructure and institution building needs financial and technical help from the EU. This is 
recognized  well  in  the  reform  plan  of  the  ENP,  which  promises  more  financial  aid  and 
development loans from the EIB and the EBRD, while offers several kinds of technical support 
for institution building as well. This we could label as the “short term answer”. More interesting 
is  however the prospect  of a long term solution which could offer  inclusive growth,  the re-
142Adeel Malik  and Bassem Awadallah: The economics of the Arab Spring, CSAE Working Paper WPS/201123, 
December 2011
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unification of the fragmented region and the diversification of domestic economies. These could 
be earned by promoting SMEs and job creation in the private sector, boosting investments and 
strengthen south-south economic ties and interactions. This could be a sustainable “long term 
answer”. In a sporadic way, all these short and long term options come up in EU communications 
which are dealing with the MENA’s economic prospects after the uprisings and propose:143
• Promote Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) and Job Creation
• Seek agreement of Member States to increase EIB lending by EUR 1 billion
• Work with other shareholders to extend the EBRD mandate to countries of the region
• Promote job creation and training
• Adopt Pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin
• Approve rapidly agreements on agricultural and fisheries products
• Speed up negotiations on trade in services
• Negotiate Deep Free Trade Areas
However progressive these proposals are, they clearly lack one thing: a comprehensive vision. 
One-by-one these steps represent only an incoherent and fragmented “group of policies”, and 
give no concrete picture of the future. Our main statement therefore in this chapter is that the EU 
has to go beyond these single policies and offer something more, namely an effective platform 
for regional economic integration. This should be understood both as the strengthening of south-
south integration (by “opening up” MENA states to each other) and as deepening economic ties 
with the EU in parallel.  
As  we  already mentioned  in  the  introductory  chapter  of  this  dissertation,  there  are  experts 
already advocating EU-MENA economic integration  and treating  it  as  the main  key to  EU-
MENA co-development and economic success. One example was Bruno Amoroso, who argues 
for economic co-development in the Mediterranean Basin with the active support of (at least) the 
southern EU-members and for a Mediterranean consensus on commodity specialization which 
should  be  developed  making  the  cooperation  and  coordination  of  these  industries  inter-
regional.144Another examples are Andre Sapir and Georg Zachman, who argue in favour of a bold 
143 Excerpts from: "A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, EC, 
March 2011
144Bruno Amoroso: On Globalization, Capitalism in the 21st century, Palgrave 1998
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initiative by the EU to frame economic reform strategies, notably by setting the objective of 
constituting by 2030 a vast Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA), which would draw 
inspiration from the existing European Economic Area (EEA) that  links  the EU to Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein. They imagine the EMEA as the world largest economic area unifying 
around 700 million people with controlled south-north circular migration which would solve 
several economic problems on both sides.145
If we put together the seven points of Amoroso’s proposed economic co-development and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area that Andre Sapir and Georg Zachman are advocating, we 
can  conclude  that  an  enhanced  level  of  EU-MENA economic  integration  would  be  highly 
desirable in the future. Also, in this dissertation we argued throughout chapter 2.3 (which dealt 
with EU-MENA economic interdependence) that trade, aid and FDI figures all support a deeper 
involvement of the EU in MENA economic issues, which could take form as a comprehensive 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA).
However, official EU communications never “go that far” to propose deep economic integration, 
we only see these “actions of approximation” that we already listed above. Still, in an unofficial  
Non-Paper from 2006 we find something extremely interesting: a proposal to “integrate even 
deeper, into a Neighbourhood Economic Community (NEC).” The argument is quite similar to 
what we used throughout the entire dissertation:146
“Deeper economic integration between the EU and its neighbors is a shared interest of all concerned. It is 
neither benevolence on the part of the EU, nor an imposition. It will be the result of our shared trade and  
economic  interests  and  complementarities  between  the  two  sides.  Fostering  greater  prosperity  will  be 
crucial not only for its own sake, but also to increase stability and security as well as to respond to a  
globalized economy......In the long term, the EU and ENP partners may decide to integrate even deeper, into 
a Neighbourhood Economic Community (NEC). A NEC would boost trade further among ENP partners via 
the elimination of  both tariffs  and non-tariff  barriers  and by establishing a minimum base of  common 
behind-the-border rules, thereby creating a common regulatory space. This would expand the size of the 
common market, stimulate growth in all ENP partners, and boost productivity through a better exploitation  
145Andre Sapir and Georg Zachman (2012): A European Mediterranean Economic Area to Kick-Start Economc 
Development, in: Egmont Papers Nr. 54, Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations
146NON – PAPER: EXPANDING ON THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNICATION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON “STRENGTHENING THE ENP”, EC,  2006
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of  economies  of  scale.  A NEC would  improve  business  climates  in  ENP countries  and  further  boost 
investment opportunities for all partners. It would also help the EU and its partners face the challenges and 
seize the opportunities of increased globalisation. A NEC’s effects would go beyond trade enhancement as it  
would also contribute, for example, to better consumer protection by improving sanitary and phytosanitary 
practice.”
This means that the EU recognized already in 2006 what we and other experts were arguing for,  
but the idea did not reach yet the official level of policy making. Call it Euro-Mediterranean 
Economic Area, Neighbourhood Economic Community or EMFTA, the message is the same: 
there should be a clear and comprehensive plan to form a deeper economic integration with the 
MENA and this should be implemented as the EU’s positive answer to the Arab Spring. Some 
positive  steps  forward  have  already happened,  and  there  is  now at  least  a  plan  to  develop 
(bilateral) Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs): "In the medium to long term, 
the common objective which has been agreed in both regional and bilateral discussions with 
Southern Mediterranean partners is the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Areas, building on the current Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans.” 147
This  is  an useful  idea,  but  in  our  opinion these DCFTAs do not  reflect  the  depth  of  Euro-
Mediterranean economic interdependence and a more ambitious, bold approach is needed. Going 
back to the idea of the Neighbourhood Economic Community could be a very good start, which 
could serve the elementary long-term needs both of the EU and the MENA.
3.2.3. Final conclusions: EU-MENA interdependence and economic co-development
Finally, we have to make a fair assessment of the current work and collect the main findings and 
ideas that aorse during this research. The work itself (without the introductory part) consist of 
four main separable items: interdependence-testing on the security and economic sectors forms 
the first two main issues and the case studies on the Arab Spring and the examination of the 
147Excerpt from: A PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY AND SHARED PROSPERITY WITH THE 
SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN, EC communication, 2011
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economic co-development possibilities forms the third and fourth.  Since we made a detailed 
assessment of all these issue areas one-by-one, now we are obligated to connect them logically 
and help the Reader understand why these for areas were chosen in our concept. Also, we have to 
summarize the findings of these separate areas to see how they complement each other and how 
they relate to the hypotheses of this dissertation.
The findings of the first two areas can be summarized in "one go". With the detailed examination 
of the five sectors of interdependence (military, political, societal, environmental and economic), 
we identified the strong interdependence in all sectors and concluded that this interdependence 
transforms  the  area  into  a  single  security  complex.  Moreover,  with  the  even  more  detailed 
examination  of  the  economic  sector  we  highlighted  that  this  interdependence  is  partially 
assymetrical and the EU has a clear advantage in the economic sector. With these findings we 
managed to prove the basic statemeents of our two hypotheses.
However, already here we have to complement our arguments with some side-findings. The most 
important  complementary  finding  here  is  that  the  EU  currently  can  not  use  effectively  its 
advantage in the economic sector. The hypotheses would be more accurate to state that within 
this five-thread complex network of interdependence the EU has a potential advantage in the area 
of economics, but how this potential is being used depends on several external variables. (Which 
variables are not the subject of the current work.)  The most important external variable is the 
current economic crisis of the EU which makes it inwards-focused and allows it only limited 
external acting capabilities. These limitations came to limelight during the Arab Spring in which 
the EU could have acted far more courageously and could have been much more proactive if the 
econommics "at home" would have been more comfortable. The other external variable is the 
young age of the EU's external policy institutional framework. Basically we can say that the 
Arab Spring was the first live-test of this framework and as a new and unexperienced system, it 
was determined to fail in some areas.
The  other  two  areas  of  research,  the  assessment  of  the  effects  of  the  Arab Spring  and  the 
possibility of economic co-development can be merged as well. With the short examination of 
four case studies, we have shown that the Arab Spring was triggered mainly by the economic 
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decline of the region and also that the current  "policy toolbox" of the EU does not provide 
effective answers to the deep-rooted problems of Arab economies. The historically developed 
statist and fragmented economic build-up of the MENA can not be effectively "healed" with the 
current short-termist and incoherent set of EU policies that are dealing with the region, therefore 
the redesign of these policies is highly dessirable. A much more courageous approach is needed 
with a coherent vision on the future of EU-MENA economic co-development.  Together with 
some other authors, we suggest that this vision should be a form of economic integration. These 
findings support the main statements of our hypotheses, which we consider now proven.
However, here again we have to complement our hypotheses with some very important side-
findings.  The first one is the neccesity of differentation. Especially the geograpical differentation 
between  the  Maghreb  and  Mashreq  sub-regions  is  crucial.  When  designing  a  new 
neighbourhood-agenda, EU officials should be aware of the fact that these two sub-regions are 
very different in their EU-dependence and that the Mashreq is far more EU-independent than the 
Maghreb. This should imply a difereniated approach towards these sub-regions and even raise 
the  issue of  differentiated institutional  frameworks.  Rather  than using  the  "one  size  fits  all" 
approach in future institution-building, a separate and narrower agenda could fit the Mashreq 
region better, while a more ambitious one ("everything except for institutions") fits the Maghreb. 
The  other  line  of  differentation  reflects  more  the  current  political  build-ups  of  the  partner 
countries and not the deep structural differences like the first one. Still this is important too as it  
provides a valuable insight to the short- and mid-term strategies that the EU could use in  the 
region. This differentation should be based on the state-forms of the partner countries, namely 
the monarchies and the "new democracies". New democracies -as we saw in the case studies 
chapter- are more open now to implement EU-advised reforms and the public opinion in these 
countries see the EU as a favourable partner who helped during the transitions. This implies that 
the  EU  can  now  act  and  communicate  more  boldly  with  these  countries  and  expect  more 
cooperation. In the case of the "surviving monarchies" the EU has now also a little bit more 
space to manouver because of the "Arab Spring pressure", but this space is still highly restricted 
and these countries need a more pragmatic and less direct way of communication.
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Finally,  we can conclude that -by upholding all  these complementary findings- we definitely 
suggest that in the light of the discovered interdependence patterns and economic shortcomings, 
the  most  promising  way forward  in  EU-MENA relations  is  the  deepening  of  the  economic 
cooperation.  The  MENA's  economic  EU-dependence  together  with  its  deepening  economic 
problems point to the direction that this vicious circle of degradation can be broken only by an 
external force and this role of  "economic interventor" fits only Europe.
This will be a slow gradual process with a lot of different backdrops and shortcomings but the 
goal should be never forgotten: namely that if the EU manages to open up MENA economies and 
re-integrates them first into the regional and later into the global ecoonmic "flow", then -and only 
then- will it be able to secure prosperity and stability in the regions at its immeddiate borders. 
And as we know exactly this is the main aim of the European Neighborhood Policy: "to develop 
a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood -'a ring of friends'- whith whom the EU enjoys 
close, peaceful and co-operative relations."148
148 Commission of the European Communities 2003. Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. 
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